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ABSTRACT  
 
In recent months there has been an increased interest in the potential for a wind 
power sector in South Africa. This is in response to broader climate change 
commitments by government and the potential inclusion of Independent power 
producers (IPP) in the South African generation capacity. In support of this the 
government has set policies that indicate their support for the inclusion of 
renewable energy into the mix. However, this policy does not send a clear signal 
of certainty to investors especially with regard to the implementation. The thesis 
set out to review how investors and financiers have responded to these signals 
and how they set the cost and availability of project funding based off the 
uncertainty due to the gaps in the enabling environment. The thesis combined a 
review of international best practises sourced from the relevant literature sources, 
and grounded with the opinions of the potential investors and financiers that are 
looking to commit funds to the market.  
 
The cost and availability of project funds are set and communicated through the 
set of key financing terms and variables financiers and investors extend a project. 
In South Africa the ranges of these variables expressed through the exploratory 
interviews were more restrictive than those ranges that are typically seen 
internationally (as sourced by the literature). This is attributed to the large degree 
of uncertainty in the enabling environment and the global financial crisis. 
However there is an overwhelming support invest and finance these projects and 
it is the definition of the policy and associate regulatory enabling environment that 
is key to secure this investment. 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1. CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. AREA OF STUDY/OBJECTIVE 
 
The thesis’ objective is to determine the availability and cost of project funding for 
IPP, project financed, wind power projects in South Africa. Key to establishing 
this is to understand how investors and financiers set their availability and cost of 
project funds and what factors influence this determination process. To meet this 
objective the area of study will cover the topics relevant to development, 
investment and financing of IPP, project financed wind power projects globally 
and in South Africa. The theory will detail the actual mechanics behind the 
investing and financing decisions and how these mechanisms are manipulated in 
response to uncertainties and risks in the enabling environment. These investing 
and financing decisions will determine the eventual availability and cost of project 
funds which will provide insight into the current financing landscape in the South 
African wind market. 
 
 
2.        Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
1.2. BACKGROUND TO STUDY 
 
There has been a recent surge in interest around the development of wind power 
in South Africa. The country is in a situation where it desperately needs more 
generation capacity to meet current and forecasted demand. Currently this 
demand figure sits at 250TWh which is supplied by an installed capacity of 44GW 
(van der Merwe [1], 2009). This demand is expected to grow significantly over the 
next few years as the country struggles to set the enabling environment to 
achieve economic growth targets 6% in 2014 (Wikipedia, 2009. Economy of 
South Africa. [Online] 10 December 2009; and van der Merwe [1], 2009). The 
economic growth will not come without a larger cost to the environment as South 
Africa is already placed globally in the top 25 emitters of green house gases 
(GHG), which can only be expected to grow in the absence of important steps to 
a new, cleaner modern energy mix (WRI, CAIT, 2009). In line with this, a letter to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the 
Environmental Affairs DDG Alf Wills said, "South Africa reiterates that it will take 
nationally appropriate mitigation action to enable a 34% deviation below the 
‘business as usual' emissions growth trajectory by 2020, and a 42% deviation 
below the ‘business as usual' trajectory by 2025," (van der Merwe [3], 2010). 
Wind power can play an important role in not only achieving these CO2 reduction 
targets but as part of the solution for electricity capacity building to fuel the 
economic growth targets. 
 
The potential for wind power in South Africa was published off the back of an 
analysis done by Mainstream Renewable Power South Africa (MRPSA). The 
results revealed that, to date Eskom, the wholly state-owned utility, has received 
over 10,500 MW of applications for grid connection from wind power projects due 
to the REFIT and supporting signals.  
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Furthermore, it is argued that 5%, 5GW or 13TWh of the country’s current 
electricity demand could come from wind power to be installed over the next 5 
years. Further sources support these findings as AfriWEA claims that Eskom has 
received 3600MW of wind generated power and Promethium Carbon claims that 
6000MW of applications have been received for wind generated power (Berry, 
2009; and van Oerle, 2009). The MRPSA analysis indicated that 25% of the 
country’s electricity demand could be met by wind power by 2025 (van der 
Merwe, [1] (2009). These numbers suggest the potential for wind power in the 
country and demonstrate the significant reaction from private investment in 
response to signals in the enabling environment. 
 
This vast wind energy potential is set against a series of policy objectives and 
regulatory steps. The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME, or the 
Department of Energy, DoE, as it is known now) published the Renewable 
Energy White Paper, 2003. This policy document set the clear target of: 
 
“10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced mainly from biomass, wind, solar 
and small-scale hydro.” 
    (Department of Minerals and Energy [1], 2003) 
 
The purpose of this target was to facilitate the integration of renewable energies 
into the mainstream energy economy or in other words, “to give a much needed 
thrust to renewable energy” (Department of Minerals and Energy [1], 2003). In 
light of this communicated target the National Energy Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA) released the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) in two phases 
with the aim to, “create an enabling environment for achieving Government’s 
10,000 GWh renewable energy target by 2013 and sustaining growth beyond the 
target” (Nersa [1], 2009).  
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Some further points in the background leading up to the REFIT in the creation of 
a wind market in South Africa are summarised in the points below: 
 
- 2003: Eskom Demonstration Plant: Klipheuwel Wind Farm 
- 2005: South African Wind Energy Programme (SAWEP) established by 
the DME 
- 2008: The Darling Wind Farm, Commissioned 
- 2009: Eskom is advanced in the planning of their first big scale wind farm, 
which was ultimately delayed. 
- 2009: Declaration of intent for cooperation on renewable energies 
between the SA Government and the Kingdom of Denmark 
- 2008/9: RisØ Institute initiative to compile a wind atlas for South Africa 
 
The above signals have set the stage for wind power industry and attracted the 
attention of Government, investors and financiers.  
 
The ownership option and financing structures that are most likely to shape this 
industry are Independent Power Producers employing a project finance structure. 
The Department of Energy (DoE) has made provision for 1100 MW of IPP 
projects under the first integrated resource plan (IRP1) over the next 3 years 
(Department of Minerals and Energy [3], 2009). Apart of this 1100MW will be 
500MW of wind power. These wind power IPP’s are likely to use project finance 
which, according to the literature reviewed, has typically been a popular structure 
for developing wind farms internationally in both developed and developing 
markets. South African IPP's will most likely use project finance to safeguard 
their balance sheet from the projects risks inherent in the Greenfield nature of 
investing in wind power projects in South Africa. This view point was supported in 
the exploratory interviews and this evidence is presented under section 3.4 in 
Chapter 3. 
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An exploratory review of the project financed, IPP wind power projects will now 
be developed throughout the thesis guided by the below key research questions. 
 
1.3. KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
This research paper aims to determine the availability and cost of project funds in 
South Africa for utility scale wind power projects and then to determine how the 
level of perceived risk and uncertainty that important potential financiers, 
investors and developers see in this specific market influence their investing and 
financing decisions. In order to determine this perceived uncertainty the research 
will endeavour to establish how the set of key financing terms and variables 
selected by financiers and investors communicate their perceived level of 
uncertainty. In other words the research will analyse how these key financing 
terms and variables are altered in response to an increase or decrease in 
perceived project uncertainty or risk. The following set of key research questions 
will be the framework under which the above topic will be explored. 
 
What are the policy objectives and the associated Regulatory Framework 
that pertains to the development of a wind power market in South Africa?  
 
The wind sector’s enabling environment is developed through the mesh of policy, 
legislation and regulations that define the mechanisms, roles and responsibilities 
of those entities involved. The private players require a steady policy objective 
and an associated defined regulatory framework, under which they can realise 
returns, allocate risks and maximise project value.  
 
In order for this to happen the public players need to be unambiguous about what 
their targets are and make sure they support the requirement’s of the private 
players in order to achieve these targets in the nation’s best interests.  
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The question sets the context, under which a review of the South African’s 
Government’s, and the associated public players, set of policy objectives and 
implementing regulatory signals that have been communicated to the private 
market and the rest of the thesis will analyse how the private investment and 
finance have reacted to these signals and why. 
 
What gaps exist in the enabling environment for wind power projects in 
South Africa? 
 
This question essentially addresses the how the enabling framework that has 
been set so far creates barriers or uncertainties for investors in the form of 
regulatory risks. This question does not intend to list an exhaustive set of the 
exact barriers and uncertainties that still exist in the South African wind power 
project market as this is changing everyday and each financier and investor will 
face different barriers. Rather the intention of this question is to highlight the 
predominant uncertainties and sources of blockages to facilitate financing and 
investment and how the private players will react to these broader uncertainties, 
why and how will they communicate this through the cost and availability of their 
funds. 
 
What is the predominant financing structure and ownership option for 
utility scale wind power plants globally and in South Africa? 
 
This question will support the selection of project financing under and an IPP 
ownership that is expected to be the predominant structure for the development 
of wind power plants in South Africa in the early stages of the market’s 
development.  
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Before the thesis focuses entirely on IPP project finance the predominant 
ownership options and financing structures will be discussed in order to 
understand the choices that investors must make on the structure under which 
they will develop the project and how this will influence the financier’s decisions. 
 
Who are the financiers and investors that have chosen to invest in 
response to the signals in the enabling environment? 
 
Through answering this question the research will be able to identify the key 
potential players that will extend funds, in terms of debt and equity, to utility scale 
wind power plants in South Africa. This will serve the dual purpose of firstly, 
determining the potential sources of funds and how serious these entities are in 
committing funds to projects of this nature. Secondly, from this investigation the 
list of interviewees can be identified. 
 
What project uncertainties and risks stand out to financiers and investors 
to the South African wind energy market? 
 
This question will highlight the key risks that exist in the market at the time of the 
exploratory interviews were conducted. With these risks identified and explained 
the effect on the key financing terms and variables can be explored. 
 
What are the ranges of key financing variables for project financing utility 
scale wind farms in South Africa? 
 
The outcome of this question will provide the set of key financing terms and 
variables for South African utility scale wind farms which can then be analysed to 
make conclusions as to how these variables and terms reflect the perceived risks 
as identified from the question above.  
 
8.        Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
How does this range reflect the perceived level of uncertainty 
financiers/investors see in the South African wind energy market? 
 
The above set of questions will set the framework for the analysis of this question 
to determine the feasibility of a wind power market in South Africa from a funding 
perspective. In other words, is there capital and debt available for wind power 
project development in South Africa and if so, will these funds be offered on 
terms that will yield feasible projects? 
 
What is the impact of uncertainty in the enabling environment on the 
availability and cost of project funds? 
 
This will allow the paper to demonstrate how the uncertainty and risks that are 
apparent in South African enabling environment will affect the availability and 
cost of funds for wind power project development in South Africa.  
 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
 
The methodology pursued was in accordance for the purpose of the research 
and builds off the similar methodology employed by Sabine Raab, 2009, in her 
MBA thesis titled “Wind Energy Developments in South Africa: A Delineation and 
Analysis of Barriers and Obstacles”. 
 
1.4.1. COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE 
 
The research methodology of this paper started with a review of international 
literature on the financing structures and ownership options that have and will 
underpin the development of large scale infrastructure projects, and more 
specifically, utility scale wind farms worldwide.  
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The influence of political, regulatory, economic and social factors on the 
perceived risk exposure behind these projects was explored with the purpose of 
understanding the eventual impact on the set of key financing terms and 
variables. Before this, project finance literature was explored to investigate which 
key financing terms and variables are most commonly used within the framework 
of these projects. This approach was adopted to delineate the boundaries of the 
area of focus and guide the set of questions that were used to develop the set of 
questions used in the qualitative exploratory interviews that are explained below. 
 
1.4.2. PRIMARY RESEARCH: QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
 
The review of literature provided a baseline on the concepts and structures 
employed historically in other countries that have seen the development of a wind 
energy market. Many of the concepts identified throughout the literature sources 
guided the pre-defined questions that were used to guide the informal and open 
interviews. The majority of the exploratory interviews were carried out in a face to 
face discussion and guided by pre-defined questions based off the literature, with 
few done via the telephone such as those based outside of South Africa.  
 
This qualitative approach is called an exploratory interview as defined by 
Oppenheim, 1992, cited in Raab, 2008. The format an exploratory interview 
follows is to place the interviewee in an atmosphere similar to that of a normal 
conversation where open questions are asked in combination with questions 
based in fact to establish the interviewee’s own opinion around the area of 
predefined interest (Oppenheim, 1992, as cited in Raab, 2008).  
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This research approach was appropriate for the purpose it was intended for as 
the objective of the analysis was to gain the key decision maker’s, of the 
financiers’ and investors’ organisations, specific opinions on the policy objectives, 
institutional framework and level of risk exposure they perceived in committing 
funds to a utility scale wind power plant in South Africa and how they would 
reflect this through the key financing terms and variables. 
 
The people targeted for exploratory interviews were the key decision makers or 
people with significant influence to afford debt, equity and development skills to 
the development of wind power plants in South Africa. Consequently, both local 
and international commercial banks were engaged and individuals with focus on 
energy, utilities and infrastructure finance were targeted. Secondly, potential 
investors that are looking to commit local and foreign equity into wind power 
projects were engaged. Thirdly, the people who are responsible for infrastructure 
development activities of certain organisation such as local and foreign energy 
companies were approached. Lastly, industry experts in the financing of 
infrastructure and more specifically energy projects worldwide and in South Africa 
were interviewed. These people offered the right combination of specific 
knowledge on the topics of financing, investing and developing utility scale wind 
farms in South Africa, and the energy finance experts who could offer a more 
holistic viewpoint of financing landscape. A list of the people interviewed is 
included in the Table 1 but please note names of individuals are only included if 
permission was given. The insights and opinions offered by the interviewees can 
be found dispersed throughout the report and these usually follow from concepts 
established from the literature. 
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Table 1: List of Interviewees 
INTERVIEWEE POSITION ORGANISATION 
Domestic Commercial Banks 
Omar Vajeth Power and Energy Absa Capital Investment 
Banking Division 
Paul Eardley-Taylor Director of Investment 
Banking Coverage and 
head of Energy, Utilities 
and Infrastructure in 
South Africa and Africa 
Standard Bank 
Jonathan Muller Energy Project Finance Nedbank Capital 
Amith Singh Energy Project Finance Nedbank Capital 
Tommie Potgieter Capital Markets Investec Capital Markets 
International Commercial Banks 
Industry Participant Energy and 
Commodities, Structured 
Debt 
BNP Paribas 
Equity Investors  
Barry O’Flynn Regional Manager Mainstream Renewable 
Power 
Alasdair Maclay Infrastructure Actis 
Development Finance Institutions 
Youssef Arfaoui, Energy Expert from the 
Private Sector 
Department, OPSM 
African Development 
Bank and the African 
Development Fund 
Fatima Collins Business Development 
Specialist 
Renewable Energy 
Market Transformation 
Project Implementation 
Support Unit (REMT 
ISU). Development Bank 
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of South Africa (DBSA) 
Industry Experts/Research Institutes 
Francois Viljoen Director Cresco Project Finance 
Chris Greenwood Head of Research New Energy Finance 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
1.5. DISCLAIMER 
 
Please note that the opinions and reference to key financing terms and variables 
by interviewees in this report are by no means final or legally binding to the 
interviewees or the organisations they represent but rather offer insight into the 
response of funders to the current level of perceived risk. Any content in this 
regard was made in the absence of any real project but rather a general set of 
requirements and key financing terms and variables that could potentially apply 
to South Africa. 
 
1.6. LAYOUT OF THE THESIS 
 
1.6.1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter one will introduce the area of study/objective of the research and set the 
background for the research. The methodology and layout of the report will then 
be introduced and explained. 
1.6.2. CHAPTER 2 SOUTH AFRICAN WIND ENERGY: 
REGULATION, LEGISLATION AND BARRIERS TO 
FINANCE 
 
The chapter will highlight the policy, legislative and regulatory steps that have 
been taken that are relevant to project financed, IPP wind power projects in 
South Africa.  
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It will discuss where there are gaps in this framework, as it is these gaps that 
serve as uncertainties to potential investors and financiers. The core discussion 
of this thesis aims to understand financiers and investor’s response to these 
uncertainties in their determination of the availability and cost of their project 
funds. So this chapter will serve to highlight these uncertainties in South Africa in 
order to contextualise the rest of the thesis. This chapter does not serve as a 
comprehensive list of the barriers to private wind power project development in 
South Africa but rather to present some of the uncertainties so that the financier’s 
and investor’s response can be discussed in the presence of these uncertainties.  
 
1.6.3. CHAPTER 3: FINANCING STRUCTURES AND 
OWNERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
Chapter 3 will explore some of the investing and financing decisions that the 
private players will have to make with particular focus on the financing structures 
and ownership options that have commonly been employed in the financing and 
development of utility scale wind power plants. The chapter will cover project 
financing, corporate financing and government financing and explain how the 
ownership options of non-utility generator (NUG), investor owned utility (IOU) and 
a public owned utility (POU) interact with these financing structures. The specific 
advantages and disadvantages of each structure and option will be outlined and 
the associated risk allocation and perception to financier and investors to this risk 
allocation is analysed with specific to how these affect the set of key financing 
terms and variables of funders to these projects. Lastly, the chapter will analyse 
literally sources and information from the qualitative interviews to explore the 
most applicable form of financing and ownership option that will be common for 
the development of utility scale wind power plants in South Africa. 
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1.6.4. CHAPTER 4: PROJECT FINANCING 
 
The main purpose of Chapter 4 is to introduce the concept of a project financing 
after its suitability to wind power development is established in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 will then unpack some of the elements of this structure that make it 
applicable to utility-scale wind power plant financing. These elements are firstly, a 
brief introduction and analysis of the structures main advantages and 
disadvantages. Secondly, the main project participants and the set of complex 
contractual documentation will be identified with an explanation on how the 
documentation connects the SPV to the different project participants. It is 
Chapter 7 that will develop on this concept to explain the risk allocation under 
these contractual agreements. Lastly, the chapter will introduce the contractual 
documentation framework that form the legal foundation on which South African 
utility scale wind farms will be developed and some of the key players or partners 
in this process are identified. 
 
1.6.5. CHAPTER 5: KEY FINANCING TERMS AND VARIABLES 
 
This chapter will deal with each key financing terms and variable by firstly 
introducing each one and discussing how financiers and investors manipulate 
these in response to the perceived level of uncertainties and risks in a particular 
project or market. This will then make it possible to determine the reaction of 
private entities to the public player’s policy and regulatory signals. This will be 
followed by an illustration of some of the tolerances as reflected in the literature 
and the qualitative interviews to facilitate the comparison of the key financing 
terms and variables that are currently valid for South Africa against those 
researched from the global literature. This comparison only serves as a rough 
indication as to how funders currently perceive their risk exposure in South Africa 
in the absence of defined project risks.  
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This is set against the context of researched key financing terms and variables, 
to determine how the risk appetite for South African project financed wind farms 
compares with the levels identified in the literature. 
 
1.6.6. CHAPTER 6: PROJECT DEVELOPMENT AND SOURCES 
OF FINANCING 
 
Chapter 6 will cover the two broad topics of firstly, defining the project 
development phases of utility scale wind farms and secondly, identifying the 
different types of financiers and investors, private players, that extend funding to 
a project financed wind power project. Furthermore, the chapter will explore 
which project development phase these sources of funding entities enter the 
project and on what premises, and indicate how each source of funding has its 
own drivers and interests that will shape their risk appetite which will eventually 
be reflected through their key financing variables as was discussed in Chapter 5. 
Lastly, the Chapter will introduce some of the predominant players in the funding 
of utility-scale wind farms in South Africa broken down into commercial banks, 
equity investors and development finance institutions (DFI). 
 
1.6.7. CHAPTER 7: PROJECT RISKS AND RISK ALLOCATION 
 
Chapter 6 identified the project development phases and the types of 
financiers/investors that are active in each of these development phases. 
Chapter 7 aims to demonstrate how each financier is exposed to risk through 
identifying the key broad project risk categories that are typical for a project 
financed, utility scale wind farm project as identified by the literature and from the 
point of view of potential investors and financiers in South Africa. Then, by 
indicating in which of the project development phases that these project risks will 
be apparent these risks can be matched to the project participant which will 
usually be responsible for the risk. 
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If these project risks are then unallocated, then the SPV and ultimately its 
financiers and investors will bear this residual risk, so this chapter will highlight 
which type of financier/investor will ultimately bear the residual risks through 
comparing the project phase where the risk is apparent and against the type of 
financiers/investors that are active in that phase and exposed to the adverse 
outcome of each project risk.  
 
Finally, the chapter will explore how these project risks are allocated through the 
project documentation and risk mitigation instrument away from the SPV to the 
different project participants according to the guiding principle of risk allocation. 
This will indicate where financiers and investors are exposed to risk in the 
development of a wind power project and the important role that both internal and 
external factors can influence the cost and availability of project funding. 
 
1.6.8. CHAPTER 8: AVAILABILITY AND COST OF WIND 
POWER PROJECT FUNDING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Finally, Chapter 8 will detail the broad and specific conclusions and key findings 
from the thesis that has used a combination of literature sources in the area of 
infrastructure finance and qualitative exploratory interviews with identified key 
players to gather information and make conclusions on the research questions, 
defined in Chapter 1. The findings will be used to answer the key research 
questions such as the impact of uncertainty on the availability of project finance 
and the focus on project finance structure under and IPP ownership. Furthermore, 
the main investors and financiers that are either actively involved or potential 
private participants in the South African wind market are identified with the 
project risks that stand out in the South African context outlined and how these 
private participants would like to see these project managed detailed.  
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Finally the key financing terms and variables that capture the broad risk 
categories of country and the wind energy sector are detailed and the appetite to 
extend funds to wind power plant projects in South Africa is explained through a 
review of these communicated key financing terms and variables.  
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2. CHAPTER 2: FINANCING STRUCTURES AND ONWERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
SOUTH AFRICAN WIND ENERGY: REGULATION, 
LEGISLATION AND BARRIERS TO FINANCE 
 
The chapter will highlight the policy, legislative and regulatory steps that have 
been taken that are relevant to project financed, IPP wind power projects in 
South Africa. It will discuss where there are gaps in this framework, as it is these 
gaps that serve as uncertainties to potential investors and financiers. The core 
discussion of this thesis aims to understand financiers and investor’s response to 
these uncertainties in their determination of the availability and cost of their 
project funds. So this chapter will serve to highlight these uncertainties in South 
Africa in order to contextualise the rest of the thesis. This chapter does not serve 
as a comprehensive list of the barriers to private wind power project development 
in South Africa but rather to present some of the uncertainties so that the 
financier’s and investor’s response can be discussed in the presence of these 
uncertainties.  
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The importance of setting a clear enabling environment in order to attract private 
investment is illustrated in the quote, “Red tape and lack of well-structured 
projects, rather than external funding crimped by the global downturn, are the 
main hurdles to boosting capacity in Africa's power sector” (Reuters, 2010). This 
was communicated by a group of Southern Africa interested financiers, of which, 
David Donaldson, a senior manager for infrastructure at the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) explained that, “The problem isn't finance and never was ... if 
you have a decent, bankable project in the power sector in Africa, you will be 
able to get the finance" (Reuters, 2010). He continued to explain that the problem 
is in fact that many African countries have not put the enabling regulatory 
frameworks in place that will elicit a significant response from the private 
investment players (Reuters, 2010). In other words it is in response to the level of 
certainty in the enabling environment that the private finance community will 
make decisions as to whether to commit funds; to what degree; at what cost; and 
what sets of requirements they will have. 
 
The chapter will now introduce the policy objectives, legislation and regulatory 
situation in the South Africa wind energy sector in order to highlight some of the 
main gaps in this enabling environment. 
 
2.1. SOUTH AFRICAN POLICY AND INSITUTIONAL KEY 
PLAYERS 
 
An important part of the enabling environment is the different entities that shape 
this environment. Vincent Baslé, the head of EDF's strategy and development 
insular power systems unit, gives a clear indication as to how these entities 
should be organised in South Africa, “Government should set the social criteria 
and the global policy; the systems operator, or ISO, would ensure that it 
contracted only with technically feasible entities [or IPP’s] able to meet that 
criteria; while the regulator would play the role of "referee", while ensuring that 
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the tariff structure was fair and viable” (Creamer [8], 2010). This explanation 
serves as a hypothetical situation where there is a clear distinction and definition 
of roles and responsibilities for Government, a system operator, IPP’s and a 
regulator. However, in South Africa these roles and responsibility are somewhat 
blurred between the South African Government and the Department of energy 
(DOE); NERSA; and Eskom. These entities are briefly introduced below. 
 
The DOE is a Governmental ministry headed by the South African Minister of 
Energy, Dipuo Peters, with the mandate to determine policy, make regulations 
and promote the energy sector for the benefit of the country. With respect to wind 
power the DOE created the South African Wind Energy Programme (SAWEP) in 
2005 with the goal to support the development of wind power in South Africa. A 
part of the DOE’s responsibilities is the oversight of NERSA which is the 
regulatory authority established in terms of Section 3 of the National Energy 
Regulator Act, 2004 (Act No. 40 of 2004). NERSA’s mandate is to regulate the 
electricity, piped-gas and petroleum pipeline industries in terms of the Electricity 
Regulation Act, 2006 and thereby implement the specific regulation for the 
broader policy objectives of the Government (Act No. 4 of 2006).  
 
Eskom, the wholly state-owned utility plays multiple roles in a wind power market. 
Firstly, it is a generator, and hence potential competition to IPP’s, as it provides 
roughly 95% of the country’s generation. Secondly, it is the system operator as it 
owns the transmission network. Thirdly, Eskom stands as the off taker for 
potential IPP’s through the mechanism of the Single Buyer’s Office as mandated 
by NERSA under the REFIT (Nersa [1], 2009). These multiple roles of Eskom, 
and the lack of a clearly defined mandate, only serve to create additional 
uncertainty for potential investor and financiers as it becomes unclear as to 
where Eskom’s influence begins and ends. A further effect of these multiple roles 
are that it places Eskom in a position of significant influence within the sector.  
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This means that Eskom’s opinion can seriously influence the content of the 
sector. As Eskom is the system operator that is responsible, in consultation with 
the energy planner and the regulator, for the integrated resource plan 
development process their opinion on technologies like wind power are crucial to 
their inclusion in the integrated resource planning process (Government Notice 
No. 9116, 5 August 2009). In a time where Eskom’s main goal is to add crucial 
generation capacity to the ageing fleet of power stations, they are relying on 
trusted technologies such as coal to ensure that they fill the supply gap. This 
commitment is evident in the IRP1 with the large capacity additions of Medupi 
and Kusile coal fired power stations in contrast to the limited commitment to wind 
power. Eskom’s position for influence and their preference for traditional 
technologies create uncertainties to investors and financiers as to the whether 
they will use this position to create further barriers for wind power in the enabling 
environment. 
 
2.2. SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATION RELEVANT TO WIND 
ENERGY 
 
Table 2, below, illustrates the current policy, legislative and regulatory documents 
relevant to the framework for IPP wind power projects. 
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Table 2: Legislation Framework Relevant to the South African Wind Market 
 
Legislation Date Responsible 
White Paper on the Energy Policy of the 
Republic of South Africa 
 
12/1998 Department of Energy 
White Paper on Renewable Energy 
 
 
11/2003 Department of Energy 
National Energy Regulator Act, Act no. 
40 
 
2004 Department of Energy 
Eskom Multi-Year Price Determination 
(MYPD 1) 
 
02/2006 NERSA 
Electricity Regulation Act, Act no. 4 
 
 
5/07/2006 Department of Energy 
Electricity Regulations On New 
Generation Capacity (under 35(4) of 
Electricity Regulation Act, 2006) 
05/08/2009 Department of Energy 
NERSA Consultation Paper: Renewable 
Energy Feed-in Tariff Phase I 
 
12/2008 NERSA 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Phase 
I 
 
31/03/2009 NERSA 
NERSA Consultation Paper: Renewable 
Energy Feed-in Tariff Phase II (Included 
a proposed PPA for comment) 
07/2009 NERSA 
Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff Phase 
II 
 
02/11/2009 NERSA 
IRP1: Determination Regarding The 
Integrated Resource Plan and New 
Generation Capacity 
31/12/2009 Department of Energy 
Proposed Revenue Application Multi-
Year Price Determination 2010/11 to 
2012/13 (MYPD2) 
30/09/2009 ESKOM 
Revised Eskom Revenue Application 
MYPD 2: 2010/11 to 2012/13 (NERSA 
decision scheduled for 24/02/2010) 
30/11/2009 ESKOM 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
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The White Paper on Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa (Department of 
Minerals and Energy [2], 1998) was introduced by the DOE (then the DME) in 
order to set the policy framework for the electricity sector and the energy sector 
as a whole. The white paper made provision for increased competition in the 
electricity generation sector through the inclusion of IPP’s; an Independent 
System Operator (ISO) and an independent regulator. Importantly, this document 
also discussed the inclusion of renewable energies into the energy mix of the 
country. However, this reform process was eventually abandoned in 2004 by the 
Government and Eskom’s already dominant role was reaffirmed however the 
vague commitment to renewable was not. While the policy commitment to the 
inclusion of IPP’s was never formally abandoned there was no enabling 
legislation or regulation to actually implement this inclusion, and the DOE’s 
attempt to include IPP’s in 2000 had failed due to this. So while the policy makers 
paid lip service to the inclusion IPP’s they did not provide the enabling 
environment to allow this inclusion to happen. 
 
In 2003 the White Paper on Renewable Energy the DOE set the target of 10 000 
GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable energy contribution to final energy consumption by 
2013. This target was unclear from two perspectives: firstly, how would the target 
be met in terms of technologies, incentives and sectors; and secondly, how 
would the target be calculated i.e. would it be the total renewable energy 
generated in 2013 or would it be cumulative from 2003 to 2013? The DOE fuelled 
this uncertainty as they switched between these definitions. However, the target 
did create some political momentum: it was in response to this policy target that 
NERSA justified the creation of the REFIT. The white paper set a target with very 
little context under which this target could be achieved. The result of this is 
increased level of uncertainty as to the Government’s exact electricity policy 
objectives. Which raises the question for investors and financiers of whether 
there is a future for IPP’s and wind power in the South African electricity sector, 
and if there is what does this future look like? 
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The first attempt to offer a plausible incentive for private renewable energy 
generation came in the form of a feed in tariff. NERSA established the 
Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff (REFIT), Phase I and II, which set a tariff of 
R1.25/kWh over 20 years for qualifying IPP’s (Nersa [1], 2009). However, the sub 
mechanisms required to actually deliver this incentive are still missing. The 
commitment to a set tariff over a fixed period was the first clear signal offered to 
potential investors and financiers. Although this favourable tariff enticed the 
interest of potential investors it currently still lacks the clarity to get investors to 
actually invest and to deliver the REFIT to IPP’s.  
 
The next step was the August regulations consisting of the Government Notice 
for Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity, the IRP1 and the 
selection criteria for IPP’s. These regulations created two new sources of 
uncertainties to investors and financiers: firstly, uncertainty around the apparent 
tender process for the selection of wind power under the IRP1; and secondly, 
uncertainty as to the apparent incompatibility of NERSA’s and the DOE’s 
objectives. In the first instance, the IRP process gives NERSA the mandate to 
license only what is in the IRP and nothing more. Feed in tariffs should usually 
accept all qualifying projects however the DOE redefined this by imposing a 
process on the REFIT with all the hallmarks of a tender process such as a limited 
amount of MWs based on a set of selection criteria. The uncertainty to investors 
and financiers arises as under this tender-like process they need to commit early 
project development funds to get the project to a point where they meet the 
qualifying criteria for the REFIT. However, there is no certainty as to whether the 
project will actually meet the qualifying criteria and even if it does it may be 
turned down due to the limited capacity. So this creates uncertainty as to whether 
they will recoup their project development funds which creates a barrier to 
investment. In the second instance, it appears that the DOE’s and NERSA’s 
policy objectives are incompatible as the framework for the IRP seems to 
contradict that of the REFIT.  
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So the main points of uncertainties in the enabling environment which serve to 
reduce the availability and cost of capital are: the lack of an overall guiding policy 
for the electricity sector; the apparent contradiction in objectives of NERSA and 
DOE; the unclear set of legislation and regulations; and the multiple roles of 
Eskom. These broader uncertainties set the context for more specific 
uncertainties outlined below. 
2.3. OUTSTANDING REGULATORY UNCERTAINTIES 
 
Under the above main points of uncertainty there are a host of more specific 
sources of uncertainty. Mainstream Renewable Energy CEO, Dr Eddie O' Connor, 
offers some insight into this in saying, “The two major requests from wind-energy 
developers seeking to develop projects in South Africa, were: clear transparent 
rules for access to the national electricity grids; and clarity on who would pay for 
the electricity generated by IPP’s” (van der Merwe, C. [2], 2010). This is but one 
example of the uncertainties that are perceived by potential providers of funds to 
the South African wind power industry and the reaction to this uncertainty is 
made clear in the statement, “If we have to wait too long, we will go elsewhere 
where we are welcome" (O’Conner as cited in van der Merwe, C. [2], 2010). This 
is an example of how regulatory inaction can cause an adverse investment 
environment and limit the availability of private funds from investing in South 
Africa.  
 
The main regulatory uncertainties that were raised in the exploratory interviews 
are listed below:  
 
- A clear counter party needs to be identified as an independent system and 
market operator (ISMO) separate from ESKOM; 
- The responsibilities and mandate of the off taker must be set; 
- A workable set of project documentation needs to be put in place to 
access the REFIT such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), 
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Standardised Direct Agreement, Transmission Connection Agreement 
(TCA), and Transmission Use of System Agreement (TUOSA); 
- The transparent grid connection process needs to be set; 
- The transparent and defined IPP bidding process, with a clear set of 
qualifying criteria needs to be documented and nominated implementing 
parties need to honour this bidding process. 
 
The distinction between uncertainty and risk is explored in detail Chapter 7 but 
risks differ to uncertainty through a greater degree of predictability. The above set 
of barriers are by no means exhaustive set of outstanding problems in the 
enabling environment, they act as outstanding uncertainties that have not been 
defined into a set of well understood risks with predictable outcomes. This thesis 
will show how these uncertainties serve to make the financing and investment 
funds for IPP-owned, project financed wind power plants, limited and more costly. 
The overall perverse effects will be limited availability of already limited private 
investment capital and debt and any access to these funds becoming with more 
costly key financing terms and variables. The concepts of IPP, project finance 
and the sensitivity to the enabling environment then sets the context to review the 
theory on private financing of wind power plants, the typical structure of project 
financed infrastructure projects and the important role that project risks play in 
determining the key financing terms and variables or cost of project funds. 
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3. CHAPTER 3: FINANCING STRUCTURES AND ONWERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
FINANCING STRUCTURES AND OWNERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
This chapter deals with the investing and financing decisions that must be made 
by private entities when considering investing in the South African wind power 
market; with specific focus on the financing structures and ownership options that 
underpin the financing and development, respectively, of utility scale wind power 
plants. The discussion will explore project financing, corporate financing and 
government financing in turn and explain and how the ownership options of non-
utility generator (NUG), investor owned utility (IOU) and a public owned utility 
(POU) subscribe to each option. Each of these structures and options have 
associated advantages and disadvantages in terms of risk allocation and 
perception and the discussion will explore how these affect the set of key 
financing terms and variables of funders to these projects. Lastly, the chapter will 
analyse literally sources and information from the qualitative interviews to 
illustrate that a project financed structure under a private IPP ownership option 
will be the most applicable form of financing and ownership option for the 
Greenfield development of utility scale wind power plants in South Africa.  
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This is not to say that other structures will be excluded from the market, but 
rather the focus of this thesis will be IPP, project finance, as for example Eskom, 
a POU, has committed to developing 100MW wind farm in the Western Cape 
called, SERE or Koekenaap in 2010. However, as Eskom is struggling to raise 
the R400 billion price tag for its capital expansion plan, their contribution to the 
wind industry will be limited. 
 
3.1. FINANCING STRUCTURES AND OWNERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
Renewable energy projects such as wind power projects are characterised by a 
high initial capital outlay, before any incomes are secured and low rates of 
returns and in comparison to other competing more traditional technologies 
investors and financier revere these projects as higher risk (Sonnetag-O’Brien 
and Usher, 2004). In developing countries this is especially the case as the 
inclusion of country risk makes access to finance particularly difficult without the 
inclusion of guarantees, targeted subsidies and support from host governments, 
and support from bilateral and multilateral agencies (Dunkerley, 1995; and 
Sonnetag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004). Wind farms have traditionally been financed 
through three predominant financing structures which differ in the way debt is 
structured, namely: government financing, corporate financing, and project 
financing (Wiser 1997; and Delman, 2009). Furthermore, these financing options 
have been matched to three common ownership structures of: nonutility 
generator (NUG), investor owned utility (IOU) and public utility ownership (PUO) 
(Wiser, 1997). NUG and IOU’s use the private forms of finance of corporate and 
project finance and POU’s can use all three financing structures however will 
traditionally rely on government funds or debt. 
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There are multiple considerations and complex forces that guide the choice 
between project ownership options and financing structures and there is no 
single “correct” combination that will work for all developers, under all market 
conditions that covers all projects (Harper et al, 2007).  
 
A large factor in this decision process are the signals that are sent by the public 
entities responsible in terms of policy objectives and the regulatory framework, 
where financiers and investors make decisions in response to the clear and 
transparent enabling environment set by the Government and the institutional 
players. Delmon, 2009, defines some broader influences that can guide this 
decision such as: the market concerned; the stakeholders concerned; market 
availability for financing; project and market risk perception; and the risk appetite 
of financiers and investors to bare these risks (Delman, 2009).  Harper et al, 
2007, explain that this decision is based on the some broad factors which are, 
firstly the project developer’s ability to absorb the public incentives such as feed 
in tariffs, subsidies, tax benefits or grants. Secondly, the project developer’s 
position to provide the required capital funds and the degree of debt leverage 
required to satisfy return requirements (Harper et al, 2007). 
 
The ownership option and financing structure that are eventually employed are of 
vital importance as wind power project costs are acutely sensitive to key 
financing terms and variables and conditions that depict them. Wiser and Kahn, 
1996, explain that project costs can vary by up to 40% with a change in 
ownership and financing structure. This chapter explains the advantages and 
disadvantages that cause these swings in projects costs and argues that the 
majority of wind farms in South Africa will exist under a project finance structure 
with a NUG or IPP ownership. However, before this discussion the chapter will 
provide a brief explanation of each ownership option and financing structure. 
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3.2. FINANCING STRUCTURES 
 
3.2.1. PROJECT FINANCE 
 
 
Project financing has been a common form of financing structure for utility scale 
wind farms, which is discussed in detail at the end of this chapter, as non- or 
limited recourse debt is granted to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which has 
limited risk to the project sponsors and the SPV’s shareholders (Navigator 
Project Finance, 2009; and Wiser and Kahn, 1996). Investing in wind farms is a 
relatively new investment so the non-recourse debt is favoured by developers as 
the investor’s liability is limited to their investment in the project and does not 
extend to their balance sheets. More specifically the loans are extended to the 
project secured primarily on firstly the project’s assets and secondly its future 
revenue stream, so it is the cashflow generated by the project that financiers rely 
upon for debt service (Delmon, 2009, p. 50).  
 
A further benefit of project financing and an explanation on its popularity among 
investors is that the project’s debt leveraging capability is greatly enhanced so 
expensive equity portion of a project’s capital structure can be significantly 
reduced through access to cheaper debt which has the overall affect of reducing 
project financing costs and increasing returns to investors (Delmon, 2009, p. 56). 
The possibility for higher leverage comes through the use of a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) which has a more transparent structure in terms of ownership 
when compared to corporate and government funding. This provides two reasons 
for higher leverage possibilities. Firstly, risks are easier to identify, assign, 
mitigate and in the worst case claim damages for than in corporate finance where 
the company structure can be complicated and change in management can have 
adverse impacts on the project. Secondly, financiers have step in rights in case 
of default by sponsors so they can proactively manage their loss through 
operation of the asset.  
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As senior debt takes priority over equity in a default situation, i.e. equity is “first 
loss”; banks can favour a project finance structure for wind farm projects. 
Based on the experience of Erik Sejersen, Specialist, Debt Capital Markets for 
Vestas Wind Systems A/S, banks have not incurred losses on Project 
Financed wind farms and in the worst case (caused by poor wind) banks have 
had to extend the repayment period. In contrast most banks have taken serious 
"hits" for corporate debt, since the owner's corporate balance sheets have been 
much less transparent and subsequent changes of management have negatively 
impacted long term credit rating of the corporate (Sejersen, 2010). However, this 
financing structure is not without its disadvantages, of which the structure’s 
complexity is the most prominent. Project financing requires an intricate matrix of 
project documentation or contracts, subcontracts, guarantees, risk mitigation 
instruments and financing agreements that must create a seamless allocation of 
risk between all parties involved in order to provide the security to both investors 
and financiers that the project can successfully service the debt and ROE over its 
lifetime (Delmon, 2009, p. 98-104). This complexity creates high transaction 
costs such as legal expenses and longer lead times in deal closing. A further 
disadvantage is that the non or-limited recourse debt that the structure relies on 
is offered by financiers who will always take the conservative viewpoint which 
means that the project will always be subject to a due diligence review from a 
worst cast scenario perspective.  
 
Hand in hand with this is that financiers will offer their debt under strict key 
financing terms and variables as they are the project participant who has the 
most to lose if the project is not a success. In other words, because the debt is 
non or-limited recourse and the debt portion forms the majority of the project’s 
funds a project finance structure requires financiers to carry the bulk of the risk 
exposure while developers can limit their risk just to their investment in the 
project. 
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This financing and investing decision to employ a project finance structure and its 
implications on the key financing terms and variables are discussed in depth in 
Chapter 5. 
 
3.2.2. CORPORATE FINANCING 
 
As wind power markets mature and investors and financiers become more 
comfortable with the degree of project risks exposure large project developers 
such as utilities and large energy companies will consider securing the required 
project liabilities against their established corporate balance sheet and commit 
their own capital resources through general equity (Burton et al., 2009; and 
Delmon, 2009). So when IOUs, and sometimes POUs, seek debt to fund a wind 
power project this credit uses the income stream of their entire asset base as 
security and not only the future revenue stream from the individual wind power 
project as in project financing (Wiser, 1997; and Wiser & Kahn, 1996). Financiers, 
therefore, prefer this structure when compared to the riskier project financed 
structure because they can lay claim to established corporate balance sheet in 
the case of default in debt service by the project developers, which in turn means 
that financiers will offer debt under a set of favourable key financing terms and 
variables to the company as opposed to a single project.  
 
Consequently, this structure can yield lower financing costs than project finance 
as financiers will usually prefer to guarantee their loans against the balance sheet 
of a large stable company and this preference will be reflected in the key 
financing terms and variables. More specifically, under a corporate finance 
structure there are debt and equity cost reductions, longer debt amortization 
periods, and the lack of project-specific DSCR requirements (Burton et al. 2009; 
and Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
33.   Chapter 3: Financing Structure and Ownership Options 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
Under this structure the overall credit rating of the company in question is used to 
determine the cost of debt for the project rather than using the project-specific 
cost structure to determine cost of debt and other key financing terms and 
variables (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). Based off this security of a balance sheet 
financiers will have fewer restrictive project specific loan covenants such as the 
minimum DSCR constraint as in project financing (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). 
However, there is limited financiers’ project specific DSCR constraint that pushes 
up the cost of funding through a company wide limit on the degree of leverage 
that the company can take on, but this is limited compared to those constraints 
under project financing (Smith and Warner, 1979). These relatively favourable 
costs of debt conditions and lack of a project specific loan covenants reflect the 
financier’s reduction in risk exposure when compared to a project financing 
structure. What is more is that equity is also frequently cheaper, but still more 
expensive than debt, under corporate finance due to the asset diversity of the 
company’s balance sheet which means that the asset’s performance is viewed as 
apart of a portfolio of projects as opposed to being subject to conservative, 
project specific scrutiny where the risk of failure cannot be diversified through the 
support of other project’s success. 
 
The key disadvantage of a corporate financing structure is that it can be difficult 
to divert funds from other “business-as-usual” activities and other investment 
opportunities to invest in the project and to accept the liability onto the balance 
sheet (Delmon, 2009, p.18-21).  The minimum return on equity (ROI) must 
outweigh the opportunity cost of investment to forego the returns that are 
available through investing the funds in other opportunities and not the project 
(Delmon, 2009, p.18-21). Furthermore, while there are limited loan covenants 
from the financier’ side the capital structure will still be bound by an implicit 
company-wide DSCR constraint or a restriction on issuing debt beyond certain 
limits (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
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If a company takes on too much debt this can adversely affect shareholders 
through the reduction of debt servicing capabilities on existing debt (Wiser and 
Kahn, 1996). Consequently, the capital structure is less flexible as it bound by 
company wide leveraging constraints which can make funding costs more 
expensive through the inclusion of high cost equity (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). So 
even though corporate financing has lower cost of debt and equity than under 
project financing, the cost of funding can be more expensive due to a rigid capital 
structure as a result of limited leveraging capabilities of the company in question. 
A further disadvantage highlighted by Delmon, 2009, p. 10-12, is that corporate 
financing does not yield the same project specific efficiencies that project 
financing structure does. Corporate financing structure lacks the degree of 
specificity found in project-financing and the importance of the project is lumped 
in the set of investments on the developer’s balance sheet (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996; and Delmon, 2009, p. 18-21).  
 
A Corporate finance structure requires a greater commitment from project 
developers and sponsors in terms of risk exposure, and in contrast represents a 
lesser degree of risk exposure to financiers which is reflected in a more lenient 
key financing terms and variables. However, minimum ROI requirements need to 
be favourable enough to justify diversion of funds from other investment 
opportunities and company wide leveraging constraints yield a less flexible 
capital structure with a larger portion of higher cost equity. 
 
3.2.3. GOVERNMENT FINANCING 
 
In most cases Governments have the ability to qualify for debt, such as public 
bonds, at more favourable set of key financing terms and variables when 
compared to the private sector, especially in the case of interest rates (Delmon, 
2009, p. 18-19).  
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This ability depends on the credit rating of the specific government and usually 
developed nation’s government risk profile poses a smaller risk exposure to 
financiers when compared to a private company however a developing nation’s 
government may have political and country risk elements that some financiers 
may be unwilling to accept (Delmon, 2009, p. 108-110). 
 
Some of disadvantages of government financing structure are, firstly that 
governments and public departments are prone to inefficiencies in public 
processes which is especially the case in developing nations such as South 
Africa (Delmon, 2009, p. 10-12). These inefficiencies may filter into the 
development process of a wind power project in the form of delays, minimal 
incentives to manage risk correctly, and higher development costs. Secondly, 
Government sources of funding are usually bound by fiscal constraints and social 
targets that can limit the availability of government financing (Delmon, 2009, 
p.18-21). Therefore, in some instances private sector financing under a corporate 
and project financing structures may be less expensive, less time intensive, and 
more flexible than government financing that has less incentive or focus on 
generating profit in the most efficient and risk tight manner (Delmon, 2009, p.18-
21). 
 
3.3. OWNERSHIP OPTIONS 
 
Wind power plants can be developed using a variety of ownership structures and 
in some cases a combination of these options such as those found under Private 
Public Participation projects (PPP). The predominant broad ownership options 
are a NUG, IOU and POU. Examples of these in South Africa would be any IPP 
as a NUG, Eskom as a POU and the IOUs would be companies such as DONG 
or EDF who are international privately owned utilities. Each one is explained in 
turn below and matched to the financing structure that most suits the option. 
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3.3.1. NON-UTILITY GENERATOR (NUG) 
 
Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386, argue that the majority of utility-scale, non-
hydroelectric renewable energy projects that exist in the United States  have 
been developed, owned, and financed by privately-owned renewable energy 
companies known as non-utility generators  (NUG). The electric output is then 
traditionally either sold under long-term contracts to investor-owned utilities (IOU), 
public-owned utilities (POU), or sold on open spot markets (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996). The ownership option is most commonly linked with a project finance 
structure and while this combination has been the most common in the U.S. its 
main disadvantage is that it is also the most costly combination of the existing 
ownership options and finance structures (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). The two 
drivers of this combination’s cost are, firstly the inclusion of private investors in 
the capital structure who seek high returns on equity (ROE) to justify the 
commitment of funds to the wind power project as opposed to investing in other 
investment opportunities, which is known as the opportunity cost. So the 
minimum required ROE must outweigh the opportunity cost of investment. 
Secondly, a project financed structure sources the majority of its funding in the 
form of non-recourse debt from financiers who will demand strict key financing 
terms and variables to justify the high risk levels inherent in lending non or-limited 
recourse debt. 
 
It is under a NUG ownership option that an independent power producer (IPP) 
option is categorised. An IPP is a standalone power generating plant that is 
financed based off the creditworthiness of the contract used to create and 
operate them with the power purchase agreement (PPA), which is the long term 
obligation to buy the power produced by the plant, acting as the most important 
contractual document (Esty, 2004, p. 25).  
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In South Africa IPP’s are privately owned companies that sell their power to the 
POU, Eskom who owns the transmission and distribution system that will connect 
the electrical output of a project to the end consumer. 
3.3.2. INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITY (IOU) 
 
As markets are deregulated and the wind power industry begins to mature there 
will be a host of well established utilities that will focus on developing large 
portfolios of wind power projects, for example, E.On with 2200 MW installed in 
Europe and America; and Iberdrola with 7,000 MW of wind power plants globally 
(Fehrenbacher, 2008; and E.On AG, 2009). These IOU’s have traditionally 
sought corporate financing structures based off their size and established asset 
base, however this is changing somewhat as IOUs have chosen to project 
finance wind power projects to protect their balance sheets from wind farm 
liabilities (Wiser, 1997; and Wiser & Kahn, 1996). 
 
Some of the advantages of an IOU ownership are that investors and financiers 
under an IOU option usually offer favourable key financing terms and variables 
when compared to individual project financed power projects (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996). This benefit is explained above under Corporate Financing, but briefly this 
is due to an IOU’s access to corporate-finance through its asset diversity in the 
sense that the project is assessed as apart of an overall balance sheet so it’s 
individual risk profile is diluted and supported under the context of an existing set 
of assets for investors and that act as surety to the financiers. A further IOU 
specific advantage is the strategic position these organisations hold in their 
provision of a significant portion of a country’s basic power supply (Wiser and 
Kahn, 1996).   
 
This means that IOU’s service is so vital to a country’s economy that the 
regulatory bodies and any public investors will be of greater assistance to IOU’s 
rather than private NUGs (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
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As an IOU ownership option commonly employs a corporate finance structure 
due to its access to an established balance sheet, IOU ownership shares many 
of the disadvantages of corporate financing which are detailed in section 1.2. 
However, the most important disadvantage or cost of an IOU ownership is a less 
flexible capital structure: the company will usually have to maintain a 
conservative debt to equity ratio through working to a company-wide DSCR 
constraint or leveraging constraint (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). So while IOU’s 
qualify for more favourable set of key financing variables this cost saving may be 
outweighed by the inclusion of expensive equity due to a less flexible capital 
structure when compared to NUG and project financing. 
 
3.3.3. PUBLIC-OWNED UTILITY (POU) 
 
A public-owned utility or POU is either wholly owned or partly owned by the 
government of a certain country as is the case in South Africa where Eskom’s 
primary shareholder is the government. POUs can employ both a corporate or 
project finance structure however corporate financing is typically the most 
common when developing generating capacity (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). Under a 
corporate financing structure with a POU ownership option funding is raised 
through the combination of equity from internal funds and issuing tax-exempt 
bonds on public markets to raise debt (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). This public debt 
uses the income stream from the POUs entire asset base as collateral and for 
debt service for the credit as is the case in corporate financing under an IOU 
ownership option, with only company wide DSCR requirements and not project 
restrictive DSCR requirements (Wiser, 1997; Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
In other words the income stream used in the business case to calculate the cash 
flow available for debt service (CFADS) that will support debt service is 
diversified over the entire asset base and not the revenue generated only by the 
individual project (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). 
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The key advantage of a public ownership option for wind power plant 
development is that costs are typically lower than under a private ownership 
option of IOU and NUG (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
This is due to a variety of reasons namely; public debt finance can be supported 
through a diverse set of assets and is largely tax-exempt with income taxes and 
property tax exemptions applied (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). There are no project 
specific DSCR requirements which all qualify the project for longer debt maturity 
periods and a greater use of debt in the capital structure, consequently a POU 
can qualify for lower financing costs (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). Furthermore, public 
utilities enjoy a franchise monopoly situation, especially in recently deregulated 
markets, with associated ratemaking authority and the ability to pass risk onto 
rate payers and make them the ultimate bearer of project risks (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996). The key disadvantage of this ownership option is that public entities can 
often lack the same efficiencies throughout the project development phase that 
private companies can facilitate and risk allocation can sometimes not be as 
effective as POUs have the facility to pass risk onto ratepayers so do not share 
the same incentive to allocate risk efficiently (Delmon, 2009, p.18-21). 
 
3.4. DOMINANT FINANCING STRUCTURE & OWNERSHIP 
OPTION FOR WIND POWER PROJECTS 
 
3.4.1. EVIDENCE FROM THE LITERATURE 
 
The literature reviewed holds project financing, which is most commonly linked to 
a NUG ownership option, as the most common form of financing for wind power 
project development. This view is supported by Wiser and Kahn, 1996, who claim 
that private ownership option and a project finance structure has, historically, 
been the dominant forms of finance in the wind power industry (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996).  
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Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386, and Wiser, 1997, make clear the link 
between private ownership, project finance and wind power development as they 
argue that non-utility generators (NUG) have generally relied on project financing 
to back wind power development.  
 
Navigator Project Finance, 2009, claims that there has been a, “substantial 
increase in project finance structuring of wind power projects, both for green 
fields, brown fields and acquisitions.” While Wiser and Kahn, 1996, go on to 
explain that, “almost all utility-scale wind power projects were developed and 
financed by private renewable energy companies (non-utility generators), often 
through project-finance structures,” and that “true project-financed facilities with 
independent debt and equity investors is now the most frequently used structure” 
(Wiser and Kahn, 1996). Further literature match a project finance structure to 
projects with the following characteristics: power generation projects with a 
medium to large scale capital intensity (i.e. those projects with a high capital cost 
relative to the rest of the project costs); a well defined cashflow; and fixed off take 
prices secured under long term contracts (Kensinger and Martin, 1988; Nevitt, 
1983; Wiser and Kahn, 1996, Navigator Project Finance, 2009).  
 
Two reasons that private power producers, or NUG’s, have typically employed a 
stand alone, project finance structure is firstly, because many small, often start 
up, renewable energy developers simply do not have the existing balance sheet 
to leverage debt off of as in the case of corporate finance. Secondly, NUG’s 
developers can grow their project base and cashflow without compromising their 
parent company with new risk through additional projects and associated debt in 
their asset portfolio (Navigator Project Finance, 2009; and Wiser, 1997). This 
means that developers can set up multiple project financed SPV units, with 
limited effect on capital, gearing, balance sheet restrictions, and the credit rating 
of the parent company (Navigator Project Finance, 2009).  
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These two reasons rely on the point that wind energy investments are seen as 
high risk from the perspective of the investment community as they have 
relatively new technologies, are not dispatchable, have high capital costs, and 
associated longer payback periods so developers will want to limit their liability 
and risk exposure in this sort of project.  
Delmon, 2009, p. 10-12, gives another reason to explain project financing as a 
popular financing structure to private wind power producers as he argues that 
project financing is the most efficient method of financing infrastructure projects 
due to the structure’s ability to better manage commercial risks and efficiencies in 
the project development process. 
 
According to the literature, a project finance structure and a NUG or private 
ownership option has been the most popular structure for the financing and 
development of wind power projects. The financial crisis has only seen this 
structure strengthened due to the risk adverse nature of investors and developers 
aiming to limit their risk exposure in turbulent times however as large energy 
companies and utilities continue to build large portfolios of wind energy projects 
new structures such as IOU’s and corporate finance may overshadow project 
financing deals. 
 
3.4.2. EVIDENCE FROM THE QUALITATIVE INTERVIEWS 
 
The evidence from the qualitative interviews explain that in the early stages of 
South Africa’s wind market development a project finance structure with access 
to non or-limited recourse debt will be the most popular financing structure under 
an IPP ownership option. This financing and investing decision is in reaction to 
the inherent uncertainty and risks in investing in a new market in a developing 
nation so investors will want to protect their balance sheets through employing 
project finance. However, in the long term, when the risks behind these projects 
are more defined, there could be some instances of corporate financing. 
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Vajeth, 2009 from Absa Capital, explained that in an ideal world, from a 
commercial bank’s risk perspective, a corporate financing structure off a sound 
balance sheet is the most desirable financing structure for debt lending. However,  
Vajeth from Absa Capital, 2009, explained that in the SA power sector the only 
entity that could possibly corporate finance a utility-scale wind farm is Eskom, but 
at this stage even they have got serious funding issues, and even those 
developers that do will not be prepared to expose their balance sheets to that 
level of risk in the current market (Vajeth, Personal Interview, 2009). 
Consequently, in the short term there will not be an environment where large 
utilities could go ahead with corporate financing, however as the market and the 
industry matures and projects are bought and sold there may be some instances 
of corporate financing (Eardley-Taylor, 2009). So the predominant structure will 
have to be project finance as no one else has the balance sheet to support the 
development of a utility-scale wind project (Vajeth, Personal Interview, 2009). So, 
both Eardley-Taylor, 2009 and Vajeth, 2009, believe that if the ownership option 
is an IPP then it will most certainly be a project finance structure.  
 
Eardley-Taylor, from Standard Bank, 2009, supports this point as he very much 
doubted that any wind power projects in South Africa will be financed under any 
other structure than project finance with IPP ownership. Eardley-Taylor, 2009, 
detailed that with the tariffs that have been set under the REFIT, developers 
would need the benefits of debt leveraging under a project finance structure to 
achieve the Rand return on equity of around 20% and the WACC on debt of 
around 11% to 12% that had been communicated (Nersa [1], 2009). Eardley-
Taylor, 2009, went on to state that these sorts of projects will require a minimum 
of two shareholders or sponsors and this ownership structure lends itself well to a 
project finance structure and what’s more is that these projects should be project 
financed as this is how it has been down in the rest of the world.  
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Potgieter, from Investec, 2009; Maclay, from Actis, 2009; an Industry Participant, 
from BNP Paribas, 2009; and Greenwood, from New Energy Finance, 2009, all 
believed that project finance would be the predominant financing structure in 
South Africa under an IPP ownership at this early stage of the market’s 
development. Potgieter, from Investec, 2009, discussed that in South Africa, as in 
the rest of the world, there is a limited amount of capital. Due to the significant 
capital cost of wind turbine technology and its installation these projects require a 
large upfront investment so there will not be any entity, at this early stage of the 
market’s development, which will concentrate all their limited capital or risk into 
one market through corporate financing or full recourse debt (Potgieter, 2009). 
This is in contrast to project finance structure due to the non-recourse loan basis, 
and lender and equity security is provided solely through the assets and cash 
flows of the project itself and not the balance sheet of the shareholders (Maclay, 
2009). Consequently, there will be few developers that will not seek to leverage 
their projects through project financed debt and meet the outstanding amount 
with a portion of equity (Potgieter, 2009; Maclay, 2009; an Industry participant, 
2009; and Greenwood, 2009).  
 
Viljoen, Cresco, 2009, develops on the point of limited capital as he argues that 
the main reason for the project finance’s dominance is that there is a severe 
capital shortage so attempting to use a corporate finance structure with multiple 
organisation’s balance sheets may end up being a lot more messy than using a 
project finance structure with its clear debt and equity definitions. Another reason 
that Viljoen, 2009, identified is that many developers in South Africa view wind 
energy projects as non-core activity or not in line with their normal line of 
business so they will chose to remove the project from their balance sheet. 
Viljoen, 2009, concluded that there may be limited corporate financing in South 
Africa such as Exxaro but a Project Finance structure and an Independent power 
producer ownership option will be the predominant shape of utility-scale wind 
energy projects in South Africa under the current market conditions. 
44.   Chapter 3: Financing Structure and Ownership Options 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
Mainstream Renewable Power is an active example of the preference for project 
finance and IPP ownership as their mandate in South Africa is to develop 
projects using only a project finance structure (O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009). 
Furthermore, Mainstream’s chief development officer Torben Andersen was 
quoted in Engineering News, 2009, saying that their South African projects would 
be project financed through a capital structure of equity and debt and finally the 
Mainstream website claims that project finance is the preferred financing 
structure under which Mainstream will develop project (Mainstream website, 
2009). The African Development Bank is another active example as Arfaoui, 
2009, explained that the bank was looking to create loan packages for project 
financed deals on the wider African continent, and of the projects the AFDB are 
involved in, they are all project financed deals searching non recourse debt from 
the bank. These two examples lend evidence to the point that the majority of 
wind farm projects sponsors and financiers agree on a decision to employ a 
project finance structure in South Africa (Arfaoui, 2009; and O’Flynn, 2009). 
 
The above evidence presents the opinions of key players in the financing of 
infrastructure projects in Africa and South Africa. All players have an active 
interest in the financing of utility-scale wind farms in South Africa and all of these 
individuals agreed that a project finance structure under and IPP ownership 
option would be the dominant structure for the financing of utility-scale wind 
farms in South Africa in the early stages of the market’s development. This 
investing and financing decision is in response to the high levels of perceived risk 
and uncertainty in the immature market, under the context of very risk adverse, 
limited capital available to the market as a consequence of the financial crisis. In 
the long term this preference may change once project risks become more 
defined and investors can justify the commitment of funds secured off of their 
established balance sheets.  
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3.5. CONCLUSION 
 
There are three main financing structures for utility scale wind farm development 
of: government financing, corporate financing, and project financing. These 
financing options have traditionally been matched to three common ownership 
options of: nonutility generator (NUG), investor owned utility (IOU) and public 
utility ownership (PUO). NUG and IOUs can use the private forms of finance of 
corporate and project finance while POUs can use all three financing structures 
however will usually rely on government funding. Traditionally, project financing 
under a NUG or IOU ownership option has been popular for the development of 
wind farms globally, especially in the early stages of the wind market’s 
development in a certain region where there are many uncertainties and 
consequently a high degree of risk.  
 
This is expected to be no different in South Africa where qualitative interviews 
supported the literature that a project finance structure under a private IPP 
ownership option will be the most common combination in the early stages of the 
market in response to perceived uncertainties and risks under the context of risk 
adverse, limited capital due to the financial crisis. Corporate financing may 
become a possibility as the market develops and uncertainties are worked into a 
defined set of risks founded in past practise. 
 
The decision as to which ownership option and financing structure are employed 
by a particular developer depends on a variety of factors however the policy 
objectives, the consequent regulatory framework and the resulting set of 
uncertainties and risks will be a heavily weighted consideration. This financing 
and investing decision is of vital importance as wind power project costs are 
highly sensitive to key financing terms and variables and the conditions that 
depict them.  
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Each combination of the above financing structures and ownership options create 
different allocations of risk to the project participants, especially in the case of the 
equity investors and the debt financiers, and this increased or decreased risk 
exposure will be reflected in the key financing terms and variables offered by 
funders. Chapter 5 will discuss how risk is reflected in the key financing terms 
and variables; however it is the task of the developer to balance the trade off of 
leveraging their own capital against the restrictive covenants and costs of this 
leveraging. 
 
The qualitative research and the literature review then supports the dominance of 
project finance and IPP ownership in the market’s infancy and the possible 
introduction of corporate finance in the long term once many of the uncertainties 
have been defined into risks and identified, assessed or valued, mitigated and 
allocated (Esty, 2004). 
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4. CHAPTER 4: PROJECT FINANCE 
 
PROJECT FINANCE 
 
The previous chapters have presented some of the reasons why IPP’s employing 
a project finance structure will be the main project structure for renewable energy, 
wind power plant development. In light of this, the main purpose of Chapter 4 is 
to introduce the concept of a project financing structure and explore some of the 
elements of this structure that make it applicable to utility-scale wind power plant 
financing. The elements that this chapter will cover are firstly a brief introduction 
and analysis of the structures main advantages and disadvantages. Secondly, 
the main project participants and the set of complex contractual documentation 
will be identified with an explanation on how the documentation connects the 
SPV to the different project participants. It is Chapter 7 that will develop on this 
concept to explain the risk allocation under these contractual agreements. Lastly, 
the chapter will introduce the contractual documentation framework that form the 
legal foundation on which South African utility scale wind farms will be developed 
and some of the key players or partners in this process are identified. 
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4.1. PROJECT FINANCING 
 
Project financing is the allocation of non- or limited recourse debt to a standalone 
legal entity called a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) through a network of 
contractual agreements, namely: 
 
- Off-take agreement or power purchase agreement (PPA); 
- Construction contract; 
- Operation and maintenance contract (O&M); 
- All other project-related agreements 
 
Under a project finance arrangement the financing and equity security is provided 
solely by the cash flow generated by the project and the project’s underlying 
assets, rather than the project sponsor’s balance sheet or own credit lines. This 
debt is granted with a variety of security requirements or restrictions which are 
known as debt covenants and each financier will have different requirements with 
respect to this according to a variety of factors such as each financier’s own risk 
tolerance. 
 
Table 3: Project Finance stakeholders for a South African wind energy 
project 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
STAKEHOLDER DESCRIPTION 
Grantor Government, and/or Regulator (NERSA) 
Off taker Utility, System Operator (Eskom) 
Financier Domestic/International Commercial Banks, DFIs 
Shareholders Stakeholders with equity stakes in the Project Company 
Project Company/SPV 
Standalone legal entity which will own and operate the asset made 
up of different shareholders or a parent company 
Construction Contractor Design and builds the project works 
Operation Contractor Operates and Maintains the asset over the lifetime 
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A project is made up of many stakeholders, which are those entities that have an 
economic interest in the project (Irwin, 2007). These stakeholders that interact 
under a project financed structure, which are explained in this chapter, are the 
grantor, off taker, financier, project company, shareholders, Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), construction contractor and operation contractor. Where the 
grantor, the set of public players that has the legal right to enter into a concession 
agreement, is national or local government or government agency or some 
regulatory authority that has made a grant or concession to the project company 
to build, own and operate an electricity generation project that to date has been a 
service provision of the public sector or Eskom for the purposes of this paper 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 104-105).  
 
The grantor is the public players that will set the regulatory requirements, tax 
restrictions, and tariff levels that will create the requirement to issue a concession 
in line with public and national policy target. The offtaker is the counter party that 
will sign the power purchase agreement (PPA) to purchase the output of a project 
over a predefined contractual period. In many cases the grantor and the offtaker 
can be the same set of entities especially in regulated markets. In South Africa, 
under the REFIT regulation a Single Buyers Office, ring-fenced within Eskom, will 
be the offtaker and is bound by the regulator to purchase the energy produced by 
qualifying projects under the REFIT. The financier is the lender or provider of 
non- or limited recourse debt facilities. The project company will own and operate 
the asset and will take the form of a limited liability SPV whose shares are owned 
by a number of shareholders such as a parent company, or group of companies, 
of the project that will inject equity to the project (Delmon, 2009, p.110-111). The 
project company or SPV will design, construct, operate, maintain and have the 
option to transfer the project and is made up of shareholders and companies that 
specialise in the tasks which need to be performed under the concession 
agreement (Delmon, 2009).  
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An SPV is a standalone legal entity which is merely the vehicle through which a 
large number of agreements are made (Burton, 2001). For the purposes of this 
paper’s focus the asset is a wind energy power-plant, which uses a series of wind 
turbine generators (WTG) connected to the national electricity grid. The 
construction and operation contractors will be discussed in detail below. 
 
In its simplest form project financing structure can be defined as the, “financing of 
a particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look at the cash flows 
of that unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be repaid and the assets 
of the economic unit are used as collateral for the loan” (Navigator Project 
Finance, 2009). There is limited liability for the sponsor as the standalone legal 
entity called the SPV will be set up with accountability for all liabilities pertaining 
to the project (Navigator Project Finance, 2009; Wiser and Kahn, 1996). This 
characteristic is the main difference between a corporate finance and a project 
finance structure as rather than using the project sponsor’s or parent company’s 
balance sheet as collateral, the SPV and its associated cash flow and project 
assets secure the debt facility (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
Project finance is then the provision of debt facilities to projects secured primarily 
or entirely against the cash flows the project generates and the assets with 
limited or no recourse to the corporate credit of the project sponsors (Potgieter, 
Personal Interview, 2009; Wiser and Kahn, 1996; Navigator Project Finance, 
2009). As explained above the project sponsor has limited or no liability for the 
project as the debt facility in project financing takes the form of non- or limited 
recourse structure. This means that financiers have no recourse to the sponsor’s 
or parent company’s balance sheet and credit worthiness, but rather financiers 
have recourse to project cash flows and the underlying assets of the project 
(Ubajaka, 2006). This recourse extends to the liabilities defined in the contracts, 
sub-contracts and all guarantees with third parties providing services to the 
project (Ubajaka, 2006).  
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Subsequently, in the event that a project defaults on the terms and conditions 
stipulated in the financing agreement with the financier, then the financier would 
have no recourse to the sponsor’s overall balance sheet as a source of funds for 
settlement (Navigator Project Finance, 2009). 
 
Financiers have a high level of sensitivity to the security behind the project 
revenue stream and it is this guarantee that is vitally important for leveraging 
purposes (Delmon, 2009). In the absence of a proven credit line or an 
established balance sheet as security for debt service and given leveraging the 
financier has to be sure that revenues generated from the asset alone will be 
adequate to cover the debt service commitments (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). To 
provide this assurance the financiers typically apply restrictive loan covenants 
which are included in the agreements with borrowers which in this case would be 
the SPV (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). The most important of these project-finance 
loan covenants, is the debt service coverage requirements (DSCR) which 
calculates the projects ability to service its debt obligations which will be 
discussed in detail later on in this chapter (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). A good 
example of where a restrictive minimum DSCRs level is used is that in project 
finance debt is frequently less costly than equity, so project developers will seek 
to maximise debt leverage, however this tendency will be limited by the debt 
service coverage requirements (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386). In other 
words, the project’s revenue will have to cover the total debt service at a certain 
ratio which will have the natural effect of limiting the amount of debt a project 
uses in line with the ability of the project to service this debt amount.  
 
The DSCR along with a variety of other ratios such as the profitability ratios and 
debt/equity ratios, are used by financiers during the due diligence process before 
financial close to establish sensitivities to certain risks and throughout the project, 
post financial close, as monitoring and control tools (Delmon, 2009, p. 55-59).  
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As these ratios are a good indicator of the project’s financial position and its 
potential and actual performance over its lifetime, financiers will stipulate certain 
levels for these ratios the project must maintain (Delmon, 2009, p.55-59). If the 
project is not meeting the required levels the financiers will have included a host 
of interventions, some of which Delmon, 2009, p. 53, lists: blocking distributions; 
cash sweeping from existing accounts, applying reserve account money to debt 
service; taking over rights of the borrower or the shareholders; and in some 
cases cancellation of loans. In this way financiers can ensure that projects 
maintain focus in order to successfully service the debt repayment. 
 
4.1.1. ADVANTAGES 
 
Project financing has two predominant characteristics that gives this structure an 
advantage over other forms of financing such as corporate financing, these are 
firstly, the non- or limited recourse nature of debt and secondly, the increased 
debt capacity or leveraging capabilities. The non recourse nature of debt allows 
the sponsor to set up a stand alone SPV that will shield the brunt of the projects 
liabilities. This will have limited impact on the parent company’s creditworthiness 
and balance sheet in terms of capital, gearing and other imposed balance sheet 
restrictions (Wiser, 1997; Navigator Project Finance, 2009). In South Africa and 
many other markets, IPP’s entering the power market will not have a large, 
established balance sheet and they do not have a substantial track record in wind 
power plant development to finance their projects through corporate financing 
and any high risk finance, such as venture capital, comes at a heavy price 
(Ubajako, 2006). Those developers that do have experience and the balance 
sheet will not want to expose their balance sheet to the Greenfield development 
in a new market in a developing nation with sovereign risk (Eardley-Taylor, 
Personal interview, 2009).  
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However, under a project finance structure there is no requirement for an 
established balance sheet or any collateral outside of the project, which can 
enable small and medium-sized developers to participate the market and can set 
up a number of projects at the same time, as can large companies, without 
negative company-wide impacts to the shareholder’s balance sheets (Ubajako, 
2006; and Navigator Project Finance, 2009).  
 
The second characteristic of project finance, a greater debt capacity, is as a 
result of a greater transparency to lenders through the visible structure of an SPV  
(Sejersen, 2010). This visible structure allows for better risk identification, 
assignment and mitigation. A long-term service agreement with an availability 
guarantee is put in place and Liquidated Damages (LD’s) for poor performance  
are assigned which reduces technology risk, furthermore the transparent 
ownership structure highlights the underlying credit risk, which then can be 
understood by lenders and risk mitigation is possible (Sejersen, 2010). For these 
reasons lenders have felt comfortable extending higher leverage to project 
financed wind farms (Sejersen, 2010). This debt leveraging capacity allows for 
higher debt/equity ratios which can result in cheaper financing costs because the 
cost of debt is typically cheaper than that of equity (Wiser, 1997). Wiser and 
Kahn, 1996, explain that consistent with industry practice, project developers will 
have a tendency to maximise the portion of debt in the capital structure of the 
project which, as explained above, is constrained by lender constraints such as 
the minimum DSCR constraint. Lastly, due to the flexible nature of the capital 
structure inherent to project finance, debt to equity ratios can be maximised to 
reflect the cheapest financing costs for a project (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-
386). 
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4.1.2. DISADVANTAGES 
 
The non- and limited recourse characteristic of a project financing structure has a 
host of benefits as discussed above however the limited recourse debt does not 
come without a price. This “price” comes in the form of higher risk to the financier 
which results in higher debt and equity costs to the borrower and a greater array 
of restrictive loan covenants such as project specific minimum DSCR 
requirements (Wiser, 1997; Jechoutek and Lamech, 1995; Nevitt, 1983).  
 
Furthermore, due to the complex nature associated with arranging the various 
contracts, both transaction times and transaction costs are longer and larger 
respectively, especially with respect to higher legal fees (Jechoutek and Lamech, 
1995; Nevitt, 1983; Navigator Project Finance, 2009). 
 
These longer transaction times and the increased level of risk to the financier will 
mean that banks will take a conservative view when they review the project’s 
estimated revenue and the associated debt service ability (Navigator Project 
Finance, 2009). In today’s essentially risk adverse environment it is essential that 
independent engineers and consultants with a proven track record perform a 
detailed due diligence review of the power project, which is usually 
commissioned by the financier to the project (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). In 
this due diligence process the banks will ensure that in even in the most 
conservative of cases the revenue forecasts will be sufficient to cover the debt 
and interest payments (Navigator Project Finance, 2009).  
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4.2. PROJECT FINANCING DOCUMENTATION 
 
 
Figure 1: Typical Commercial Structure of a Project Financed Wind Farm 
  Source: Delmon, 2009, p.99 
 
Figure 1, above, illustrates some of the main project participants and the 
documents that connect them to the SPV. The SPV is a legal entity that is 
founded on a set of legal contracts which typically has 40 or more contracts 
which define the interactions of multiple parties and it the project financed deal is 
only as good as the contracts or agreements that underpin it (Esty, 2004, p. 2; 
Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). A long term commitment reduces overall risk in 
the eyes of financiers and investors so it is the quality of supply or purchase 
contracts, secured into the long term, that communicate the perceived risk of the 
project and are therefore the basis for financing to independent power project 
development (Jechoutek and Lamech, 1995, p. 941-953).  The project’s cash 
flow, which is essential to obtain credit support for project-finance as discussed 
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above, is secured contractually through the revenues defined under the off-take 
agreement or power purchase agreement (PPA) (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
The PPA is an important contract but it exists in an intricate and interrelated 
structure of contractual arrangements, of which, the most important are: the PPA, 
the construction contract, the operation and maintenance contract, all other 
project-related agreements (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). It is the strength of 
these underlying contractual arrangements that allows risk to flow seamlessly 
between different project parties and give financiers and investors the confidence 
to extend debt and capital to the project (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; Sargent and 
Lundy LLC, 2001). It is important to note that these agreements are only as good 
as their contractual enforceability so it is the legal activities of a project that are 
inherent to its success (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). The guiding principle for 
all project documentation is that it must be compiled in accordance with the 
financiers’ requirements as the bulk of the project funding will come from non- or 
limited recourse debt. The financiers will want all contracts to shield the SPV and 
therefore the financier from all project risks in order to obtain certainty as to their 
exact financial exposure over the maturity period of the loan (Delmon, 2009, p. 
98). 
 
Due to the non- or limited recourse nature of a project financing structure a 
complex set of legal contracts or documents are negotiated between all 
stakeholders with the primary focus of identifying the relevant project risks and 
how they can be avoided, accepted or transferred to the entity which is best 
placed to manage each risk (Sargent and Lundy, 2001). These documents and 
how they are structured ensures the ability of the project to generate a 
predictable income stream that will be purchased and it sets the mechanisms that 
create a “seamless web of risk allocation” between party participants (Sargent 
and Lundy, 2001).  
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The documentation that is a minimum requirement for a project financed deal and 
which stakeholders the SPV contracts with, as defined above, are listed in Table 
4 below. 
 
Table 4: Project financing documentation and connected stakeholder's for 
South African wind power projects 
 
DOCUMENT STAKEHOLDER 
Concession Agreement Government, ANC, DOE 
Power Purchase Agreement Eskom 
Grid Connection License NERSA 
Loan/Financing Agreement Financiers 
Shareholders Agreement Shareholders – Project Company/SPV 
Land Lease Agreement Land Owners 
Construction (EPC) Agreement Construction Contractor 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Agreement Operator Contractor 
Source: Compiled from primary research  
 
It is important to note in other power infrastructure projects there is a further 
document called the Fuel Supply Agreement (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). 
However, for a for wind energy projects there are no input fuel requirements that 
are required to generate power, the wind turbines use the wind to turn the 
generators, so no Fuel supply agreement is required. However, financiers will 
require that the wind resource has been accurately measured and modelled over 
at least 12 months and correlated against long term data, and the financiers will 
employ independent engineers to perform a due diligence on this process. 
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What follows is a basic discussion of the documentation that is identified above 
with the purpose some of the characteristics common to these types of 
agreements however as mentioned above the main purpose of setting this 
contractual structure is to facilitate the allocation of risk which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 7. 
 
4.2.1. CONCESSION AGREEMENT 
 
The Concession Agreement is the project document through which the grantor 
grants the rights or “concession” to the project company to develop, build, and 
operate the project and it is between the project company and the grantor, or 
NERSA and Eskom in the case of South Africa. For wind farms in SA the 
Concession Agreement is actually a collection of documents that detail the 
license to generate through the permission of NERSA. More broadly this includes 
all the relevant published policy and legislation that creates the directive for 
concession but more directly the concession agreement includes the 
Standardised Direct Agreement, Transmission Connection Agreement (TCA), 
and Transmission Use of System Agreement (TUOSA) as outlined in the REFIT 
Phase II media release by NERSA (NERSA [2], 2009). It is through these 
documents that the broad project risks categories of political/sovereign risk, 
completion risk, and operation risk are transferred from the grantor to the project 
company (Delmon, 2009, p. 254-256).  
 
The right to develop the project on “concession” from the grantor is in the sense 
that the provision of electricity has conventionally been a service of the public 
sector or Eskom (Delmon, 2009); however under the REFIT the government has 
set up the facility to concede the development of grid connected wind power 
plants to IPP’s.  
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Delmon, 2009, p. 253, explains that the concession can be granted in two 
manners: a concession by contract where the grantor will contract directly with a 
private company or through creating legislation and licensing as is the case with 
South African Government’s policy the REFIT (Delmon, 2009, p.252). Under the 
Concession Agreement the legal system, tax and environmental obligations are 
defined and the agreement will specify other details such as: the completion date; 
performance requirements; maintenance regime; and construction and operation 
requirements (Delmon, 2009, p. 253-254). 
 
In the case of South Africa the context for the concession is created by legislation 
and policy such as the REFIT and the 10,000 GWh renewable energy target, and 
concession is granted through license by the regulator NERSA through the Grid 
Connection License Agreement to eligible IPP renewable energy generators. The 
grid connection agreement will facilitate the connection of the project to the 
electrical power system or network to export the output from the project to the 
end users or other offtakers (Burton, 2001). In South Africa this agreement is also 
known as the Transmission Connection Agreement (TCA) and Transmission Use 
of System Agreement (TUOSA) (Nersa [2], 2009). Through these agreements a 
series of rights (or concession) is granted to the SPV to build, own and operate 
renewable energy power plants for the concession period, in this case the 
duration of the PPA or 20 years. The policy objective of the Government is to 
include wind power IPP’s into the energy mix so in essence they are conceding 
the right to the IPP to design, build and operate wind power plants in SA is 
granted through a combination of the legislation and the Grid Connection License 
Agreement. 
 
 
 
 
60.        Chapter 4: Project Finance 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
4.2.2. POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
 
Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001, define The Power Purchase Agreement PPA is a, 
“critical risk element that secures that the plant will be able to sell its electric 
output to a reputable off-taker at acceptable rates and is contracted to continue to 
do this for the duration of the project.” The PPAs, also known as the Offtake 
Purchase Agreement, is the agreement between the project company and the 
off-take purchaser, and is the most important document under a project finance 
structure. 
 
The main purpose of the PPA is to sell the output of the project, in this case 
electrical power, preferably over the project lifetime, to an offtake purchaser 
which is usually a utility, public service provider or operator (Delmon, 2009, p.101, 
p.339). The offtaker will then sell the electrical output to end consumers or under 
negotiated long term supply contracts (Burton, 2001; and Delmon, 2009).   
 
In the case of South Africa the offtaker will be Eskom, or more specifically the 
Renewable Energy Power Purchase Agency (REPA) situated in the Single 
Buyers Office under Eskom as mandated by NERSA under the REFIT Phase I 
and II: 
 
“The Renewable Energy Power Purchase Agency (REPA) will be obliged 
to purchase the energy delivered by the renewable energy projects 
licensed by the NERSA under REFIT Phase I and II.”  
(Nersa [3], 2009) 
 
“The Renewable Energy (RE) Power Purchase Agency (REPA) to be 
housed in Eskom’s Single Buyer Office.”  
(Nersa [4], 2009). 
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The PPA is a critical requirement for project financing as it is through this 
agreement that project’s revenue stream is secured, which in turn provides 
security to financiers to provide non- or limited recourse debt (Burton, 2001; and 
Delmon, 2009). The majority of funding for project financed deals comes from 
non- or limited recourse debt (see capital structure below), or in other words from 
financiers with all unallocated residual risks being borne by the financier. These 
financiers only have recourse to the projects future income stream and the 
project’s assets as explained above, so long-term fixed/indexed price PPA 
contracts are essential prerequisite to qualify for project financing (Wiser and 
Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386).  
 
It is essential that these contracts secure the revenue streams in the long term 
and most financiers will require that the contract period is for the duration of the 
project. For wind projects the project lifetime is twenty years (Delmon, 2009, p. 
339) and in South Africa the REFIT PPA will extend over this lifetime as 
mandated by the REFIT Phase I and II: 
 
“The term of the REFIT Power Purchase Agreement will be twenty (20) 
years.” (REFIT Consultation Paper South Africa Renewable, Energy Feed-
in Tariff (REFIT), Regulatory Guidelines 26 March 2009) 
 
The PPA will define the long term operation conditions as required by the grantor 
and the technical limits and standards that are needed to meet these 
requirements (Delmon, 2009), and any penalties for non-payment and dispute 
resolution provisions will be negotiated and defined in this document (Sargent 
and Lundy LLC, 2001). However, the REFIT mechanism that NERSA has 
initiated has the express goal to remove lengthy and costly negotiations between 
Eskom and IPP’s through creating one PPA document that will stand as the 
standard PPA with specific provisions for each renewable energy technology. 
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The PPA is a critical risk element and the document allocates the market risk of 
demand and the price level for the project output thereby guaranteeing the 
financiers that there will be enough market demand for the projects output 
(Burton, 2001; and Delmon, 2009, p. 342). The market demand for the project’s 
output, electricity, will vary due to a variety of factors, however the Project 
Company and its Financiers will want certainty as to project revenue and hence 
their financial exposure over the lifetime of the project at least to cover the 
generation costs of that output. So they will seek to allocate this market demand 
and the generation cost to the offtaker (Delmon, 2009, p. 342-343).  
 
In other words if there is not enough demand to accept the output of a wind farm 
onto the grid when it is producing, the PPA, through different mechanisms such 
as “take or pay”, will guarantee that the project will receive revenue for this output. 
It is in this way that the Project Company and the financiers will seek to minimise 
credit risk of the offtaker and ensure that the offtaker has the ability to accept the 
output and make timely payment (Delmon, 2009, p. 101). On the other hand the 
offtaker will want a guaranteed long-term output so if there are any shortfalls in 
contracted plant capacity or supply then the PPA will define the resulting lower 
capacity payments; however this completion risk can be transferred to other party 
participants in the Construction or Operation Agreement (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 
2001).  
 
The PPA is of particular importance in the case of renewable energy technology 
which has high upfront capital costs with the result of large front-loaded draw 
downs on debt with only the revenue guaranteed under the PPA as the 
predominant security for repayment over the life time of the project (Wiser and 
Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386).  
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The PPA is a of key importance to a project financed structure as an uncertain 
revenue stream is a risk that most project financing financiers will not expose 
themselves to (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386). In the instance of South 
Africa the public players have nominated themselves as the only entity to provide 
a PPA to gain access to the REFIT tariff, however to date have not defined what 
will be the content of this PPA. The above has highlighted the importance of the 
PPA so the absence of this important stands out as a massive uncertainty to the 
financial community and is a clear example of how the action of a public player 
can result in limited and more costly project funding as defined under the public-
private partnership. 
 
4.2.3. FINANCING/LOAN AGREEMENT 
 
The Financing or Loan Agreement outlines the terms and conditions that will 
facilitate the provision of non- or limited recourse debt by financiers to the project 
SPV and can some times consist of a variety of separate agreements (Burton, 
2001; and Delmon, 2009). The Financing Agreement then defines the 
relationship between the financiers and the SPV. As discussed in Chapter 6 
financiers to a particular project can consist of one or more of the following: 
commercial banks, export credit agencies (ECA), bond holders, and multilateral 
and bilateral lending institutions, and other development finance institutions (DFIs) 
(Delmon, 2009). It is usually the case that a combination of financiers is used to 
form a financing package; so agreements, such as the Intercreditor Agreement, 
will exist that define the interaction and level of control between these financiers 
(Delmon, 2009). 
 
For project financed structures there is a high portion of debt compared to equity 
so any residual or unassigned project risks will be borne by the SPV, which in 
turn is borne by the financiers as they have the largest investment in the project 
and therefore they stand to lose the most.  
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These residual risks are allocated to the financiers from the sponsors in the SPV 
and project company through the Financing Agreement. Consequently, the 
financiers will seek to limit or eliminate these residual risks through demanding 
that the project documentation is structured in a way that they are guaranteed 
that all major project risks have been addressed, allocated and if possible 
mitigated according to the principle of risk allocation or risks are assigned to 
those project participants that are best placed to manage them which is 
explained in detail in Chapter 7 (Burton, 2001). If the financiers are confident that 
these risks have been appropriately managed and that their risk exposure has 
been limited or mitigated the project is described as bankable.  
 
The process that financiers will undertake to determine the bankability of the 
project is called the due diligence review (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001; and 
Delmon, 2009). An important prerequisite for this process is an accurate and 
verifiable measurement of the site’s wind resource as the many of the banks 
requirements will be ratio driven off the back of this analysis (Potgieter, Personal 
Interview, 2009; and Eardley-Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009; and Burton, 2001). 
 
4.2.4. CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENT 
 
The Construction Agreement is the agreement under which the project company 
assigns the tasks of designing and constructing the wind farm to a set of 
engineering, supply and construction contractor and it defines the responsibilities 
of the subcontractors to the project company in terms of delivering the works over 
the construction period up until Taking over and commissioning (TOC) (Delmon, 
2009, p. 285-286).  
 
There are a diverse set of activities that are allocated to the subcontractors under 
the Construction Agreement and exactly what is included under the 
subcontractor’s scope of works is highly project specific.  
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What follows is a review of what literary sources identify as key activities defined 
under this agreement. Delmon, 2009, p. 286, describes that the activities that are 
allocated are the design and supply of: equipment and required materials; civil 
works; electrical works; and erection and commissioning, while Burton, 2001, is 
more wind specific as he states that the purpose of the Construction Agreement 
is to construct, or facilitate the construction of the wind farm project and procure 
the wind turbines. Ruster, 1996, lists the following responsibilities of the 
construction companies: engineering, procurement, performance testing, 
obtaining permits and insurance, provision of required services (e.g. water, 
electricity, and fuel), and management under extreme events such as force 
majeure events. Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001, refer to the Construction 
Agreement as the Engineering, Procurement and Construction Agreement (EPC) 
which will define: the critical design parameters; the technology used for the main 
equipment; the balance of plant systems; and the site-related issues such as 
geotechnical data for the foundations and civil work, water, wastewater, 
transmission access, and environmental issues (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001).  
 
The construction Agreement allocates the risks that are apparent over the 
construction period and exactly what risks will be apparent is determined by site 
and project specific details. Delmon, 2009, p. 294; and Sargent and Lundy LLC, 
2001, identify some of the general risks that one can expect to be addressed and 
allocated under the Construction Agreement, which are: construction risk, 
technology risk, performance risk, and completion risk, price overruns risk, 
design risk, and environmental risk. There are a number of risk mitigation 
instruments that can be included under this agreement to protect the SPV and 
the financiers over the construction period such as: assigning turnkey scope to 
one contractor, advanced payment performance bonds, guarantees, and 
retention accounts (Delmon, 2009).  
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The choice as to which instrument to use and the mechanism’s specific details 
will be reflective of the level of risk that the financiers will have to bear, however, 
the topic of risk mitigation instruments will be explored further under Chapter 7. 
However, assigning turnkey scope to one contractor to deliver the project on a 
firm date at a fixed price with well defined penalties for defaults, warrants further 
discussion which is also commonly known as engineering, procurement and 
construction contract (EPC). 
 
4.2.4.1. ENGINEERING, PROCUREMENT AND 
CONSTRUCTION (EPC) CONTRACT 
 
Due to the high level of risk to the financier under a project financed structure the 
financier may require that the Construction Agreement is packaged as an 
Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract. This EPC 
requirement is commonly used as a risk mitigation technique by financiers for 
new technologies, situated in new markets, in developing nations where there is 
no past practise to draw upon with high levels of uncertainty and risk. An EPC 
contract, also known as a design and build or a turnkey construction contract is 
the contractual agreement where the project company assigns the full 
responsibility of the design (or engineering) and construction of the works 
through back-to-back documentation to one main construction contractor, usually 
the wind turbine manufacturer, in order to deliver a fully operational, turn-key 
facility to the project company upon a prescribed completion date, on a fixed 
lump sum price basis at each completion milestone (Delmon, 2009, p. 286-294; 
Ruster, 1996; and Burton, 2001). The end result is that the risks that are 
apparent during the construction development project phase are allocated to the 
EPC contractor (Burton, 2001). 
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The responsibilities that are allocated to the construction contractor through an 
EPC contract cover the design of the entire works; coordination of the interfaces 
between the design and construction project participants; and these 
responsibilities must be in accordance with the contractually predefined time for 
completion, performance targets; and specified contractual standard of care 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 286-287). In other words the works must be completed by a 
certain date to perform at certain targets and the contractor must perform the 
works at a prescribed level of care (Delmon, 2009). 
 
The main benefit of employing an EPC contract structure to govern the risk laden 
construction phase of the project is that there is a single point of responsibility for 
the design and construction of the works which is the main construction 
contractor (Delmon, 2009, p. 286-294). So in the event that any default occurs 
during the construction phase, or as a result of the works performed during the 
construction phase, the project company and financiers can deal with one project 
participant to remedy the problem as opposed to the host of participants required 
to design and construct the works. Another important benefit of using an EPC 
contract is that the agreement will provide a fixed price lump-sum structure with 
milestone payments where payment is made at each completed milestone with 
little to no room for price increases other than those that are carefully indexed 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 286-294). This contract framework has the dual result of 
incentivising the EPC contractor to work more efficiently to meet milestone 
completion dates with no cost overruns as to not to erode margins constrained by 
the predefined fixed contract price, and this then provides greater certainty of the 
SPV and therefore the financiers’ financing exposure over the construction phase 
of the project (Delmon, 2009). This certainty over the construction period is of 
particular importance to wind energy projects due to the capital intensive nature 
of these projects, which will require a greater degree of upfront debt and equity 
than more traditional power plants with lower capital costs (Wizelius, 2007).  
68.        Chapter 4: Project Finance 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
However, this allocation of risk to the construction contractor comes at a price 
which is a risk premium that is included in the fixed contract price that will depend 
on the level of risk that is borne by the construction contractor (Delmon, 2009, p. 
294).  
 
The risks that are transferred from the Project Company or SPV to the 
construction contractor through the Construction Agreement are all the 
construction risks apparent over the construction phase of the project, more 
specifically the risks are: completion risk, performance risk, and cost overruns 
risk (Delmon, 2009, p. 294-297). The construction contractor does not only bear 
risk over the construction period but there will be a defects liability period where 
the responsibility to remedy defects, such as latent defects, in the works that the 
construction contractor was responsible under the construction phase and this 
will be for a predefined period after completion (Delmon, 2009). There is 
generally a requirement for EPC contracts for the financing of wind farms in 
South Africa according to the findings of the qualitative interviews. 
 
Arfaoui, 2009, from the AFDB stated that one of the “key elements” that must be 
in place for project financing to take place is an EPC contract, a point that, 
Maclay, 2009, from Actis agreed with as they require an EPC contract to cover 
Construction Risks to facilitate their equity involvement. Viljoen, 2009, from 
Cresco Project Finance concluded that a project will not be able to get away 
without having at least an EPC contract in place under the South Africa 
conditions. In stark contrast to this, Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard bank 
explained that they do not need EPC contracts based on the European ethos that 
the contractors that exist in the market are well known to the bank they are 
confident that they are bankable so there is no need for an EPC contract. When it 
comes to construction risk, Eardley-Taylor explained that particularly in the SA 
market this is a very low risk area for Standard bank.  
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Standard bank knows all the civil and electrical works contractors that exist, they 
have banked them all on previous projects and what’s more is that wind energy 
projects are relatively simple in these two areas. It is then very important for 
project developers in South Africa to ensure that the contractors and consultants 
that are used have a track record of expertise in the area they are to fulfil and in 
addition to this track record must be bankable from the perspective of the bank. 
So for South Africa an EPC contract is generally a requirement to facilitate 
project financing and funding with some exceptions as is the case with Standard 
Bank. This requirement is in response to the level of uncertainty that exists 
around the development of wind power plant projects in South Africa from a 
project delivery, construction, and execution perspective as there is no significant 
track record of the projects in South Africa.  
 
4.2.5. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT 
 
The operation phase is an extremely important phase of the project as it is here 
that all revenues are generated which are used to service debt, pay operating 
costs and disburse returns on equity to the shareholders (Delmon, 2009). For this 
reason the financiers will demand that the project company signs an Operations 
and Maintenance (O&M) Agreement which defines the conditions on the operator 
to ensure the continued and efficient operation of the asset over the 20 year 
lifetime (Delmon, 2009; Burton, 2001; and Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). The 
O&M Agreement is between the project company and the operator and will 
require that a fixed price is given for the operation and maintenance of the project 
and that the methods of calculation are clearly detailed with any price increases 
clearly indexed and explained (Delmon, 2009).  
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Delmon, 2009, outlines some of the primary O&M contractual structures that are 
used for project financing structures where the operation and maintenance 
responsibilities and obligations can be assigned to one or more of the following 
entities: the project company; a third party; a shareholder or its subsidiary; or the 
obligations can be split between multiple contractors (Delmon, 2009, p. 321-322). 
In today’s financial climate financiers will require that whoever the project 
company assigns the task of operation and maintenance to, that this operator 
has a proven track record in operating wind power projects under the context of 
similar political and commercial conditions of those characteristic of the host 
country (Delmon, 2009). For wind power plant projects the O&M Agreement will 
usually be signed with a wind turbine manufacturer, which, according to the risk 
allocation principle, is the project participant that is best placed to manage and 
influence the risk. Suppliers such as Vestas have standard service packages 
such as the AOM4000 that covers all scheduled and unscheduled maintenance 
to ensure guaranteed availability of 97% park availability and where there is 
capacity and availability shortfalls the O&M Agreement will hold the operator to 
certain penalty clauses (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). 
 
The Concession Agreement and PPA will stipulate operating requirements and 
obligations that must be performed to meet a standard of performance for the 
project and the responsibility for this is past onto the Project Company through 
these agreements. In other words when the construction phase of the project has 
come to an end which is signalled by completion of the works and take over has 
taken place the management of the operation of the project; the provision of 
maintenance for materials and equipment; and the adherence to the offtaker’s 
requirements will become the responsibility of the project company (Delmon, 
2009). The O&M Agreement will then pass these obligations and responsibilities 
onto the operator to ensure the availability and efficient operation of the wind 
farm and where these responsibilities are not clear the operator will be contracted 
to a set of standards and criteria of performance (Delmon, 2009, p. 321-326).  
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The availability and efficient operation, mentioned above, of the wind power plant 
can be defined as the capacity of the project to operate at certain performance 
levels inline with the operating requirements that, as discussed above, are 
outlined under the Concession Agreement and PPA by the grantor and the 
offtaker respectively (Delmon, 2009). This capacity to perform must be in line 
with the levels of efficiency that satisfy the revenues forecasted by the financial 
model as it is this forecasted revenue that forms the bulk of the security to 
financiers (Delmon, 2009).  
 
The O&M Agreement allocates the risks that are apparent in the operation phase 
of the project from the project company to the operator. These risks are: 
operating risk; performance risk; increase in cost risk; and political risk. The last 
risk listed, political risk, is present in South Africa as the project company is 
supplying service that has been supplied public sector which should needs to be 
in accordance with public expectations (Delmon, 2009). 
4.2.6. SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENT 
 
The Shareholders Agreement establishes and defines the relationship between 
the different shareholders and owners that have a stake in the Project Company 
or SPV and this agreement defines the rights and obligations of these entities 
with respect to the project company (Burton, 2001; and Delmon, 2009, p. 271). 
There is the opportunity for different shareholders to be active in a project along 
the different project development stages: for example in some instances a 
development company will move the project to completion and take over utilising 
its own funding then they will sell on their equity stake to longer term investors 
such as pension funds for the operation period of the project (these different 
equity options are explored in greater detail in Chapter 7).  
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Due to the changing composition of the shareholders in a wind power project the 
Shareholder Agreement is either dynamic or is the group term used for all the 
documentation that defines the relationship, rights and obligations between 
shareholders in the project company. Some of the documentation that the 
Shareholders Agreement may cover are, but not limited to: the development 
agreement or pre-financial close sponsor’s agreement; joint venture agreement; 
articles of association; constitutional documents; and stand-by credit and equity 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 100). 
 
The Shareholders Agreement aims to address the rights and obligations and the 
relationship between all the shareholders with respect to the project company. 
Under these broad topics there a variety of topics that are addressed under the 
Shareholders Agreement and its exact content is dependent on the project 
specifics and shareholder’s preferences but some general topics that are 
included are now discussed. Firstly the details of establishing the SPV, the 
conditions precedent to its creation, and the structure of the SPV are defined 
under this agreement (Delmon, 2009, p. 100).  
 
Secondly, the management and governance structures that define decision 
making and voting details are defined. Thirdly, the allocation of costs and 
revenues, the commitment of resources and contributions of each shareholder, 
and the transfer and issuance of shares are outlined (Delmon, 2009, p. 100). The 
Shareholders Agreement will define the priority of payments made from the 
cashflow and revenues generated by the project with employees and tax 
authorities paid first; then contractual obligations to third parties are settled; then 
financiers’ senior debt servicing, then any reserve funds and contingencies 
accounts are maintained, and finally the shareholder’s disbursements or returns 
on equity are settled (Delmon, 2009).  
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Fourthly, any other issues, and how the shareholders address them in the event 
that they occur, are addressed, namely: conflict of interest; confidentiality; 
restriction on transfer of shares to any third party; and non-competition clauses 
(Delmon, 2009). 
 
The Shareholders Agreement will allocate the residual project risks amongst the 
different shareholders with an investment in the project company. This can be 
explained as all the project risks that are not borne by the grantor and offtaker will 
be transferred to the project company under the Concession Agreement and the 
PPA and it is then the responsibility of the project company to allocate risks away 
from the SPV to other project participants because the residual risks that are 
unallocated will be borne by the shareholders and the financiers. The proportion 
of the financial exposure that the shareholders and the financiers will bear will be 
determined by the capital structure of the project or the debt to equity ratio, so the 
shareholders will usually, through a contribution clause, only be liable up until the 
amount of their investment in the project and how these risks are shared or 
allocated amongst the shareholders within the project company will be addressed 
in the Shareholders Agreement (Delmon, 2009). It is for this reason that 
financiers will manipulate this capital structure ratio depending on the level of 
residual uncertainty and risks. 
 
4.2.7. SITE AGREEMENT OR LAND LEASE 
 
The Land Lease or Site Agreement is between the land owner and the project 
company and it is an essential facet to the development and operation of a wind 
farm as it secures access to the site where the asset will be constructed and 
operated over its lifetime. The agreement defines the relationship and the 
remuneration details with the landowners; it secures the permission to measure 
and construct a wind farm on the land; and ensure access to the site over the 
lifetime of the project (Burton, 2001; and Wiisbye, 2004). 
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Firstly, this agreement should include permission to install a number of met 
masts on the land and measure the wind conditions for at least one year but 
more preferably this permission should extend to the full 20 years of the project 
(Wiisbye, 2004). Secondly, the agreement will outline the conditions to construct 
a wind farm if the feasibility study proves successful and similar agreements 
might be necessary to establish the same permission with nearby landowners to 
make sure there are no major objections to the wind farm and to secure the land 
for future development (Wiisbye, 2004). Thirdly, and most importantly the Land 
Lease will define way in which the land owner is remunerated for the use of their 
land and the exact land owner remuneration methods employed will normally be 
project specific (Wiisbye, 2004). For instance in Sweden the land owner is 
normally remunerated through a set lease at roughly 2-4% of the gross annual 
revenue from the wind farm, or a corresponding up front lump sum payment 
when the wind farm in constructed (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
However the following broad options are often seen in the wind power industry in 
the different stages of the project’s development: In the prefeasibility and 
feasibility phase of the project a small annual fee can be paid to the land owner 
for holding the right to develop a wind farm on the land or a small annual fee can 
be paid for the permission to install a met mast and measure the wind conditions 
on site (Wiisbye, 2004). Once the feasibility study is complete and it makes 
sense to develop a wind farm on the land a larger fee is paid to the land owner 
(Wiisbye, 2004). These fees can sometimes be avoided through negotiating with 
the land owners to guarantee them future revenues contingent on the suitability 
of the site to wind farm development.  
 
Once the wind farm is developed there are two different approaches to 
remunerate land owners over the operation period of the project: fixed fee or 
annual royalty.  
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In the first instance a fixed fee is paid when the wind farm is commissioned and it 
is usually a percentage of project contract value and in the second instance an 
annual royalty is paid based on the wind farm performance (Wiisbye, 2004).  In 
reality a combination of a fixed fee and an annual royalty is often chosen as this 
will secure that the landowner is compensated from the beginning but it will also 
secure that the landowner is more willing to assist in securing the projects 
optimum performance during the project lifetime with the incentive of higher 
annual royalties (Wiisbye, 2004). 
4.3. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has introduced the concept of project financing, discussed the 
connection between the project participants and contractual documentation; and 
lastly explored this application in South Africa. The main advantages of project 
finance structure are firstly the non- or limited recourse nature of debt and 
secondly, the increased debt capacity or equity leveraging possibilities. While the 
disadvantages are that due to higher risk to the financier there will be higher debt 
and equity costs to the borrower and a greater array of restrictive loan covenants. 
This is Furthermore, due to the complex nature associated with arranging the 
various contracts, both transaction times and costs are longer and larger 
respectively, especially with respect to higher legal fees.  
 
The main project participants under a project finance structure are discussed 
above and while the above mentioned set of government, financiers and 
investors are currently in place to be the ones to execute the contractual 
documentation, there is the strong possibility that these players could change as 
the market moves forward from its uncertain position. These entities will be 
connected through the project documentation which has the main goal of creating 
a seamless web of risk allocation between party participants that is both efficient 
and effective according to the guiding principle of risk allocation (discussed in 
Chapter 7). 
76 
 
 
 
5. CHAPTER 5: KEY FINANCING TERMS AND VARIABLES 
 
KEY FINANCING TERMS AND VARIABLES 
 
This chapter will deal with each key financing term and variable by firstly 
introducing each one and discussing how they reflect the risk tolerances of the 
funding entity through revealing their and perceived level of risks they see 
inherent in a project. This will be followed by an illustration of some of the 
tolerances as reflected in the literature and the qualitative interviews to facilitate 
the comparison of the key financing terms and variables that are currently valid 
for South Africa against those researched from the global literature. This 
comparison only serves as a rough indication as to how funders currently 
perceive their risk exposure in South Africa in the absence of defined project 
risks. This is set against the context of researched key financing terms and 
variables, to determine whether the risk appetite for South African project 
financed wind farms is in line with the rest of the world or completely out. To 
make definite conclusions about this would require the South Africa wind market 
to be more advanced in terms of more defined risks as opposed to larger 
uncertainties which could yield a more South Africa, wind project specific set of 
key financing terms and variables. 
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When financiers and investors extend debt and equity respectively to a project 
financed wind power project there will be a cost for this input and a set of 
requirements or terms that must be met before either one of these entities feels 
comfortable to fund the project. The cost of debt and equity are debt interest 
rates and return on equity respectively and the potential sources of funds will 
stipulate their terms through a set of variables and ratios that communicate the 
levels of overall performance of the project and the debt servicing capabilities, 
namely: capital structure (debt/equity ratio); debt interest rate; debt maturity 
period; debt amortisation schedule; debt service coverage ratio (DSCR); and 
return on equity.  
 
The majority of these terms, variables and ratios deal with the provision of debt 
and the restrictions or “loan covenants” that are placed on the project which is 
due to the majority of funds for a project financed project coming from financiers 
in the form of non- or limited recourse debt. Furthermore, each of the financing 
structures that are discussed in Chapter 3 have their own specific set of values 
for these variables and associated terms which is reflective of the varying risk 
levels inherent to each structure. For instance a corporate financing structure will 
qualify for more favourable terms when compared to project financing as in the 
first instance the bank has recourse to an established balance sheet. However, 
for the purposes of this paper this discussion will be restricted to project financing. 
 
For a project financed project financiers will lend based off the viability of the 
project structure, the business plan and the forecast revenue stream (Delmon, 
2009). So before financiers consider a project they will perform a due diligence 
review of the financial viability of the project to establish the performance of the 
project; its debt servicing capabilities; and finally their overall financial or risk 
exposure on the funds (Delmon, 2009).  
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Their main focus will be to determine the full extent of the negative potential of 
the project and how they can structure the project to provide the necessary 
security they require to mitigate their exposure to these negative potentials 
(Ubajaka, 2006). Financiers will consequently adjust their interest rates and 
default terms, or key financing terms and variables, to the level of risk exposure 
on debt that financiers perceive in the project with most lenders requiring some 
form of equity investment in the project to communicate the investor’s 
commitment (Ubajaka, 2006). Similarly, equity investors will review the potential 
return on their equity and will usually have a hurdle rate, below which, they will 
not invest. Based off this review, and their associated risk exposure of funding 
the project, both financiers and investors will decide whether or not they will get 
involved in the project; what the degree of their involvement will be; and the cost 
and terms of their involvement which will then be reflected through the key 
financing terms and variables. 
 
The set of values behind the key financing terms and variables are vitally 
important as they have a significant influence over overall costs and returns 
(Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386; Wiser, 1997). Consequently, a project 
financed deal can not materialise without a contribution of debt and equity so it is 
vitally important to understand how these variables and terms reflect financiers’ 
and investors’ risk tolerance and overall appetite before a discussion on how to 
manage, allocate, and mitigate these risks to package projects in a way that 
qualifies the project for the most favourable key financing terms and variables, in 
coming chapters.  
 
The structure of this chapter will start with a general discussion about the 
financing terms and variables for the South African market, followed by a 
discussion of how the ranges of values of the variables given in the qualitative 
interviews match up to the ranges of values from different global literature 
sources.  
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Then each variable will be discussed and how this variable is altered in response 
to the level of perceived risk and uncertainty that the particular financier/investor 
believes there to be in extending the funds to the project. 
 
5.1. KEY FINANCING VARIABLES 
 
Table 5 gives the ranges for the key financing terms and variables as sourced 
from the literature while Table 6 illustrates the ranges that were expressed by the 
qualitative interviews held with potential and existing financiers and investors to 
the South African utility scale wind energy projects. 
 
Table 5: General value ranges of the key financing terms and variables from 
the international literature sources vs. the qualitative interviews 
 
TOLERANCE 
KEY FINANCING VARIABLE EXPLANATION 
Literature 
Exploratory 
Interviews 
Capital Structure Debt to equity Ratio 50/50 – 90/10 60/40 – 80/20 
Debt Interest Rate Interest Rate 8.5% – 14.90% 12% – 14% 
Debt Maturity 
Length of the Loan, 
years 
10 – 15 yrs 
8 – 15 yrs 
(refinance) 
Debt Amortisation Debt payment schedule 
Mortgage-style 
Repayment 
Sculpted and 
Mortgage 
Debt Service Coverage Ratios 
Minimum acceptable 
value for the DSCR 
1.35 – 1.60 1.2 – 1.4 
Equity Return 
Return on Equity 
(ROE), Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) 
16% to 20% USD 
IRR 
ZAR: 18% - 20% 
Dollar: 11% - 
25% 
Payback Period (Equity) Number of years - 12 years 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
 
There seems to be a great deal of uncertainty due to the many undefined market, 
regulatory and project risks in South Africa that have not been defined into well 
understood risks at this early stage of the market’s development for financiers 
and investors to confidently comment on the specific set of key financial variables 
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assumptions and the specific tolerances (BNP Paribas, 2009; and Viljoen, 2009). 
Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project Finance explained that when it comes to 
specific key financial variable assumptions and the specific tolerances of 
financiers and sponsors it is dependent on two main factors: firstly the outcome 
of what the proposed PPA structure will be, and secondly the quality of each 
specific project and whether or not all the major risks have been addressed and 
assigned appropriately (Viljoen, 2009). So the tolerances to the financing 
variables will be project specific and it is too early to comment specifically so 
once the first project passes through the bank’s credit approval process many of 
these uncertainties will unfold and the risk profile defined. It is only once the risks 
are defined and the specific value of each possible outcome is understood can 
financiers and investors effectively price the associated risk exposure. It is only 
once this has happened that financiers and investors can reflect their tolerances 
to this calculated risk profile through the key terms and financing variables. 
 
Many of the financiers and investors that were interviewed shared this view that 
the terms and variables would be project specific as Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA 
Capital explained that it will be difficult for them at this stage to define exactly 
what the bank would require to pass a project through their credit approval 
process until they see the first transaction go through. The credit in ABSA is not 
familiar with wind projects and the team at the bank will have to test their credit 
requirements before they can confidently list their requirements and risk 
tolerances. Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy Finance suggested that in the 
absence of any defined project on the table it is difficult to determine the specific 
set of assumptions for the South Africa wind energy market. However, the 
following tolerances that underpin global developments would be a good start.  
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Arfaoui, 2009, from the African Development Bank explained that the actual level 
of the key financing variable varies to such a degree over the different project 
structure, country, PPA format, and other project specific details that is difficult to 
quote any specific numbers that can be used to capture the whole African 
continent region that it covers and that the level or tolerance to these variables 
depends on the unique risk of each project (Arfaoui, 2009). In other words, it is 
only once these broader market level uncertainties are defined and captured in 
an appropriately packaged first project that financiers and investors will be able to 
perform their due diligence review and advise their set of key financing terms and 
variables (BNP Paribas, 2009). As this will be discussed in later chapters the 
public players in South Africa have a large influence over the level of perceived 
uncertainty in the market at this stage due to an undefined regulatory framework 
to deliver the REFIT tariff. This means that the public players have a direct 
influence on the availability and the cost of potential project funds. 
 
Many of South Africa’s commercial banks and foreign/local equity investors are 
waiting for the first project to be successfully licensed, constructed and 
connected to the grid to pave the way for others to follow and to define many of 
the outstanding uncertainties of the financiers and investors. In other words they 
are adopting a wait and see attitude to see if wind power has a place in South 
Africa’s future energy mix. When questioned as to the specific tolerances that 
potential and existing financiers/investors have with regards to their set of key 
financing terms and variables, many commented that it is too soon to 
communicate an accurate and tailored set of financing terms and variables for 
South African utility scale wind farms, however a general “rule of thumb” can be 
applied to these variables that capture the global, company, sector, and project 
type risks that banks, DFIs and investors will use to tailor their products to the 
projects under review.  
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Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA Capital, demonstrated how this tailoring process will 
play out as there are different levels of certainty, such as P50 or P90, and for 
each of these levels ABSA has a matrix that returns a certain risk profile which 
they use as a starting point for determining the associated tolerance or hurdle 
rates for the key financing variables at each level of certainty. So the exact 
packaging requirements, debt pricing and financing terms is ratio driven off the 
back of the certainty levels behind the key risks of a project under review and 
these will only become apparent once the first project has passed through their 
credit’s approval process. Vajeth, 2009, showed how this demonstrated the 
importance of the first utility-scale wind farm in South Africa and he stressed that 
this will be a milestone as it assure financiers of what these projects entail and 
what the impact is for financing purposes. Unfortunately, for the first project 
bank’s credit facilities will demand a higher level of certainty, P90, which will give 
them more comfort especially under the context of a global financial crisis. 
 
That said financiers and investors can give a “rule of thumb” range of financing 
terms and variables that captures their broader global, company, sector and 
country specific risk tolerance. O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable 
Power said that the banks are giving similar gearing and margins as other forms 
of infrastructure in the market and these key financing variables will be in line 
with the rest of the world and Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy Finance 
explained that the tolerances that underpin global developments would be a good 
start. With this in mind any indication that is given as to the level of these 
variables acts as a “rule of thumb” that captures the global, company, sector, 
project type risks rather than providing an accurate and tailored set of financing 
terms for South Africa utility scale wind farms (Industry Participant, BNP Paribas , 
2009). Cresco Viljoen, 2009, explained that although the exact hurdle rates to the 
key financial variables are project specific and financier specific there is a broad 
range of tolerances over these set of variables.  
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Viljoen stressed that any tolerances communicated at this stage, act as mere 
guidelines at this stage and financiers/sponsors may demand more or less as the 
market and project specific detail becomes apparent or in other words as the 
uncertainties are defined into a clear set of risks. 
 
The ranges of key financial terms and variables that are described in this paper, 
as summated in Table 5, are to be treated as a general, pro forma set of “hurdle 
rates” or tolerances for the key financial variables, but it is only once the major 
uncertainties, such as the format the PPA will take, NERSA’s procurement 
process, and the technical issues of grid connection and dispatch, start to unravel 
that the more market and project specific key financial variables’ assumptions 
can be tailored for South Africa wind energy projects and financiers and sponsors 
will be able to accurately formulate their South African wind energy specific risk 
tolerances and communicate this appetite through a set of key financial variables 
(Viljoen, Personal Interview, 2009). These tolerances that are explained through 
these personal interviews are useful in communicating the general project risks; 
current global risks; wind power specific risks; existing company best practise; 
and broad assumptions about South Africa. In other words once the PPA has 
been published and the first project has been successfully developed 
financiers/sponsors will understand where South African wind projects sit on the 
risk scale and where in this range their key financing terms and hurdle rates will 
be to reflect there desired risk exposure. From this one can see that uncertainty 
in the regulatory framework can have a severe impact on financiers and investors. 
 
It is because of the uncertainties and lack project specifics, as outlined above 
that, at the early stage of the market, it will be inaccurate to profile each specific 
financier’s and investor’s risk tolerance and appetite based off their 
communicated key financing terms and variables so this report will aim to profile 
the overall tolerance of potential financiers and investors to the inherent risks of 
project financing utility scale wind farms in the South African market as reflected 
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in their key financing terms and variables. Before this is discussed this chapter 
will explore how Table 5 was formulated, through a review of each variable in 
turn and how they reflect the financier’s/investor’s risk tolerance to perceived 
project risks. 
 
5.1.1. CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
The capital structure of a project is the combination of debt and equity that is 
used to finance a project, with the proxy of this combination being the debt/equity 
ratio (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386; Wiser, 1997; and Wong, 1995). Debt is 
often cheaper than equity so the project company will seek to maximise the 
amount of debt in the capital structure and reduce higher-cost equity capital, 
thereby reducing overall project costs (Delmon, 2009; Wiser, 1997; Wong, 1995; 
and Wiser and Kahn, 1996). The capital structure of a project is flexible and can 
be optimised to reduce overall financing cost however, the contribution will 
depend on the relative costs of debt and equity; how much equity financiers 
require depends on the financier’s risk exposure of the project which is 
expressed through the minimum DSCR constraint (Wiser, 1997; Wong, 1995). It 
is the requirement to meet this DSCR constraint that limits the ability to optimise 
the capital structure of privately developed and owned wind power plants 
because this constraint is the financier’s way of stipulating the minimum amount 
of equity they require to lend debt to the project which is determined by the 
financier’s perceived risk exposure of the project (Wiser, 1997; Wong, 1995; and 
Wiser and Kahn, 1996). 
 
The capital structure reflects the risk tolerance of the financiers as the proportion 
of the financial exposure that the shareholders and the financiers will bear will be 
determined by the capital structure of the project or the debt to equity ratio.  
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The higher the debt to equity ratio is, or the higher the portion of debt in the 
project, the more the financier is exposed to project risk so for projects with a 
high level of inherent risk, financiers will require a greater equity contribution or 
“ownership” of shareholders in the project which is considered a form of 
commitment from developers and sponsors (Delmon, 2009, p. 56; and Ubajaka, 
2006).  
 
This is because shareholders will only be liable up until the amount of their 
investment in the project due to the non- or limited recourse nature of debt so 
financiers will require a greater equity stake in accordance to the level of 
perceived which will assign greater exposure of the residual risks to shareholders 
which will increase their incentive for project success (Delmon, 2009; and 
Ubajako, 2006). In other words the requirement for a higher injection of equity is 
the key protection against risks as it acts as a cushion against risk for financiers 
as equity sits lower on the list of priority of payments than senior debt servicing 
(Donaldson, 1992, as cited in Ubajako, 2009). Other factors that influence this 
minimum level of equity investment from shareholders in the project company are: 
security available, the creditworthiness of project participants, the project specific 
detail, the country risk and the degree of involvement of government entities 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 56). 
 
Table 6 below represents some of the debt/equity ratios sourced from a variety of 
literature that has been reviewed which covers the financing and risk 
management of utility scale wind farms globally.  
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Table 6: Capital Structure (Debt/Equity) from the Literature 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE [Debt To Equity Ratio] 
Source Tolerance 
Wong (1995) (1994) 50/50-70/30 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) Flexible - 50/50 
Burton et al (2001) 80/20 
Ubajaka (2006) 75/25 
Wizelius (2007) 80/20 
Delmon (2009) 70/30 - 90/10 (40/60 high risk) 
NERSA REFIT (2009) 70/30 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The observation from Table 6 above is that this variable is flexible and the level is 
dependent on project, country, company and sector specifics which is evident 
from the different levels expressed above. However there is a range that can be 
deduced for project financed utility-scale wind farms with the lower bound being 
50/50 and the upper bound being 90/10. The upper bound in this instance is 
unrealistic under the current risk adverse context of the financial crisis and for the 
lower bound Wiser, 1997, argues that the optimal capital structure for a wind 
power plant in the US is approximately 50/50, however this comment is outdated 
as he goes on to say that, “The capital structure of recent [1995] US wind plants 
is consistent with this analysis” (Wiser, 1997; Wong, 1995). Delmon, 2009, p. 57, 
explains in a more current report, that for power projects a “ball-park” debt/equity 
ratio is around 70/30 to 90/10, however for projects with a higher degree of 
inherent project and market risks financiers will require a larger share of equity 
with debt/equity ratios in the range of 45/55 to 40/60 (Delmon, 2009, p. 57). 
Finally, the REFIT Consultation Paper Phase II, NERSA, 2009, published a 
capital structure of 70/30 for South African utility-scale wind power facilities.  
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To determine where South Africa will lie along this range key financiers, investors 
and industry participants were questioned as to the contribution of equity that 
South African financiers will require. Table 7 lists the results from this qualitative 
analysis. 
 
Table 7: Capital Structure (Debt/Equity) from Qualitative Interviews 
 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE [Debt To Equity Ratio] 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Nedbank Capital 70/20-75/25 
Investec Capital 60/40-75/25 
Standard Bank Ratio driven P50/90 production 
Absa Capital Ratio driven P50/90 production 
BNP Paribas 70/30-80/20 
African Development Bank (AFDB) 70/30 
Actis Equity Fund Project Specific 
Mainstream Renewable Power 80/20 
Cresco Project Finance 60/40-70/30 
New Energy Finance 80/20 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The debt/equity ratios that were communicated in the qualitative interviews are in 
the middle range of the range determined by the literature of 50/50 to 90/10 as 
explained above. The lower bound of these qualitative results is 60/40 with the 
upper bound of 80/20 which shows that while financiers will provide the majority 
of the funds to a project financed deal in South Africa they will still require a 
significant portion of equity to shield against the largely undefined project risks in 
South Africa.  
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Potgieter, 2009, from Investec agreed with this range and indicated that debt to 
equity ratios will range from 60/40, on the conservative side, to 75/25 on the 
optimistic end of the spectrum which was in line with a industry participant from 
the French international bank BNP Paribas, 2009, explained that only a well 
structured project where all the major project risks have been addressed and 
assigned to those best placed to deal with them will be able to qualify for limited 
recourse debt that will cover up to 80% of the project, however, a 70/30 debt 
equity ratio is more realistic from domestic commercial banks.  
 
Both O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power and Greenwood from 
New Energy Finance remain confident that, despite impact of the credit crisis, 
there is still sufficient appetite from domestic and international commercial banks 
to facilitate an 80/20 debt-to-equity ratio (Andersen, as quoted in Engineering 
News, 2009). The Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) with the ability to take 
on a higher degree of political and country risk are still within this range of 
offering a capital structure 70/30 i.e. at least 30% of equity from project sponsors 
which Arfaoli, 2009, African Development Bank explained. 
 
Both ABSA Bank and Standard Bank require a confidence level of P90 sensitivity 
on production modelling to lend project finance debt and their hurdle rates to the 
key financing variables are essentially ratio driven off the back of this production 
modelling (Eardley-Taylor, 2009; and Vajeth, 2009). So the windier sites will 
qualify for a more relaxed set of hurdle rates while sites where the wind resource 
is marginal banks will be stricter and require more equity as the project has less 
ability to reliably service senior debt. 
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5.1.2. DEBT INTEREST RATE 
 
When financiers lend funds to a project in the form of non-or limited recourse 
loan there will be an opportunity cost to financiers for giving this money to the 
project rather than another investment where they would earn a certain return, so 
they will reclaim this money through the debt interest rate. The focus of this 
discussion will be on real interest rates where inflation is taken into account as 
this is what the project actually pays for using the debt, as opposed to nominal 
interest rates where the effect of inflation is not factored in. So the cost of debt to 
the project company for using the funding from the bank is the interest rate 
charged.  
 
The actual interest rate charged depends on a variety of factors, some which are 
country and bank specific, but those relevant to this study are the perceived risk 
of the project and the maturity period of the loan in the sense that interest rates 
will usually rise with the length of the debt maturity period as the opportunity cost 
to the financier is larger as funds are tied up in the project for longer (Wiser and 
Kahn, 1996; Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386). Interest rates are sensitive to 
the perceived project risks as the higher this risk is the higher the cost of this debt 
will need to be for financiers to be remunerated for taking on this risk (Wizelius, 
2007). This is how the debt interest rate reflects the risk appetite of financiers as 
traditionally the higher the risk is the higher the interest rate is, however to 
determine the actual appetite of financiers this interest rate needs to be 
compared against the inherent risk in the project and if this is exposure is low and 
so is the interest rate then financiers have a high risk appetite and vice versa. 
Furthermore, this illustrates how financiers firstly determine the inherent level of 
perceived risk or uncertainty and price their exposure of the debt so it is these 
factors, uncertainty and risk, that drive the level of this opportunity cost or debt 
interest rate. 
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Table 8 illustrates the debt interest rates that literature sources have compiled for 
studies covering general wind farm development and some isolated to certain 
regions. 
 
 
Table 8: Debt Interest Rates from the Literature 
 
DEBT INTEREST RATE [Percentage] 
Source Tolerance 
Karas (1995) (1994) 8.50-10.50% 
Wong (1995) (1994) 8.50-10.50% 
Hoffman (1995) 8.50-10.50% 
Kahn (1995) 8.50-10.50% 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) 9.5% 
Wiser & Pickle (1998) 9.5% 
Burton et al (2001) 10-20% 
NERSA (2009) Nominal:14.90% Real:6.39% 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The range of interest rates from the literature as illustrated in the Table 8 is 8.5% 
to14.90% with 20% acting as an outlier. It is difficult to make a comparison of 
interest rates from across countries as central banks, country inflation and fiscal 
or monetary policy have a significant affect on how banks will set the interest 
rates they will extend to projects. This process for South Africa is discussed 
below and the interest rates that were communicated in the qualitative interviews 
are listed in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Debt Interest Rates from Qualitative Interviews 
 
DEBT INTEREST RATE [Percentage] 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Standard Bank 12% 
Absa Capital Ratio driven P50/90 production 
African Development Bank (AFDB) Better rates than banks 
Mainstream Renewable Power 12-14% 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The South African market has high real interest rates when compared to the rest 
of the world and both Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank and Greenwood, 
2009, from New Energy Finance and Maclay, 2009, from Actis identified the high 
interest rates in South Africa and globally as a variable that will be very important 
for project financed deals which is due to the role of the interest rate in 
determining the cost of debt. They stressed that the interaction between a high 
inflation rate and nominal interest rates result in relatively high real interest rates 
which will result in lower returns on equity which could potentially act as a 
deterrent for foreign investors.  
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank explained how Standard bank, a 
leading commercial bank in South Africa, sets its real interest rates that it will 
offer to a project. To start the Johannesburg Interbank Agreed Rate (JIBAR) is 
8% which is the money market rate or the average of the rates indicated by local 
and international banks that is used by South Africa (Answers.com, 2009). JIBAR 
is calculated as a yield and then converted into a discount which is calculated 
daily after all of the rates are received by participating banks (Answers.com, 
2009). The interest rate that Standard bank then lends off is determined by the 
following components. Component number one is the central banking costs 
which are normally 30 basis points.  
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The component number two is the “cost of money” which is a critical component 
as this is essentially tied to liquidity of the banks. Before the financial crisis banks 
would take the liquidity risk of a potential mismatch between the cost of debt they 
lend to a project and the cost of money that the bank pays for its own funding. 
However, banks have now been encouraged to become increasingly 
conservative and price their cost of debt off their own cost of external funding. 
This is where the variability in different banks interest rates originates as different 
banks get their funding from different sources. Standard Bank gets their funding 
from the market and the bank gets charged the full market prices for liquidity. So 
if they lend a ten year loan they need to raise ten years of liquidity from the 
market and the cost of this is reflected in the interest rate or cost of money they 
charge on project financed debt which is in the order of 150 basis points. 
Component three is the normal credit margin which is roughly 20 basis points so 
all in for screening purposes the interest rate of project finance debt from 
Standard Banks is 12% (Eardley-Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009). 
Arfaoui, 2009, from the African Development Bank explained that DFIs, with their 
ability to absorb political/sovereign and country risk, will be able to offer better 
debt interest rates than some commercial banks. So the range for South African 
wind energy project financed deals will be between 12% to 14% which falls in the 
range stipulated in the literature of 8.5% and 14.9%, but will be project specific 
and dependent on the components as explained above and the degree of clarity 
offered by the public players on the uncertainties identified in Chapter 2. 
 
5.1.3. DEBT MATURITY 
 
The debt maturity period, also known as the amortisation period, is the length or 
amount of years that the project company will be liable to pay yearly amortisation 
both the principal and interest in the repayment of the loan (Wiser, 1997).  
 
93.     Chapter 5: Key Financing Terms and Variables 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
Financier’s risk tolerance is reflected in the length of the debt maturity period as a 
project with a high degree of perceived project risk to the financiers will be 
reflected through financier’s offering a shorter debt maturity period as they will 
want to get their money in and out of the project as quick as possible, make their 
interest, and invest the money in the next investment (Wiser, 1997). The shorter 
this maturity is, the greater the up-front burden of these principal payments on 
the project company will be on the project company (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). So 
maturity periods will increase inversely to the level of perceived financier project 
risk exposure.  
 
Some of the debt maturity periods from the literature are listed in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Debt Maturity Periods from Literature 
 
DEBT MATURITY PERIODS [Years] 
Source Tolerance 
Wong (1995) (1994) 10-15 yrs 
Hoffman (1995) 10-15 yrs 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) 12 yrs 
Wiser & Pickle (1998) 12 yrs 
Wizelius (2007) 10-12 yrs 
Private Placement Letter (2008) 
source? 
20 yrs 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The range of debt maturity periods from the literature, as illustrated above in 
Table 10, is from 10 to 15 years with 20 years as an outlier, where the lower 
bound is that characteristic of commercial banks while the upper bound of the 
range being representative of DFIs, MLIs, and BLIs with the ability to bear more 
risk than commercial banks.   
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Hoffman, 1995 and Wong, 1995 state that 10-15 year debt maturity periods are 
common in wind power project-finance, and Wiser and Kahn, 1996 agree with a 
12 year debt term.  
 
However, these debt maturity periods are predominantly from the ‘90s and with 
the occurrence of the financial crisis financiers have become increasingly risk 
adverse. Table 11, below, illustrates some more current debt maturity periods as 
expressed by potential and existing financiers and investors to the South African 
project finance wind energy industry. 
 
Table 11: Debt Maturity Periods from Qualitative Interviews 
 
DEBT MATURITY PERIODS [Years] 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Nedbank Capital 10 yrs (refinance) 
Investec Capital Banks: 13-17 yrs / DFI: 20yrs (refinance) 
Standard Bank 15-17 yrs (refinance) 
Absa Capital Ratio driven P50/90 production 
BNP Paribas 8 yrs (refinance) 
African Development Bank  15 yrs 
Cresco Project Finance Banks: 10 yrs / DFI: 12yrs (refinance) 
New Energy Finance 10 yrs (refinance) 
Source: As stated in table 
The range for given by the individuals interviewed was, for commercial banks, 
between 8 to 17 years with refinancing required and between 12 and 20 years for 
DFIs such as African Development Bank. There is also an option to refinance at 
the end of these periods to gain access to longer maturity periods. Refinance will 
be of benefit to both the financiers and the project company.  
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As the financers will be given the chance to reconsider the loan once the many of 
the project risks, especially post the risk heavy construction phase, have been 
defined and mitigated; while the project company will benefit from lower interest 
rates and better financing terms due to the lower risks in their project.  
So while the range communicated through the qualitative analysis fall in the 
range of the range as deduced from the literature, the banks will cover 
themselves with the requirement to refinance at a lower level of project risks. 
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank explained this concept as although 
Standard Bank is still writing 20 year loans they are effectively not 20 year 
tenures as the customer is required to refinance at year 6 or 8. The concept of 
refinancing at year 6 to 8 rests on the assumption that the funding markets will be 
in a better place and that many of the outstanding uncertainties will have become 
more clearly defined so projects will qualify for longer tenures and cheaper prices 
(Eardley-Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009). 
Potgieter, 2009, from Investec stipulated the debt maturity periods that South 
Africa is likely to see is in the range of 13 to 17 years from commercial banks 
while Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank was slightly more optimistic with 
a range of 15 to 17 years with the condition of refinancing. The DFIs, on the other 
hand, will be the only organisations that will be able to offer 20 years based on 
the 20 year PPA under the REFIT, according to Potgieter, 2009, from Investec 
although Arfaoui, 2009, from the African Development Bank said that the AFDB 
as a general rule of thumb is only looking to fit debt with a maturity period of 
maximum 15 years with two to three years grace period depending on the project. 
Multilateral Lending Agencies (MLA) such as the AFDB have the facility to stretch 
lending tenures well past standard commercial maturities according to Khatib, 
1997, and an industry participant, 2009, from BNP Paribas agreed with this point 
as he expressed that MLAs were an avenue for developing nations to pursue 
longer debt tenures where it will be possible qualify for tenures of up to 17 years.  
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As explained there are uncertainties that financiers and investors have 
highlighted in South Africa in terms of gaps in the regulatory framework and 
process for wind farms accessing the REFIT tariff and connection to the grid.  
These uncertainties, if not addressed, will result in limited and expensive debt for 
these projects from the commercial banks; however, the development finance 
institutions have a greater capacity to absorb this risk so this states the 
importance of these institutions for South Africa and developing nations at large. 
 
An industry participant, 2009, from BNP Paribas explained that there is likely to 
be a mismatch between the loan tenures and PPA periods due to the financial 
crisis more than as a result of the country or project specific risks in South Africa 
(Quaye, 2009). It is likely that the banks, both domestic and international, will not 
share the long term view that the proposed REFIT tariff has outlined, more 
specifically, commercial banks will be looking at 8 year maturity periods even 
though the REFIT promises a PPA that will run for 20 years. This can be 
attributed to the limited liquidity in the market at the moment which will make 
banks eager to get their money in and out as quickly as possible and reduce their 
exposure to project and market risks (An industry participant, 2009, from BNP 
Paribas). This then means that project developers may have to rely on the MLA's 
development finance to take the shortfall in debt that is required past the 8 years 
that the commercial banks will offer. The issue of refinance will then be an 
important tool for South African wind power project’s funding. 
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5.1.4. DEBT AMORTISATION (DEBT PRINCIPAL PAYMENT 
SCHEDULE) 
 
Debt amortisation refers to the debt payment schedule and total yearly debt 
service includes both principal and interest payments that are made through the 
maturity period of the loan and for senior debt repayment for privately owned, 
project financed wind farms there are two primary debt payment schedules that 
are common, namely: mortgage-style debt repayment and sculpted-style debt 
repayment (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; and Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386).  
 
The first payment schedule is mortgage-style debt repayment has historically 
been used for wind farm financing and this takes the form of a constant annuity 
repayment profile. More specifically this is where equal annual payments, 
consisting of changing interest and principal payment, are made in repayment of 
the loan, with the proportion of principal payments increasing and interest 
payments decreasing with time (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; and Wiser and Pickle, 
1998, p. 361-386).  
 
The second payment schedule is a sculpted-style debt repayment which is more 
tailored to wind power generation as it takes into account the seasonal 
oscillations of the wind resource (Navigator Project Finance, 2009). As the wind 
resource varies from season to season the Cash flow Available for Debt Service 
(CFADS) is also variable, so by sculpting debt repayments around a constant 
DSCR, debt repayments will be sculpted to pay more during high wind months 
and lesson the debt servicing burden during lower wind months. The main benefit 
of sculpting debt repayments is that the actual debt repayment each month will 
be driven by the constant DSCR ratio and the seasonal CFADS 
(DSCR=CFADS/Debt servicing), thereby taking into account the seasonal 
variation in wind resource and maximising the potential of the project to service 
senior debt. 
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Table 12: Debt Amortisation (Debt Principal Payment Schedule) from 
Literature 
 
DEBT AMORTISATION [Schedule] 
Source Tolerance 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) Mortgage-style repayment 
Wiser and Pickle (1998) Mortgage-style repayment 
Source: As stated in table 
 
Table 12 above illustrates some of the debt amortisation schedules that are 
characteristic of wind farm development historically as discussed by Wiser and 
Kahn, 1996, and Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386. From the literature 
reviewed a mortgage-style repayment schedule has been common for wind farm 
project debt servicing which is in line with what Nedbank Capital, 2009, 
expressed as their preference for their debt servicing to South African wind farm 
project financing, as illustrated in Table 12. This is in contrast to what Eardley-
Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank expressed, who detailed that the debt 
amortisation schedule that Standard Bank would require would be a sculpted 
repayment schedule ratio where it is ultimately the wind speed that determines 
the schedule of repayment. The ultimate schedule required by banks will depend 
on the degree of experience the bank has in financing wind farm facilities where 
first time banks will aim for mortgage-style amortisation schedule, as are found in 
more traditional power plant financing, where as those banks with a track record 
in wind power financing will aim to maximise the debt servicing capabilities of a 
variable wind farm output and employ a sculpted-style repayment schedule. 
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Table 13: Debt Amortisation (Debt Principal Payment Schedule) from 
Qualitative Interviews 
 
DEBT AMORTISATION [Schedule] 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Nedbank Capital Mortgage-style repayment 
Standard Bank 
Sculpted; Ratio driven off the wind 
speed 
Source: As stated in table 
 
5.1.5. DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE RATIO (DSCR): PROJECT 
FINANCE LOAN COVENANTS  
 
The debt-service cover ratio (DSCR) is the ratio of the Cashflow Available for 
Debt Service (CFADS) of a project to the total debt repayments which consists of 
the loan principal plus interest (DSCR = CFADS / Total Debt Service principal + 
interest) and the ratio is used by financiers to measure the ability of a project to 
service debt repayments. This ratio is the most important measure of project debt 
servicing capabilities as it compares the CFADS which is the total cash flowing 
into the project or its revenues minus operation costs, but before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization of a certain period against the total amount of debt 
service obligations that are due in the same period (Ruster, 1996; Delmon, 2009; 
and Wiser and Kahn, 1996). In other words it shows how many times a project’s 
CFADS will cover the total debt servicing obligations of a loan and this ratio must 
never fall below one as then default on loan repayments will occur. 
 
This key financing variable comes in many distinctions from minimum, average, 
default, and warning DSCR both from a short term and long term point if view 
(Potgieter, Personal Interview, 2009).  
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The short term DSCR is what is discussed above where the CFADS from a 
certain period is compared against the loan repayment from a certain period; 
whereas the long term DSCR is actually called the Loan Life Cover Ratio (LLCR). 
This is similar to the short term DSCR but instead of taking the revenues 
generated in one period it takes the Net Present Value (NPV) of all the future 
revenues over the maturity period of the loan and compares it against the total 
amount of debt repayments over the whole maturity period (Delmon, 2009, p. 57). 
This ratio is useful as it can be used to verify that the LLCR meets the minimum 
loan covenant requirements as defined through the financing agreement, 
throughout the maturity period of the loan (Delmon, 2009, p. 57). 
 
The DSCR is the ratio that financiers use to limit the tendency of project 
developers to maximise the leveraging of debt which is frequently less expensive 
than equity, by stamping a minimum acceptable value for the DSCR. If the 
financiers expect that the project’s DSCR will fall below the minimum DSCR 
constraint then financiers will require more upfront equity from the project 
company (Wiser, 1997). So the higher the minimum DSCR is the more equity, 
and therefore less debt, the project company is required by financiers to inject 
into the project (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). It is the minimum DSCR requirement 
that decreases the amount of debt leverage capability of the project company 
and will increase the requirement for more equity, with the further effect of 
reducing the projects debt fraction in the capital structure and increasing the 
overall project costs to the project company through the use of expensive debt 
(Wiser, 1997). Wiser and Kahn, 1996, explain that financiers of project-financed 
wind power projects typically apply stringent project-specific DSCR requirements 
on these projects. 
 
The minimum DSCR constraint reduces debt leverage and increases overall 
levilised project costs, as explained above, but further to this it locks-in the 
revenue from the first few years of operation, when revenues are at minimum, 
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predominantly to maintaining the DSCR requirement; this is called the “first-year 
DSCR constraint” (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). For these reasons this first-year 
DSCR constraint has historically been a barrier to entry for private power wind 
project developers (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). However, developers have 
traditionally used two techniques to mitigate the affect of this first year DSCR 
constraint which are front-loading of the power purchase price and/or back-
loading of debt repayment (Wiser and Kahn, 1996). The back loading debt 
payments is where developers contract with financiers through the financing 
agreement to make debt repayments larger outside the first few years of the 
project where revenues are not at a minimum and this from of first year DSCR 
constraint mitigation has become relatively common in wind power project 
financing (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; Hyuck, 1995; Wong, 1995; and Amitz 1995). 
The front-loading power purchase price is the second technique that wind power 
project developers have used to mitigate the first year DSCR constraint. This 
front loading of power purchase price is achieved by assuming a non inflation 
adjusted or constant PPA energy price. In this way energy payments are larger in 
the beginning of the project and decrease over time (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
To reduce the risk associated with project default, lenders typically require that a 
project or corporation maintain a minimum ratio of the available cash to total 
yearly debt service (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; and Kahn, 1995). The risk tolerance 
of financiers is reflected in the minimum DSCR constraint the higher the inherent 
risk in a project, the higher the minimum DSCR constraint as stipulated by 
financiers. This will mean a larger multiple of cash flow has to be held in relation 
to the debt-service, consequently, the project can take on less debt and requires 
more equity, which in turn reduces the risk exposure of the banks. For example, if 
a wind project generates a net income of one million per annum and the bank 
requires a DSCR of 1.3, the project could take out a loan for which the debt 
service would be a 770,000 per annum. 
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Table 14: Debt Service Coverage Ratios from the Literature 
 
DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE RATIOS (DSCR) 
Source Tolerance 
Wong (1995) (1994) 1.35-1.40 
Karas (1995) (1994) 1.4 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) 1.4 
Delmon (2009) 1.2-1.6 
Source: As stated in table 
 
Table 14 lists some of the minimum DSCR constraints that were sourced from 
the literature that range over 1.35 to 1.6. Karas, 1994 as cited in Wiser and Kahn, 
1996 argues a constant DSCR of 1.4 is a reasonable assumption for wind power 
projects that are attempting to sculpt the amortisation schedule to the wind 
resource variability. Delmon, 2009, p. 57, explained that financiers will set their 
DSCR constraint within the range of 1.2 to 1.6 however this is country, site, 
commercial sector, and the financiers specific which is in line with what was 
expressed in the qualitative review of this report explained above. The results 
from this qualitative analysis are detailed in Table 15 below. 
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Table 15: Debt Service Coverage Ratios from Qualitative Interviews 
 
DEBT SERVICE COVERAGE RATIOS (DSCR) 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Nedbank Capital 1.3 
Investec Capital 1.2-1.4 
Standard Bank P50: 1.4 / P90: 1.15-1.2 
Absa Capital Ratio driven P50/90 production 
BNP Paribas 1.3 
Mainstream Renewable Power 1.25-1.3 
Cresco Project Finance 1.4-1.5 
New Energy Finance 1.25-1.3 
Source: As stated in table 
 
These results range over 1.15 to 1.6 where projects with low perceived risks will 
qualify for the lower end of the range and vice versa for projects with a level of 
risk so the level that financiers will actually require over this range for financing 
wind farms in South Africa will reflect their specific tolerance to the project risks 
they perceive to be apparent.  
 
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank and Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA Capital 
discussed that their minimum DSCR constraint is determined off the back of the 
wind speed production modelling so at P50 a DSCR of about 1.4 is required 
however at P90 DSCRs of 1.15 to 1.2 can be attainable (Eardley-Taylor, 
Personal Interview, 2009). O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power 
believe that the minimum DSCR constraints they will get from their financiers will 
be in line with international best practise of around 1.25 to 1.3 and Greenwood, 
2009, from New Energy Finance agrees that this range is in line with those 
DSCR constraints they have seen around the world. 
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Potgieter, 2009, from Investec was more prudent in saying that the range for this 
variable will be 1.2-1.4 and an industry participant, 2009, from BNP Paribas was 
within this range at 1.3 which is the “rule of thumb” level for power projects in 
South Africa but this is subject to refinement as project specific details become 
apparent. Potgieter, 2009, from Investec continued to explain that the exact level 
of this minimum DSCR constraint is highly dependent on a multitude of mitigating 
factors, such as the project variables, risk levels and the environment within 
which the project exists, and key to this structure is securing a long term off-taker 
that is secured through a PPA. However, one of the predominant determinants of 
the DSCR, from the perspective of the commercial banks, is that of the equity 
portion in a project: as a rule the higher percentage of equity, and the associated 
lower percentage of debt, the lower the minimum DSCR constraint will be. It is 
logical the lower DSCR constraint will be as a result of the lower debt portion will 
be easier to pay off but in addition to this it is the commitment from equity 
partners in a project that communicates to the bank the support for the project 
and that the debt will be made good.  
 
5.1.6. EQUITY RETURNS 
 
Equity investors will put an upfront capital outlay into the project and in exchange 
for the use of these funds the investors require a minimum expected return on 
this investment (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386). These equity returns are a 
residual claim on all of the surplus revenues that are generated by the project 
company and these equity returns come in the form of direct cash flows and tax 
shields to those project participants with claims on equity called shareholders 
(Wiser and Kahn, 1996; and Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386).  
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The proxy for the return equity is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) which can be 
defined as the discount rate that makes the net present value (NPV) of all future 
cash flows from a project equal to zero and generally the higher the IRR is the 
more desirable the project is (Investopedia, 2009). The IRR can be used to rank 
all projects under consideration and, with all else equal, the project with the 
highest IRR is considered to be the best and should be pursued above the others 
(Investopedia, 2009). 
 
The equity rate of return is expressed as a yearly percent return on the equity 
invested or IRR and it indicates the value of investing in the project in terms of 
the return on equity it will generate over time against the returns that are possible 
on other investments (Wiser and Pickle, 1998). So if the equity investor invests 
their money in the wind farm project they will not be able to invest this money 
elsewhere so there is an opportunity cost of investing in the wind farm and this is 
the returns that are possible through investing in other investments. It then 
follows that the return on investing in the wind farm project must outweigh the 
returns that are possible on other investments and that ROE must equal the 
opportunity cost of not investing in other investments.  
 
It is because of this requirement that many equity investors will have a minimum 
return on equity (ROE) or hurdle rate, which must facilitate a 'reasonable' return 
on capital which is market driven concept and benchmarked at some market-
clearing level (Jechoutek and Lamech, 1995, p. 941-953). Any investment that is 
below this predefined minimum ROE the investors will not invest and this 
minimum cost of equity is what makes equity funds more expensive than debt 
funding which results in the tendency for project developers to maximise the debt 
fraction in the capital structure of the project (Wiser, 1997). 
 
This hurdle rate or minimum required return on equity is also driven by the level 
of inherent and perceived risks in the project.  
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Wiser and Kahn, 1996, explain that the, “required equity returns for privately 
owned, project-financed wind power projects depend on perceived technology 
and resource risks.” The higher the degree of project risk in the project the higher 
the required return on equity will be to remunerate and incentivise the equity 
investors for taking on these project risks. On the other hand a project with a high 
level of security and liquidity, which is how easily an investor can cash out their 
investment from a project, reduces overall project risks which will in turn 
decrease the cost of capital to a project (Jechoutek and Lamech, 1995, p. 941-
953). Some of the minimum ROEs as sourced from the literature are listed in 
Table 16 below. 
 
Table 16: Equity Returns communicated through the Literature 
 
EQUITY RETURNS [IRR] 
Source Tolerance 
Wong (1995) (1994) 16% USD 
Amitz (1995) 20% USD 
Hoffman (1995) 20% USD 
Wiser & Kahn (1996) 18% USD 
Wiser & Pickle (1998) 18% USD 
NERSA (2009) Real, after tax, 17% ZAR 
Source: As stated in table 
 
The minimum ROEs from the literature range from 16% to 20% USD IRR while 
NERSA published a real, after tax, return for South Africa renewable energy 
projects under the REFIT Consultation Paper, Phase II, 2009, of 17% on project 
IRR in nominal terms.  
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From this comparison it seems that NERSA expects that the potential investors 
under the REFIT would expect a return that is in the lower end of the spectrum 
from the range expressed in the international literature, however, this could be 
due to the provision for CDM revenue to be boost the returns. Potgieter, 2009, 
from Investec commented that international investors are used to lower returns of 
around 11% on power projects so this is in the right ballpark. 
 
Table 17: Equity Returns communicated through Qualitative Interviews 
 
EQUITY RETURNS [IRR] 
Interviewee Tolerance 
Investec Capital 11-25% ZAR 
Standard Bank 20% ZAR / 14% USD 
Absa Capital Ratio driven P50/90 production 
Actis 20-25% USD 
Mainstream Renewable Power 10-15% USD / 18-20% ZAR 
Cresco Project Finance < 20% ZAR 
Source: As stated in table 
 
Table 17 illustrates the range of returns that were expressed by potential 
financiers and investors for South African wind project financing. This range is 
11% - 25% Rand IRR return and 10% - 25% USD IRR return.  
 
Maclay, 2009, from Actis discussed as an equity investment fund the ROE is 
Actis’ most important key financial variable and that they required a Dollar ROE 
IRR of 20 to 25% with a payback on equity of four years. O’Flynn, 2009, from 
Mainstream Renewable Power are seeking lower returns and he explained that 
internationally for infrastructure projects investors would be expecting a EURO or 
Dollar leveraged IRR of between 10% to 15%.  
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For South Africa, however, the cost of debt can be up to 14% and the equity 
returns should be higher than the cost of debt otherwise there would be no 
reason to invest at all, so a Rand IRR of between 18 to 20% would be required to 
spark investment in the SA wind sector, although there may be some tweaks 
depending on the risk appetite of the equity fund and its perceptions of risk in the 
South African market. Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank was in this 
same range for expected ROE from the South African power projects with an 
approximate return of 20% Rand return and 14% Dollar return and a Payback 
Period for power and infrastructure projects that will go cash positive on IRR after 
roughly 11 to 12 years. Potgieter, 2009, from Investec was in line with this as 
Investec requires a shareholder’s ROE of 22%, while the general range Potgieter, 
2009, listed was between 20-25% for investment banks.  
 
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank explains that the equity return is a 
product of the wind speed, as the higher the wind resource the higher the 
revenue that will be generated which will result in a greater residual revenues for 
shareholder disbursements, and the degree of leverage in the project. While 
Potgieter, 2009, from Investec explains that the cost of equity or the return on 
equity is dependent on the drivers behind the sponsor’s decision to invest in the 
project and is influenced by the perceived risk in the investment. As explained in 
Chapter 6, equity investors can come with a variety of intentions: Strategic 
investors; Institutional investors; Equity investors (leverage their equity 
exposure); Project Development finance and CDM finance. All these investor 
typologies will require a different level or form of return on their equity. O’Flynn, 
2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power discussed that equity returns each 
equity investor will require will vary over different markets, investments and 
countries.  
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The predominant determining influence is where the investor sources that equity 
from; the level of perceived risk in the project and what are the requirements and 
arrangements between that shareholder and the investor. So there are variety of 
factors that determine the minimum ROE that is required to facilitate each 
investor’s decision to invest but broadly the project specifics; perceived risks and 
the investors own source of financing will be large determining factors. 
 
5.2. AFFECT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON WIND POWER 
PROJECT FINANCING 
 
Financiers interested in the power industry in Southern Africa explained that, “red 
tape and lack of well-structured projects, rather than external funding crimped by 
the global downturn, are the main hurdles to boosting capacity in Africa's power 
sector” (Reuters, 2010). 
This highlights the prominent role that the public players play in encouraging the 
involvement of private funds however one cannot ignore the impact of the 
financial crisis: making financing institutions and sources of funding more 
stringent in their risk appetite with limited liquidity, capital and debt being afforded 
only to those entities with credibility and tightly packaged projects in terms of risk. 
This tighter risk tolerance will result in a more thorough due diligence requirement 
which means it should take longer to secure financing than before the financial 
crisis (Webb, 2009). The major impact of the financial crisis on project financing 
is a stricter, and more expensive set of key financing terms and variables in the 
sense that the crisis has left a limited amount of capital and debt in the market 
that is being chased by a great number of projects (Potgieter, 2009; Industry 
Participant, BNP Paribas, 2009; and Engineering News, 2009). There is then the 
situation where there is a high demand for funding versus a low supply of funding 
which means that the cost of this funding will be expensive (Potgieter, 2009).  
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More specifically the cost of both debt and equity will increase; the minimum 
DSCR constraint will be set at a higher rate; and capital structure will swing more 
in favour of expensive equity as opposed to relatively cheaper debt (Potgieter, 
2009; Engineering News, 2009). However, due to the scale required in 
developing nations such as South Africa it is still possible to project finance 
infrastructure projects in the country with an active appetite from financiers and 
developers. 
The financial crisis has had the impact on the global wind energy market of a 
general slowdown in market growth where key financing terms and variables are 
much tighter with only highly solvent entities such as utilities and established 
energy companies being likely to qualify for the limited debt and liquidity in the 
market (Hays, 2009). It is the large utilities with their fixed revenue streams and 
diverse asset base, or balance sheets, which are most likely to get projects over 
the line and be one of the main drivers of wind growth under the unfavourable 
financial crisis environment (Sala de Vedruna et al, 2009). 
South Africa has not suffered the effects of the financial crisis to the degree of 
some other developed countries however it has seen staggered economic growth 
along with a flight of capital, limited liquidity, less international aid and tighter risk 
requirements as many developed nations are experiencing (Pringle [2], 2009). 
Nonetheless, these constraints need to be matched against the required 
infrastructure projects needed to carry the growth targets of South Africa and 
Africa as a whole (Pringle [2], 2009). Eardley-Tayler, 2009, from Standard Bank 
agreed with the above impacts of the crisis on South Africa in that liquidity was 
scarce, therefore debt was limited, risk horizon have shrunk significantly and 
project timelines have lengthened, however he argued that the rationale for 
investing in the South African wind sector was still there as the majority of wind 
projects will be financed by the domestic banks.  
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This does, however, not mean that conservative international funding market 
conditions will not have some impact on the way domestic banks will lend to 
projects: for example, as a result of the financial crisis tenure periods offered by 
banks are shorter; however, the banks are encouraged to offer longer tenures to 
guarantee project’s success over the long term. The cost of debt or interest rates 
offered by commercial banks now more closely matches the cost of money that 
the bank pays on its external funding. This has the effect of debt becoming more 
expensive as the liquidity risk is now passed on to the project through higher 
interest rates as the banks will no longer bare a potential mismatch between the 
rate at which they lend and the rate at which they receive funding (Eardley-Taylor, 
Personal Interview, 2009). 
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, concluded that the lack of debt is putting challenges on 
balance sheets and there is a greater focus on the lower hanging fruits, which 
has the effect of pushing marginal deals off the radar screen (Eardley-Tayler, 
2009). "Small is beautiful... downscale the megawatts targets, set realistic 
projects ... only doable deals will get done these days and that will remain the 
case for at least the next two years" (Eardley-Tayler, 2009). Private investors are 
still keen to invest in Africa's power sector as long as projects are realistic, well 
structured, have government backing and their risk credentials are sound (Webb 
[1], 2009). This is where development funding institutions (DFIs) will need to take 
the lead to balance the local need for infrastructure and development against the 
constraints imposed by the global financial crisis (Webb [1], 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
112.     Chapter 5: Key Financing Terms and Variables 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
5.3. CONCLUSION: SOUTH AFRICAN FINANCIERS’ AND 
INVESTORS’ CHOICES IN REACTION TO RISK APPETITE 
 
This chapter has reviewed the ranges of the key financing terms and variables as 
illustrated in Table 5 at the start of the chapter, and shown how the actual value 
selected by a specific financier or investor reflects their appetite to accept project 
risk; how they reflect their tolerance to a project’s perceived risks and the 
remuneration they require to take on a higher degree of risks.  
 
To determine the risk appetite the financiers and investors interested in the South 
African wind energy market it is worth comparing how the ranges in Table 5 of 
those in the literature against those sourced from the international to see how 
they compare. The capital structure from the interviews fell over a narrower band 
of 60/40 – 80/20 compared to the range in the literature of 50/50 – 90/10, 
however there is consistently higher portion of debt in the capital structure. South 
Africa has higher interest rates in the range of 12% – 14% while internationally 
this band is 8.5% – 14.90%. This is in line with what Eardley-Taylor of Standard 
Bank, 2009, explained that the South African market has high real interest rates. 
What’s more is that financiers will offer shorter debt maturity periods of 8 – 15 yrs 
which will be conditional on refinance at year 6 to 8 which is compared to the 
10 – 15 yrs from the literature. To counteract this, South African wind power plant 
developers will have to use the refinancing and development finance institution’s 
ability to absorb more risk as tools to secure longer term debt. The minimum 
DSCR constraint from the interviews will are within the band of those found in the 
literature, with a lower range of minimum DSCR constraints of 1.2 – 1.4 
compared to 1.35 – 1.60 from the literature. The debt amortisation schedule will 
be mortgage which is in line with the literature but there is the addition of 
sculpted-style repayment schedule. Finally the minimum returns on equity 
requirements are higher for South Africa at ZAR: 18% - 20% Dollar: 11% - 25% 
as compared to 16% to 20% USD IRR. 
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So the ranges from the South African interviews were within and below the 
ranges as stipulated in the literature which means that while South African banks 
and financiers are willing to extend a higher portion of funds in the capital 
structure they will offer this debt on stricter terms and at a higher cost of debt 
which reflects their low risk appetite and tolerance in the South African wind 
energy project finance arena. This is true for equity investors too who require a 
higher minimum ROE than those published internationally. However, this stricter 
set of key financing variables and the lower risk appetite is set in the context of 
the limited liquidity and tighter risk tolerances under the global financial crisis, 
whereas the majority of the ranges from the literature were documented before 
the advent of the financial crisis. However, this risk adverse attitude is in line with 
the Q2 results of Vestas Wind Systems A/S, where the CEO, Ditlev Engel, 
explained that, “New banks were also prepared to lend to projects, Vestas said, 
but it added that the more thorough due diligence they were insisting on meant it 
took longer to secure financing than before the credit crunch” (Webb, 2009).  
 
Another important issue to remember to explain this risk adverse attitude is that 
there is no first project on the table for reference and the outcome some 
regulatory uncertainties with respect to access to the REFIT and to the grid 
network are still unclear, consequently there are many undefined uncertainties at 
this early stage of the market and this uncertainty is reflected through the key 
financing terms and variables which will evolve as these uncertainties unfold. 
This uncertainty is largely created and controlled by the public players in their 
lack of action on certain aspects of the regulatory framework, such as the PPA 
document and access to the grid, remain as drivers for a stricter set of key 
financing terms and variables. However, even under this uncertainty banks are at 
least willing to consider wind power project financing in South African, albeit from 
an extremely conservative perspective. 
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PROJECT DEVELOPMENT PHASES AND SOURCES OF 
FUNDING 
 
Chapter 6 will cover the two broad topics of firstly, defining the project 
development phases of utility scale wind farms and secondly, identifying the 
different types of financiers and investors that extend funding to a project 
financed wind power project. Furthermore, the chapter will explore which project 
development phase these sources of funding entities enter the project and on 
what premises, and indicate how each source of funding has its own drivers and 
interests that will shape their risk appetite which will eventually be reflected 
through their key financing variables as was discussed in Chapter 5. Lastly, the 
Chapter will introduce some of the predominant players in the funding of utility-
scale wind farms in South Africa broken down into commercial banks, equity 
investors and development finance institutions (DFI). 
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6.1. PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
 
Burton et al, 2001, explain that the development of a wind power project follows 
the general phases of a power infrastructure project, of which Khatib, 1997, 
identifies three distinct phases and infrastructure project will move through on its 
development path, namely: pre-investment, investment and operation. Each of 
these broad development phases are now discussed before we explore the 
specific development stages that underpin project financed wind power projects. 
 
6.1.1. PRE-INVESTMENT STAGE 
 
The pre-investment development phase covers all the activities that take place 
from the initial identification of the need for the project all the way through to the 
time the project reaches financial close. When a project reaches financial close it 
can be defined as the stage in a financial agreement when the all the project 
finance documentation has been executed and all the conditions precedent to 
this have been satisfied or waived so that draw-downs on the funds are now 
permissible (Business Dictionary.com, 2009). In the pre-investment phase the 
key activities that must take place are: procurement of the and preparation of the 
project, tendering, negotiation of project documentation, and securing debt and 
equity funding to reach financial close (Delmon, 2009, p. 64). 
 
The first step in developing an infrastructure power project is the identification of 
a need for the output of the project. In the case of South Africa the need for this 
output was established by the policies and regulations communicated by the 
public players: the setting of the 10,000GWh of renewable energy by 2013 target 
in the Energy White Paper, 2003, which will be implemented through the REFIT 
programme as defined in the Consultation Papers Phase I and II, 2009, are the 
signals to the private sector to establish the need for renewable energy projects 
and more specifically wind energy projects in South Africa.  
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With this need established the next step is to conduct a prefeasibility study which 
is primarily concerned with documenting the demand for the output and exploring 
all the alternatives. So the pre-feasibility study defines the demand, location, size, 
technology, fuels, costs and environmental impacts of the project through the 
preparation of the support studies such as the EIA and the financial model and 
economic analysis (Khatib, 1997). 
 
If the pre-feasibility study proves that a successful project is possible then the 
project moves through the feasibility study. Khatib, 1997, describes the feasibility 
study’s main focus as, “defining the project in a manner which allows 
implementation to proceed.” Key to this purpose and before any implementation 
can take place the project must make financial close or in other words secure 
funding to pay for the implementation. It is then of vital importance that the 
feasibility study contains all the necessary detail to facilitate a decision to invest 
in the project in line with the requirements of all potential sources of funding 
(Khatib, 1997). This detail must include all the information from the prefeasibility 
study, which generally speaking should cover the broad topics of: demand, power 
system analysis, technical, financial, economic and environmental (Khatib, 1997). 
In other words the feasibility study must be packaged in a way where all project 
financing documentation, as discussed in Chapter 4, is structured in a bankable 
format. In today’s financial markets the perceptions of what financiers understand 
the bankability of projects to be have become a lot more stringent which means 
that project developers will have to carry out increasingly more detailed feasibility 
studies with an associated increase in cost (Marais, C. as cited by Pringle, C., 
2009). 
 
To determine the bankability of a project the financiers will perform a project 
appraisal or due diligence review which is performed by an independent engineer 
contracted by the financiers.  
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The due diligence review is a detailed appraisal to determine the accuracy of the 
feasibility study and contingent on the outcome of this review financial close will 
be reached and the project will move into the next broad phase, as defined by 
Khatib, 1997, called investment. 
 
6.1.2. INVESTMENT 
  
The signal for the beginning of the investment stage is once financial close has 
been reached so that all the project’s parameters have been completely defined, 
the due diligence review is successful and draw downs on the funding is 
available (Khatib, 1997). Khatib, 1997, indentifies a variety of activities that need 
to happen under the investment stage of the project which are: implementing the 
organisational, legal and financial measures; land acquisition; engineering work; 
tendering, evaluation of bids and contracting; construction work; recruitment and 
training; plant commissioning, completion, and hand over. 
 
6.1.3. OPERATION 
 
Upon completion, the project will be handed over to the eventual owner and 
operator and at this stage the project is in the operation phase of its development 
(Khatib, 1997). The activities that are important under this phase of the project’s 
development are operation and maintenance of the power plant’s main 
machinery to ensure the availability of the project to produce output, hence 
revenue which is the foundation on what the debt is secured off of (Khatib, 1997). 
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Table 18 shows the project development phases of a project financed wind farm 
project that are detailed through a variety of literature sources and how they fall 
under the three broad development stages that Khatib, 1997, identified. These 
development stages are discussed with specific reference to the activities that 
are unique to wind farm development in order to determine the most 
comprehensive set of wind farm specific project development stages. 
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Table 18: Project development stages as defined by the literature 
 
LITERATURE SOURCE STAGES OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT 
 
Khatib, 1997 
 
1. PRE-INVESTMENT 
 
2. INVESTMENT 
 
3. OPERATION 
 
Vestas, 2009 
 
1. Feasibility (incl. pre-feasibility) 
2. Financing and PPA 
 
3. Contracting and Planning 
(Financial close) 
4. Construction 
 
 
5. Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) 
 
 
Burton et al., 2001 
 
1. Initial site selection 
2. Project feasibility assessment and 
PPA 
3. Preparation and submission of 
planning application 
 
 
4. Construction 
 
5. Operation; 
6. Decommissioning and land 
reinstatement 
 
Wizeluis, 2007 
 
1. Early Dialogue with Authorities 
and Neighbours 
2. Land Acquisition 
3. Detailed Planning: Micrositing 
4. Second Dialogue: EIA 
5. Permission for Building 
6. Contract signed: PPA, Grid 
License 
 
 
7. Supplier contracting off successful 
tendering 
8. Installation of turbines and 
connection to grid 
 
9. Transfer to wind power plant to 
the buyer or owner 
 
Source: As stated in table 
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6.2. THE PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OF A WIND FARM PROJECT 
 
The process discussed by Khatib, 1997, above is a general project development 
process for a power plant project. While the development of a wind farm falls 
under these broader stages, namely: pre-investment, investment, and operation, 
there are specific characteristics that are unique to the development of these 
projects. Table 18 illustrates how these more detailed, wind specific development 
stages fit under the broader stages that Khatib, 1997 defined that are explained 
above. 
 
Vestas Wind Systems A/S defines the stages in the development of a wind farm 
as falling into five project stages: feasibility; financing and PPA; contracting and 
planning; construction; operations and maintenance. The first stage, Feasibility 
analysis usually takes one to two years to complete while the next three stages 
can take up to one to two years to complete depending on the size of the 
development. It is important to note that there is almost always some overlapping 
between the initial stages and it is not unusual to have some stages running 
concurrently to each other. For instance, financial close can conclude some time 
during the contracting and planning stage. Burton et al., 2001 define the stages 
in wind farm development as initial site selection; project feasibility assessment 
and PPA; preparation and submission of planning application; construction; 
operation; and decommissioning and land reinstatement (Burton et al., 2001). 
While Wizeluis, 2007, is more specific through defining the project development 
process as moving through the following stages: early dialogue with local 
authorities and neighbours; land acquisition and contract negotiation with land 
owners; detailed planning to decide the number and size of the turbines; second 
dialogue to present detailed plan to authorities and the public (EIA); permission 
for building; contracts signed with grid operator and power company/utility; 
purchase based of successful tendering offers; installation of turbines and 
connection to the grid; and the transfer to wind power plant to the buyer or owner 
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(Wizelius, 2007). These stages are combined to produce Figure 2 to show a 
detailed flow chart of the various activities and the stages they fall under that are 
involved in developing a project financed, utility scale wind farm. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. FEASIBILITY 
- Land Acquisition 
- Project pre-feasibility assessment 
- Execution of Support Studies 
- Detailed Planning: Micrositing 
4. CONTRACTING & PLANNING 
- Tendering and selection of bids 
- Supply contracts negotiated and executed 
- Planning behind delivery and construction is determined 
3. FINANCING & PROJECT DOCUMENTATION 
- Sourcing of debt and equity funding 
- Project documentation executed (incl. PPA) 
 
FINANCIAL CLOSE 
5. CONSTRUCTION 
- Installation of wind turbines 
- Balance of plant construction 
- Testing and completion 
- Hand over (TOC) 
6. OPERATION & MAINTENANCE 
- Maintenance and operation to maintain availability 
7. REPOWERING, OR DECOMMISSIONING 
- Renegotiation for repowering 
OR 
- Land reinstatement 
Figure 2: Wind farm project development stages 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
1. PRE-FEASIBILITY 
- Initial site selection 
- Preliminary wind measurements 
- Early Dialogue with Authorities and Neighbours 
- Identify any “show stoppers” 
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6.2.1. PRE-FEASIBILITY AND FEASIBILITY 
 
The pre-feasibility and feasibility stage’s main focus is to determine the 
commercial and technical viability of the potential wind farm. The key outcome of 
this process is to determine the overall indication of the feasibility of the project 
and this development stage takes the project all the way to just before financial 
close if all steps are successful, and puts the project in the position to begin 
sourcing funding. The process starts with a preliminary analysis of the wind and 
site conditions, electricity grid access, expected capital cost, and any potential 
show stoppers or obstacles. 
 
One of the most important steps in the feasibility stage is conducting wind 
monitoring on the proposed site or sites. This is an essential requirement in 
determining the commercial potential of a wind farm as it is the wind conditions 
that determine the amount of energy that can be generated and therefore the 
revenue stream that the project will produce over its lifetime. As discussed before 
financiers look to the project’s revenue to establish the ability of the project to 
service debt and hence the amount of debt that can be leveraged by the project, 
keeping in mind that debt is often cheaper than equity. In practise wind 
monitoring equipment, in the form of metrological masts (met masts), erected on 
at hub height (80m) at an average location with no obstacles such as trees, 
buildings or mountains that could potentially interfere with the readings. Sets of 
wind vanes and anemometers are placed at two to three different heights along 
the met-mast to establish the firstly, the minimum required data which is: date; 
time; average wind speed and direction in degrees with standard deviation in 10 
minute intervals; and the pressure and temperature (Browne, Personal Interview, 
2009). Secondly, the recommended data from the wind measurement process 
includes: maximum and minimum wind speed and direction for each 10 minute 
period; pressure; and wind Shear (Browne, Personal Interview, 2009).  
123.                   Chapter 6: Project Development Phases and Sources of Funding 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
Most banks and wind turbine manufacturers require that the above wind data is 
collected over at least 12 to 18 months which should be measured at hub height 
from a mast correctly situated on the proposed site. Furthermore, it is a 
requirement that this data is correlated to long term data from the area such as 
data found at other wind farms, airports or weather stations in close proximity to 
the site. These requirements exist to remove the uncertainty of seasonal variation 
and yearly variation of the wind conditions on the site to ensure that the project’s 
potential revenue is modelled accurately. 
 
The next step is that if both the preliminary screening and the wind 
measurements yield encouraging results then more in-depth feasibility analysis 
are conducted through the following support studies: Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), power grid interconnection assessment, construction site 
mapping, and building zoning and permitting, Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) 
approval, financial model and economic analysis. In South Africa an EIA and the 
CAA approval is required to erect a met-mast at 80m and for the project as a 
whole. The support studies of the financial modelling and economic analysis will 
be contingent on the outcome of the micrositing analysis as the key outcome of 
this process will be an annual production figure, and the associated cost structure. 
These will be used as the basis for forecasted revenue, off which financiers will 
determine the debt servicing capabilities of the project and investors will 
determine the potential return on equity. Micrositing can be defined as the 
modelling of the optimal combination of wind turbines of different size, nominal 
power and different manufacturers, and in different layouts, where the production 
figure (and associated economics) are plugged into the financial model and for 
each option and based on all local constraints the best option is chosen (Wizelius, 
2007). 
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The feasibility study will cover all the activities from the initial recognition of the 
need for the project to financial close and its main purpose is to determine the 
overall feasibility of the project from a market demand, power system, technical, 
financial, economic and environmental perspective. If successful, project 
developers will move the project into the second major phase in the development 
process, financing and project documentation. 
 
6.2.2. FINANCING AND PROJECT DOCUMENTATION 
 
This development phase can run concurrently with the feasibility stage but it is 
contingent on a successful feasibility analysis. So with the feasibility study and 
support studies in place a project can still not commit to firm order to a wind 
turbine manufacturer or carry out any construction the developer until it has 
secured financing or gets financial close. The majority of the financing is usually 
debt/loan financed (in the order of 60-70% of required financing). In this phase all 
the project finance documentation is executed which will accompany the 
feasibility report and be put to the scrutiny of the financiers and a due diligence 
review to determine bankability. The most important of these documentations is 
the PPA and before these finance guarantees are concluded the developer must 
secure a long term power purchase agreement (PPA) with an off-taker such as a 
utility or municipality. This is the security to the financiers that the project will 
generate revenue over its lifetime so it is usually required that the PPA spans for 
the project lifetime. Once the project reached financial close draw downs on the 
funding becomes available so all contracting and planning of subsuppliers can 
take place. 
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6.2.3. CONTRACTING AND PLANNING 
 
Once financing has been secured the supply contracts with all the suppliers of 
the components that make a wind farm must be negotiated. The suppliers of the 
wind turbines, transportation, installation, civil works and electrical works are 
tendered and contracted with the availability of each supplier coordinated into a 
planning process to time the delivery and construction of all the works and 
services into a seamless timetable. Planning and contracting are interdependent 
as the timing of construction is critically dependent on the supplier’s availability. 
 
6.2.4. CONSTRUCTION 
 
The construction phase of the project is the most risky stage of the project’s 
development for two main reasons, firstly, the majority of the funds are drawn 
down in this period especially for renewable energy projects that are capital 
intensive and secondly, an incomplete project is not worth much to the financiers. 
The construction of a wind farm is subject to sound planning and implementation 
as defined in the previous stage. The main elements in this stage are road 
construction, laying turbine foundations, turbine installation, and electrical 
connection to the power grid. Mainstream Renewable Power define the stages of 
construction as: design; specification; tender construction contracts; construct 
civil and electrical works; deliver of turbines to site; turbine erection; first power; 
plant commissioning; and finally hand over to operations (Mainstream website, 
2009). The termination of these steps can take up to 12 months plus depending 
on the size of the development. 
 
Once the wind turbines have been installed and connected to the grid completion 
testing will take place and depending on this success, the facility, and the liability 
for the remaining major risks, will be transferred to the buyer, owner, or operator 
(Wizelius, 2007). 
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6.2.5. OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
 
Once construction and the initial testing are completed the wind farm will start 
producing energy will begin its commercial operation. Like any machines the 
wind turbines will require regular maintenance to cover all scheduled and un-
scheduled maintenance. Most large wind turbine manufacturers will offer service 
contracts that will cover the farm for up to 10 years with option to renew on 
completion of this period. At the end of 20 years the project can either be re-
powered, revamp the wind turbines, or they can be decommissioned and the land 
restored back to its initial state or prepared for a different function. 
 
The development of a utility scale, project financed wind farm moves through 
seven unique steps, some that run concurrently, as it moves from identification of 
the initial need for the project to decommissioning or repowering. These stages 
are illustrated in Figure 2, namely: pre-feasibility; feasibility analysis; financing 
and project documentation; contracting and planning; construction; operation and 
maintenance; and repowering or decommissioning. 
 
6.2.6. TYPES OF FINANCIERS/INVESTORS IN A WIND 
PROJECT FINANCED DEVELOPMENT 
 
Under a private ownership, NUG, project financed structure the sources of 
funding come in the form of predominantly non-or limited recourse debt and 
equity, the combination of which is defined under the capital structure or 
debt/equity ratio. This debt and equity can be sourced through a variety of 
entities, all with their own specific requirements, drivers and financing structures 
that will appraise and analyse projects from different standpoints to make choices 
as to their level of involvement and terms of this involvement (Wiser and Kahn, 
1996; and Wiser and Pickle, 1998).  
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Equity investors can be broadly grouped under three typologies, namely: 
strategic investors, institutional investors and equity investors (Harper et al., 
2007). While the sources of debt funding can be grouped under institutional 
financiers and development finance institutions (DFI). Each of these groups 
defined above are discussed in turn, with the stages at of the project 
development they enter the project identified and finally some detail is given as to 
the investors and financiers that are active or monitoring the developments in the 
South African wind energy market. The section will end with an outline of the 
potential sources of funds for the development of project financed wind farm 
facilities in South Africa. 
 
Table 19, below, gives an indication as to under which project development 
phase, as defined above, the different types of investors and financiers will be 
most active according to the literature and the qualitative interviews. This is not a 
definitive description as each project’s funding package is different and tailored to 
the unique set of requirements.  So the distinctions in Table 19 serve to give the 
best description of where the financiers and investors to the South African wind 
energy market are most likely to become active, i.e. contractually involved, in a 
South African, project financed, wind power project to understand the issues  
they are exposed to according their  presence in a development phase. 
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Table 19: Table to show where different sources of funding are typically most active along the project 
development phases in South Africa 
 
PRE-FEASIBILITY FEASIBILITY FINANCING & 
PROJECT 
DOCUMENTATION 
CONTRACTING & 
PLANNING 
CONSTRUCTION OPERATION & 
MAINTENANCE 
REPOWERING OR 
DECOMMISSION 
EQUITY -INVESTORS 
Strategic Investors  
   Institutional Investors 
   Equity Investors 
 CDM Buyers    CDM Buyers  
DEBT - FINANCIERS 
  Commercial Banks 
  Institutional Debt Investors 
Domestic DFIs     
 International DFIs 
  ECAs 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
KEY 
Most Active  
Limited Activity  
No Involvement  
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6.2.7. EQUITY 
 
Wiser and Kahn, 1996 describe how equity for project financed wind farms have 
traditionally been provided through project development companies such as 
utilities or IPP’s and/or sourced through outside equity sources. Harper et al., 
2007, identifies three broad types of investors that fill the equity portion of a 
project financed, private ownership wind farm project, namely: strategic investors, 
institutional investors, and equity investors. Another category is evident in 
developing nations such as South Africa and that is CDM investors which can be 
further broken down into compliance buyers and those that buy CERs to trade on 
markets such as the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). 
 
According to Harper et al., 2007, strategic investors offer active type equity and 
are significant equity capital investors in the project that have strategic drivers 
behind their specific investments in the wind energy sector. These strategic 
interests are usually derived from the point that the development company has 
wind power project development as part of its basic business activities, usually 
with a large existing portfolio of wind power projects. In South Africa, this type of 
investor will usually be in the form of project development companies that are 
looking to build, own/transfer and operate wind power projects. It is these forms 
of investors that will typically be most active in coordinating the project in the 
early stages of the project’s development and secure and other sort of investors 
in the later stages. 
 
Mainstream Renewable Energy, an Irish renewable energy developer, is an 
example of a strategic investor that is active in the SA wind power market and will 
be used as an example to profile this sort of investor.  
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They have established a growing international project pipeline covering four 
continents of projects covering a multitude of renewable technologies. Its core 
business is the development, construction and operation of wind, solar thermal 
and ocean current plants with the key goal to deliver a successful business that 
accelerates global progress towards a sustainable future. Mainstream is investing 
heavily in the South African wind power market and is looking to develop a 
portfolio of 500 MW of wind-energy capacity in South Africa by 2014 through its 
newly formed South African-European renewable-energy joint venture between 
Irish Mainstream Renewable Power (who will hold 85% of the new venture) and 
South African Genesis Eco-Energy (O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009). 
Mainstream finds the South African market of strategic importance due to the 
scale of investment required to match the rapidly developing country’s demand 
for power and what is more is that this growing demand needs to be matched in a 
way that is sustainable for the environment.  
 
Mainstream’s financing activities are pertinent over the whole project 
development process: feasibility, financing and PPA, construction and operation 
and maintenance. The forms of financing Mainstream employs throughout this 
process ranges from, initially, a combination of shareholder equity and corporate 
debt to inject pre-investment finance to acquire Greenfield, early stage projects, 
and/or joint venture projects. Then in the second stage of project construction, 
Mainstream utilises the financial instruments of construction equity, 
junior/mezzanine debt from financial institutions and non-recourse Senior debt 
from commercial banks. Finally, in the project operation and maintenance stage, 
long term non-recourse project finance is used as a source of finance while in 
some markets tax equity such as the US where favourable tax incentives exist 
(Mainstream website, 2009).  
 
 
131.                   Chapter 6: Project Development Phases and Sources of Funding 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
Mainstream are project developers so they will not be looking for a ROE such as 
IRR but rather once the project is operational, Mainstream will target three 
revenue streams that they look to generate from the project: developer’s profit 
from sale of the asset; long term O&M contract; and asset outperformance fee. In 
the first instance, Mainstream will sell the project to a long term investor and the 
profit from the sale is then recycled to the development of further projects 
(O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009; Mainstream Website, 2009). The second way 
in which Mainstream seeks a return is to maintain and operate the asset on 
behalf of the owner through an O&M fee. Finally, in the case where a wind farm 
outperforms Mainstream will arrange a sharing agreement in this excess revenue 
with the owner (Mainstream Website, 2009). In the last two cases an operating 
and maintaining income is generated which is then recycled through 
Mainstream’s business activities. In South Africa, Mainstream intends to apply 
the business model explained above to finance the project development stage 
and the construction process. They will then look to sell on their equity portion to 
long term financing institutions such as the pension funds or infrastructure funds 
(O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, there are the commercial banks such as Investec Capital 
Markets and Macquarie Capital who are acting as developers and according to 
Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA Capital the biggest push is coming from Macquarie 
from the development side. This point of view is backed up by Eardley Taylor, 
2009, from Standard Bank. These institutions blur the line between strategic 
investors and equity investors as they have a strategic interest in the sector 
based off an existing portfolio in Australia but are mainly looking to leverage their 
equity exposure with project debt which lends more to an equity investor typology 
(Harper et al., 2007). It is unclear at this stage as to whether these investors will 
treat these investments as long term investments where they will look to earn an 
IRR or develop and sell to gain quick returns (Vajeth, Personal Interview, 2009). 
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Investec have been involved in a variety of wind farm projects on different 
capacities all over the world. For instance in Canada and all over Europe, 
Investec have provided project finance debt while in Australia the bank has 
focused on the development side of things with a growing capacity in Western 
Australia. In South Africa, Investec, in conjunction with GDF Suez and Windlab 
Systems, are developing three sites in South Africa. As it stands they have 100% 
of the project equity which they aim to maintain a 10-20% retainer at financial 
close. Investec will bring in other interested equity partners with consideration to 
the important stake that will have to come from BEE investors. So Investec which 
is a strategic investor or equity investor will be most active in the phases 
preceding financial close. This does not mean that Investec will adopt a purely 
developer role in the South African wind market but if they are approached by 
other developers with a project that matches what the bank is looking for Investec 
could be in the market to provide limited or non-recourse debt to South African 
utility-scale wind energy projects.  
 
The second type of equity investor that Harper et al., 2007 identifies is that of the 
institutional investor who usually offer a more passive type equity capital than 
that of strategic investor and are mainly interested in the tax benefits, as in the 
US; long term returns; and investment for compliance purposes. While strategic 
investors will take an active role in the development process of the project, 
institutional investors will take a passive role in this process but fit the necessary 
funds required to qualify for the benefits of the addition of renewable energy to 
their portfolio. Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank, explained that there 
will be the international compliance buyers who are looking into the market to see 
where they can invest for compliance purposes at a cheaper rate then they would 
be able to achieve in their base countries, predominantly in Europe.  
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Another example is that of CDM compliance buyers such as DONG Energy is an 
example of an institutional investor as they have communicated publically in 
South Africa that they are seeking to purchase CERs through the CDM 
mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol to meet the reduction targets that it is subject to 
in Europe. In South Africa, Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project Financed 
explained that it would be the large corporates such as the dominant mining 
houses who will be acting as Institutional Investors looking to reduce their carbon 
footprint.  
 
Harper et al., 2007 identify a third investor typology called the equity investor, 
who is simply looking to leverage their equity exposure by layering on debt 
financing. Delmon, 2009, p. 276-277, describes that this type of investor offers 
paid in equity which comes from cash that the shareholder has borrowed against 
its own balance sheet thereby making its own debt portfolio more expensive 
through increased leveraging or diverted some of its own resources/revenues 
from other investment opportunities (Delmon, 2009, p. 276). Consequently, these 
equity investors will require a rate of return sufficient to justify taking on more 
debt or the opportunity cost of diverting investment away from other opportunities, 
which is the reason equity is frequently more expensive than debt (Delmon, 
2009). 
 
An example of an equity investor that is monitoring the South African wind energy 
market is Actis which is an equity investor that is looking to leverage its equity 
exposure in investments exclusively in emerging markets with a minimum 
investment size of US$50 and projects that meet their hurdle rates (Maclay, 
2009). These funding packages come with different ownership preferences as 
Actis is willing to accept a controlling to a minority stake which is project specific 
and depends on the existing shareholders preferences.  
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They will invest at all stages of the project’s development from providing 
development or expansion capital to acquiring mature operational assets. Maclay, 
2009, indicated that the sector is a “key investment market” and that they have 
earmarked the South African energy market and more specifically the South 
African wind energy market as an important component to their diversified 
portfolio. 
 
The other form of equity investor is the specialist investment vehicles such as 
mezzanine finance or subordinated debt (Maclay, Personal Interview, 2009; and 
Delmon, 2009, p. 276-277). Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004, defines 
mezzanine finance as, “a variety of structures positioned in the financing package 
somewhere between the high risk/high upside equity position and the lower risk/ 
fixed returns debt position.” While Delmon, 2009, p. 276-277, calls this 
subordinated debt which he explains is provided at a fixed interest rate, thereby 
excluding it from any equity upside from better than expected project 
performance and it will rank junior to senior debt but senior to pure equity which 
protects it from any potential downside that pure equity is subject to (Delmon, 
2009, p. 276-277). 
 
These equity investors and their input to a wind power project can vary over the 
different stages of project development. For instance smaller strategic investors 
such as development companies and smaller IPPs will initiate a project and focus 
on the development stage of new projects with capital that they have earned 
through selling projects that are ready to go on line onto larger strategic investors 
or institutional investors such as the large Utilities with an existing portfolio of 
projects that they own in operation (MAKE Consulting, 2009). With the global 
trend of an ever increasing favourable investment climate for renewables globally 
many equity investors have come into the ownership of wind energy facilities, 
such as unit trusts, banks and private investors, in search of the opportunity to 
leverage their equity exposure (MAKE Consulting, 2009).  
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Figure 3 demonstrates the top 20 owners of installed capacity globally in terms of 
MW and illustrates how many of these IPPs and utilities have been involved in a 
variety of activities such as: project development (except Babcock and Brown), 
asset ownership, and operation of wind power facilities globally (MAKE 
Consulting Companies, 2009). This demonstrates that the majority of investors to 
the wind energy market to date have taken an active role in the project’s 
development and can be explained as strategic investors. The South African 
developers are likely to take the same route as these global players as due to the 
Greenfield nature of projects the owners will have to take an active role in the 
development to be in control of the risks and manage their investment. 
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Figure 3: Table to show the leading IPPs and Utilities’ involvement at 
different stages of project development 
 
Source: Make Consulting Companies, 2009 
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6.2.8. DEBT 
 
Under a project financed structure the majority of the funds are sourced from 
financiers who will provide non- or limited recourse debt. This debt can be 
obtained through public markets, such as project bonds sold on the capital 
markets, or other financial intermediary such as bank loans and institutional debt 
(Wiser and Pickle, 1998; Delmon, 2009). Delmon, 2009, p. 72, describes that 
these financiers who provide this debt under a project finance structure can 
consist of one or more of the following: commercial banks, multilateral and 
bilateral lending institutions, and export credit agencies (ECA). Wiser and Kahn, 
1996, explain that debt for renewable energy projects has historically been 
sourced from institutional financiers such as insurance companies, long term 
pension funds, and commercial banks. This section will discuss these financiers 
(commercial banks, pension funds, MLAs, and ECA arrangements); comment on 
where each entity will be active through the project development phases; and 
discuss the financiers that have responded favourably to the signals sent from 
the public players in the South African wind energy project financing space as 
communicated through the qualitative interviews. 
 
When compared to investors of equity, the majority of financiers are a lot more 
risk averse as the Financing Agreement defines a fixed obligation for the project 
company to pay defined principal and interest payments so the financier will not 
claim the potential upside of greater than expected project performance beyond a 
predefined level so it is not in their interest to take on any unnecessary risks 
(Wiser and Pickle, 1998; and Delmon, 2009). Due to this, financiers will only take 
on those uncertainties that are measureable and defined into measured risk so to 
ensure that they have certainty to their financial exposure over the debt maturity 
period (Delmon, 2009). Therefore, in contrast to investors of the equity 
component, financiers will usually review a project from a worst-case perspective 
(Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386).  
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Consequently, financiers will be involved in all the key aspects throughout the 
project development phases and they will use an independent engineer with the 
skills necessary to accurately review each process to perform a due diligence 
review of all the project documentation to determine the bankability of the project 
and gain certainty as to their financial exposure and inherent risks of financing 
the project under review (Delmon, 2009, p. 86). 
 
Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project Finance explained that it is of utmost 
importance for South wind energy projects can tie down a sizable sponsor with 
support from some sort of development finance institution initially however it is 
third party financial interest that will make or break South Africa wind energy 
projects. According to the individuals interviewed under the qualitative portion of 
the research the domestic commercial banks will be dominant in providing the 
finance for project financed wind farms in South Africa with international banks 
taking a back seat. The development finance institutions (DFIs), such the IDC, 
DBSA and the AFDB, will also have an important role to play in South Africa and 
Africa as a continent due to their ability to absorb a higher degree of country risk 
and consequently offer better financing terms and variables (Potgieter, Personal 
Interview, 2009; and Pringle [2], 2009). Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project 
Finance expressed this view and indentified three main debt providers: 
commercial banks; DFIs such as European Investment Bank, IDC and the DBSA; 
and finally the infrastructure funds such as Pan Africa and Macquarie. O’Flynn, 
2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power has been in discussion with the 
domestic commercial banks and the development banks and commented that 
there is a “huge appetite” amongst these institutions for infrastructure projects 
such as wind power plants.  
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The first two categories of financiers, commercial banks and DFIs, will be active 
from the financing and PPA phase of the project when project developers are 
sourcing financiers based off a project that is bankable from their perspective, all 
the way to the end of the debt maturity period where they will have continued 
interaction as the project is usually refinanced. Finally, the institutional investors 
such as the pension funds may fill the long term refinanced debt and equity 
space over the operational phase of the project. Maclay, 2009, from Actis and 
Potgieter, 2009, from Investec explained that these institutional investors will be 
the financial institutions such as the major pension funds of Old Mutual, who is in 
partnership with Macquarie Capital, and Sanlam. 
 
6.2.8.1. COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
The domestic commercial banks will be dominant in the project financing of wind 
power in South Africa and the international banks will maintain a local presence 
as they adopt a “wait and see” approach as many of the uncertainties unfold with 
regards to the South African wind power market. Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from 
Standard Bank argues that the majority of wind power projects in South Africa will 
be financed by the domestic commercial banks as the volatility of the Rand is a 
large barrier to entry for international banks with the result of many of the 
international banks pulling out or scaling back operations in South Africa. He 
went on to say that these domestic banks are quite well defined with “four and a 
quarter” domestic commercial banks that are actively exploring the industry, 
namely and in order of financing willingness to the wind industry: Standard Bank, 
First National Bank (FNB), ABSA Capital and Nedbank Capital. The “quarter” is 
Investec as their balance sheet is not nearly the size of the other four (Eardley-
Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009). An industry participant, 2009, from BNP 
Paribas, shared this view and explained that South Africa has a strong and well 
developed financial system so the domestic commercial banks will be large 
players that are well placed to service the demands of these projects.  
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Among these commercial banks that he outlined were Standard Bank and 
Investec, which were the banks were actively looking for projects in South Africa. 
Maclay, 2009, from Actis and Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy Finance; and 
Potgieter, 2009, from Investec, were also in line with this point as they explained 
that South Africa’s large commercial banks will be the most important sponsors of 
projects on both the debt and equity portions, with Investec, Nedbank, Standard 
Bank and perhaps Rand Merchant Bank (RMB) playing an important role.  
 
The roles of commercial banks are that they can offer a variety of services to 
advance to project’s development, such as: a financial advisor, arranger and 
underwriter of senior, mezzanine debt and equity for all large capital projects 
(Standard Bank Website, 2009). More specifically the project finance services 
that many commercial banks offer are: project evaluation and feasibility studies; 
financial modelling and sensitivity analysis; risk management; evaluation and risk 
mitigation strategies; advice on the structure of project contracts; financial 
structuring;  arranging of multi-source funding, including development finance 
and export credit (political risk structuring); and underwriting and lending 
(Standard Bank Website, 2009). With this myriad of services a commercial bank 
can really be involved at any phase of the project’s development. 
 
As explained above Standard bank, ABSA Capital and Investec are some of the 
domestic commercial banks that are pegged to be large providers of finance to 
wind power facilities in South Africa. These banks were interviewed and all of 
them expressed that they are totally supportive of this sort of investment are 
looking to expand their financing portfolio in the South African renewable space 
through providing project financed debt to project developers (Vajeth, Personal 
Interview, 2009; Potgieter, Personal Interview, 2009; and Eardley-Taylor, 
Personal Interview, 2009).  
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Vajeth, 2009, stated that there is definitely “space for wind and it is going to 
happen” but it is just a matter of ABSA getting comfortable on many of the risk 
elements and surrounding issues that stand out to them at this point in time: such 
as the market risk, grid connection, wind resource modelling and regulatory 
framework. Once the bank is comfortable that the risks have been appropriately 
mitigated, Vajeth, 2009, stated that debt will not be a problem. Viljoen, 2009 
supported this view that if the delivery of the REFIT is structured correctly 
through the clarification on the PPA, he sees no reason why raising of debt 
financing should be a problem in South Africa. In other words, if the environment 
is right then the debt will flow easily into the project so while financier to the 
South African wind power project finance market will offer debt under strict 
financing terms and conditions, as discussed in Chapter 5, the banks still have a 
large appetite for providing non- or limited recourse debt to wind power projects 
as long as all the major risks are packaged in a way that is compliant with the 
bank’s set of requirements. This then pushes the initiative onto the public players 
to make the environment right through strong policy signals and a clearly defined 
regulatory framework to create a space where all major risks can be 
appropriately identified, assessed, mitigated and allocated to facilitate the 
provision of this debt. 
 
6.3. MULTILATERAL LENDING AGENCIES AND DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE INSTITUTIONS 
 
The development finance institutions (DFI), also known as multilateral lending 
agencies (MLA) and multilateral development banks (MDB) can be involved in a 
project’s financing package under many auspices, depending on their motives, 
they have the facility to provide small equity investments, or guarantees and 
insurance.  
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For South African wind power projects they are pegged to play an implemental 
role in providing a portion of the debt finance required from its own sources or act 
as an organiser of funding from one or more commercial banks (Delmon, 2009). 
 
MLAs or DFIs, including export credit agencies (ECA) are international, 
predominantly political entities that are owned and funded by one or more nation 
or a grouping of nations respectively (Delmon, 2009, p. 108). The main benefit 
that these agencies promote is that, through the way in which they are structured, 
they have the increased ability to absorb a level of political and country risk that 
are inherent to investing in especially developing nations that commercial banks 
will simply refuse to bear as it is beyond their credit limits (Delmon, 2009, p. 108; 
and Khatib, 1997). Financing renewable energy project have a high level of 
perceived risks as it is a relatively new area for financing institutions especially in 
developing nations such as South Africa, with the addition of political risk and 
country risk. Khatib, 1997, highlights this country risk attached to Africa through 
the following statement, “Africa’s potential to attract mainstream financing has 
traditionally been inhibited by poor economic performance, weak governance and 
the high levels of political risk perceived by prospective commercial investors.” 
Consequently, for projects where other sources of funding are too risk adverse or 
simply credit lines do not have the risk capacity sometimes these projects are 
only possible through the involvement of one or more MLA’s (Bronicki, 2000 as 
cited in Ubajako, 2006; and Khatib, 1997).  
 
Arfaoui, 2009, from the African Development Bank, supported this view as he 
explained that the AFDB can offer more favourable terms than some commercial 
banks as the due to the size and purpose of the bank it can absorb more risk 
than some commercial banks who are subject to more restrictive lending 
constraints (Arfaoui, 2009). This can be demonstrated through the cost of debt, 
or interest rate, which the AFDB can offer better terms than some commercial 
banks, however by how much all depends on the project (Arfaoui, 2009). 
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As a result, DFIs can offer softer financing; longer maturities than standard 
commercial maturities; and insurance/guarantees against such risks as: transfer 
restriction; expropriation; breach of contract; war and civil disturbance (Khatib, 
1997). However, in return for these terms they will place strict requirements on 
the project structure and the financing arrangements to ensure that certain social 
and environmental aspects of the project are highlighted and advanced (Delmon, 
2009, p. 108-110). This is due to the point that MLAs and ECAs will carry out the 
wish of the nations or group of nations that it represents and will require that 
these drivers are met in return for favourable financing terms and variables 
(Delmon, 2009). These drivers can cover a variety of issues or specialise in 
certain geographic regions, some of these issues are outlined by Delmon, 2009, 
p. 108, as, “fostering to market economies, alleviating poverty, supporting the 
development of new markets, and providing commercial banks and companies 
with support and incentives to enter certain markets.”  
 
The above discussion explore a DFIs important role as a source of funding to 
projects where the perceived country and political risk are too high for the credit 
limits of commercial banks, however there are other roles that DFIs play in the 
development of a project financed wind energy project. Firstly, DFIs can act as a 
source of advice on how the project should be structured to ensure commercial 
viability (World Bank, 2009, p. 57-59). Secondly, they can offer guarantee 
instruments that provide a degree of protection against public sector payment risk 
and other political risks for the private sector (World Bank, 2009, p. 57-59). 
Thirdly, DFIs can provide funding in local currency to mitigate foreign exchange 
risk (World Bank, 2009, p. 57-59). Lastly, through the involvement of a DFI the 
project’s credibility can improve to provide greater assurance to other financiers, 
investors and party participants such as contractors.  
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In the early stages of the project’s development DFIs can offer indicative and 
conditional terms of finance which act as a vital early endorsement of the project 
while the developers are still working towards a position of bankability (World 
Bank, 2009, p. 57-59). 
 
There is a lot of DFI activity in South Africa currently as these institutions move to 
fill the need created by the lack of movement from private institutions as a result 
of the financial crisis. The international Clean Technology Fund (CTF), a World 
Bank initiative has approved $500-million in October 2009 and these funds have 
been committed to the development of a portfolio of low-carbon energy projects 
in South Africa (Creamer [5], 2009). Apart of this portfolio will be the development 
of Eskom’s 100 MW utility-scale wind power plant in the Western Cape Province 
(Creamer [5], 2009). Furthermore, in a trip to South Africa, Jean-Michel Severino, 
the CEO of Agence Française de Développement (AFD) which is the French DFI, 
is signing over R3,5-billion worth of development finance in South Africa with a 
focus on the energy sector and sustainability (Creamer [6], 2009). The AFD will 
look to encourage the development of a share of renewable energies in the 
South African economy with €100-million loan to Eskom for the financing of a 
wind farm and a €120-million credit line made available to the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), Nedbank and Absa for funding of renewable 
energy and energy efficiency projects (Creamer [6], 2009). 
 
The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) CEO Paul Baloyi, as cited in 
Pringle, 2009, explained that there is a growing funding gap in the funding 
required to finance South Africa’s increasing infrastructure demands which he 
estimated this gap to be in order of R787-billion over the next three years. Baloyi, 
2009, expects that nearly 50% of these outstanding funds could be provided by 
"properly leveraging" South Africa’s DFIs (Baloyi as cited in Pringle, 2009).  
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It is clear that South African wind energy projects could benefit from some of the 
services that DFIs can offer and the African Development Bank (AFDB is 
discussed below to profile a typical DFI that will be active in South Africa. 
 
6.3.1. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 
 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) is multilateral development Bank (MDB) 
or a development finance institution (DFI) that is geographically focused with the 
mandate to promote sustainable, economic and social development of its 53 
African Regional Member Countries (RMCs) (Khatib, 1997; and Creamer Media 
Reporter [2], 2009). The AFDB is made up of the following three institutions: the 
African Development Bank; the African Development Fund; and the Nigerian 
Trust Fund through which it offers traditional lending operations to governments 
and a range of financial products to the private sector initiatives that advance the 
DFI’s mission targets (Creamer Media Reporter [2], 2009; and Khatib, 1997). 
These financial products are debt, equity and further to this it offers technical 
assistance in all aspects of a qualifying project with the ultimate goal to wean 
African countries away from offshore credit lines towards a greater independence 
(Khatib, 1997). The private sector operations of the AFDB is primarily focused on 
the development of infrastructure projects, especially energy projects and the 
bank help local companies implement international best practise to ensure 
competitiveness at domestically and on an international stage (Creamer Media 
Reporter [2], 2009). The AFDB has communicated that it wants to play a more 
active role in privately financed schemes and this involvement has averaged 
USD 1.5 billion annually (Arfaoui, Personal Interview, 2009; and Creamer Media 
Reporter [2], 2009).  
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For the wind energy sector in Africa the private sector operations of the AFDB is 
looking to be a debt financier to project financed, utility scale wind energy 
projects. Currently the AFDB does not offer project equity for this type of 
investment however Arfaoui, 2009, suggested that this is an area that the bank 
could explore in the future. The project pipeline that the AFDB is currently 
exploring is concentrated in five countries in Africa: South Africa, Morocco, Egypt, 
and Tunisia. Table 20 outlines the AFDB’s project pipeline in terms of MW and 
the associated expected total capacity for each country according to Arfaoui, 
2009.  
 
Table 20: The AFDB’s project pipeline and potential country capacity 
 
COUNTRY 
AFDB ACTIVE 
PROJECTS 
POTENTIAL 
CAPACITY 
South Africa 700 MW 3000 MW 
Morocco 300 MW 1500 MW 
Egypt 250 MW 2000 MW 
Tunisia 120 MW 800 MW 
Source: Arfaoui, Personal Interview, 2009 
 
Further to the provision of debt the AFDB can offer project development technical 
assistance and expertise to ensure that the project is developed in a bankable 
manner (Arfaoui, Personal Interview, 2009). Through legal assistance, 
environmental assessment, a modelling team, technical backup and risk 
management capabilities the bank can work with the developer to prepare the 
feasibility study, financing plan, wind feasibility, technical material and all the 
required detail to ensure that the project is brought to a bankable level that both 
equity sponsors and the financiers, including the bank itself (Arfaoui, Personal 
Interview, 2009). 
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6.3.2. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
 
An important state-owned development finance institution in South Africa that has 
expressed that it will become increasingly active and involved in the South 
African energy sector is the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) (Creamer, 
2009). This will for increased involvement has been demonstrated through the 
IDC’s support for three IPP entities so far with discussions for further interaction 
in both the renewable energy and conventional power projects (Creamer, 2009). 
The renewable energy sector is being paid particular attention by the IDC and 
explained that there has been strong interest from renewable energy IPP’s over 
various technologies spurred by the NERSA’s approval of a workable REFIT 
(Creamer, 2009). For the wind industry the IDC has been approached for funding 
on, among other RE technologies, a 500-MW wind farm, in the Western Cape, 
however all of these requests still require PPAs with Eskom (Creamer, 2009). 
The IDC is another important local DFI that could be implemental in getting wind 
energy projects over the line if this source of funding is properly leveraged and 
effectively and efficiently utilised. 
 
6.3.3. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA (DBSA) 
 
The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) is a local, state-owned DFI that 
will offer pre-investment grant finance through a project they will implement called 
the Renewable Energy Market Transformation Project (REMT) and they will offer 
assistance in sourcing post investment finance (Collins, Personal Interview, 
2009). Most institutional and equity investors and financiers will view the 
provision of early equity, or pre-investment finance, as too risky for the wind 
energy sector in South Africa with so many undefined uncertainties at this stage.  
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Vajeth, 2009 from ABSA Capital, explains this point that it will be very difficult for 
the bank to provide early equity, or project development finance, to projects 
especially in today’s financial climate of serious constraints on balance sheets. 
Consequently, the DBSA will play an implemental role in filling this crucial gap 
that will not necessarily be filled by the private sector. This role played by the 
DBSA is as the implementation agency for the REMT and the implementation 
was started in November 2008 for a duration of 4 years with $6-million in donor 
funds by the GEF/World Bank through the Department of Energy (DoE). 
Nomawethu Qase, director of new and renewable energy from the DoE was 
"begging you [project developers] to assist us in spending that money" (Van der 
Merwe, 2009).  
 
The REMT was launched to tackle three objectives: to help eliminate the barriers 
to renewable energy development; strive to reduce SA’s greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions; and assist in the country to reach the renewable energy target of 
10,000 GWh contribution to final energy consumption by 2013. These objectives 
will be coordinated through the project’s two main components: the Renewable 
Energy Power Generation (REPG) sub-component and the Solar Water Heating 
(SWH) sub-component. The development of wind power in SA will fall under the 
REPG subcomponent for which the REMT strives to provide policy, regulatory 
and institutional capacity building support at the national level. The REMT project 
looked at assisting developers in bringing projects to bankability through 
assistance with feasibility studies and environmental-impact assessments (van 
der Merwe, 2009).  
 
As discussed DFIs are important sources of funding however they also have a 
technical advice function. The DBSA is no different and under the REFT and its 
Help Desk function is set up to create a mechanism for dialogue with project 
developers and investors. It will act as a “one stop shop” for all queries with 
regards to the development of renewable energy generation projects.  
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This will offer support in the form of communicating a guideline or road map that 
will offer direction in the development process for renewable energy projects and 
will cover the issues such as how to apply for the REFIT, sign a PPA, grid 
licensing, and grid-code compliance. Furthermore, the Help Desk will act as a 
vehicle to liaise with NERSA, ESKOM, the Single Buyers Office and the 
Government in fast tracking the outstanding regulatory or policy issues such as 
the PPA, grid licensing for IPP’s and grid connection. 
 
The REMT does not offer any investment phase financing such as equity, debt or 
mezzanine finance but is solely focused on providing pre-investment finance in 
the form of a “Matching Grant” (MG) through the project’s REPG subcomponent. 
This facility will offer matching grants of up to US$200,000 equivalent per 
company and US$100,000 per project over the course of the qualifying REMT 
project, which can only be used to finance up to 50 percent of any eligible 
expenditures (Collins, Personal Interview, and DBSA, 2009). The MG is a 
market-based incentive for strengthening the capacity of the private sector to 
implement RE power projects and for moving to best practise in the REPG 
industry. The MG is on a cost-share basis and requires a “Rand to Rand” 
investment from the company receiving the grant (Collins, Personal Interview, 
2009). The MG is for project development activities such as capacity-building to 
assist the beneficiary projects to identify, prepare, finance and improve their 
business and market development capabilities towards financial closure (DBSA, 
2008). The activities and organisations active in a wind power plant project’s 
development qualify for this funding and the DBSA will play an important role in 
the early phases of the project’s development as it aids in securing the 
bankability of the project through offering an early endorsement, credibility and 
crucial project development funding. 
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6.3.4. EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES 
 
An Export Credit Agency is an international DFI that can offer, and facilitate debt 
to project financed wind farms in South Africa. An ECA is aligned with a certain 
country or a department of a country’s government, with the primary mandate to 
encourage the export of goods and services and foreign investment of the host 
nation (Delmon, 2009, p. 110). Examples of ECAs globally are the Export-Import 
Bank of the United States; ECGD of United Kingdom, and Japan Bank for 
International Cooperation (JBIC); and Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF) from 
Denmark (Khatib, 1997). 
 
According to Khatib, 1997, an ECA can offer three primary services. Firstly, an 
ECA can offer fixed or floating interest rates which enable host country exporters 
to secure international buyers with favourable financial packages (Khatib, 1997). 
Secondly, ECAs will provide insurance against non payment and repayment 
guarantees to provide exporters with the confidence to sell to developing nations 
and give further certainty to financing banks respectively (Khatib, 1997).  Thirdly, 
offering investment insurance and guarantees to protect host nation companies 
against political risks inherent to investing in other countries (Khatib, 1997). The 
two predominant financial products and services that they offer are firstly, buyer 
or supplier credit guarantee and insurance facilities in the case of political risk, 
currency transfer risk and changes in law and secondly, direct non- or limited 
recourse financing for the goods and service of exported from the host country at 
up to 85% of the total export price (Khatib, 1997; Delmon, 2009, p. 110). 
 
Khatib, 1997 explains that, “insurance and financing by ECAs play a key role in 
supporting trade and investments into developing nations which may not have 
materialised due a high level of political and/or commercial risk involved in the 
project.” South Africa, being a developing nation, stands to benefit from this type 
of DFI involvement and to date Eskom has secured funding through this channel. 
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An ECA loan agreement was signed between Eskom and BHF-BANK as the lead 
arranger of a consortium of 7 banks: HypoVereinsbank, BNP Paribas, CALYON 
Crédit Agricole (CIB), Commerzbank, KfW IPEX-Bank, and Natixis (Creamer, [4], 
2009). While this arrangement was not for a project financed deal it demonstrates 
that ECA-type deals have happened in South Africa and Vajeth, 2009, from 
ABSA Capital explained that they had good connections with the European ECAs 
that were interested in getting involved in project financed wind farms in South 
Africa. This function could be extremely important for South Africa as these 
guarantees can offer a potential shield for foreign developers to the gaps in the 
regulatory framework and the corresponding indefinable uncertainties. 
 
6.4. CONCLUSION 
 
A typical project financed, utility-scale wind farm project goes through seven 
identifiable project development phases, namely: pre-feasibility; feasibility 
analysis; financing and project documentation; contracting and planning; 
construction; operation and maintenance; and repowering or decommissioning. 
Along this development process different sources of funding are utilised in the 
form of both the debt and equity contributions. Four broad ranges of equity 
funders are strategic investors, institutional investors, equity investors and CDM 
buyers and debt providers can be broken down into commercial banks, 
institutional investors like pension funds and development finance institutions 
(DFIs). In the initial stages of the project strategic investors will develop wind 
farms with the help of DFIs and move the project to a position of bankability at 
which point institutional investors, commercial banks, and pension funds can take 
over ownership and financing activities.  
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In South Africa the strategic investors that have responded to the policy and 
regulatory signals and are likely to develop large portfolios will be RES, 
Macquarie Capital, Investec/GDF Suez, and Mainstream Renewable Power with 
smaller developers pursuing individual projects. These investors will be active 
throughout the development process with all of them focusing on development 
and the majority looking to operate the wind farm but with limited ownership in 
the operational phase of the project. On the debt side it is clear that there will be 
four, possibly five domestic commercial banks who will dominate financing 
activities. These banks will be Standard Bank, FNB, Nedbank and ABSA, while 
Investec may enter this financier market if approached with the right project. 
There is an overwhelming support from these banks and all of them are more 
than willing to extend project debt if all major risks have been appropriately 
packaged so it is up to the public players to create the appropriate environment 
to facilitate the correct packaging of risks.  
 
While these commercial banks will become involved after bankability has been 
proven the DFIs such as World Bank, AFD, AFDB, IDC and DBSA will play an 
important role in facilitating pre-investment finance and technical assistance to 
move the projects from identification of the need for the project to financial close. 
The DFIs will also play an important role in South Africa in absorbing the higher 
degree of uncertainty where private investors and financiers otherwise will not. 
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7. CHAPTER 7: PROJECT RISKS AND RISK ALLOCATION 
 
PROJECT RISKS AND RISK ALLOCATION 
 
Chapter 6 identified the project development phases and the types of 
financiers/investors that are active in each of these development phases. 
Chapter 7 aims to demonstrate how each financier is exposed to risk through 
identifying the key broad project risk categories inherent in each development 
phase. These broad risk categories are those that are typical for a project 
financed, utility scale wind farm project as identified by the literature and from the 
point of view of potential investors and financiers in South Africa. Then these 
risks will be matched by indicating in which of the project development phases 
that these project risks will be apparent and the project participant which will 
usually be responsible for the risk. If these project risks are then unallocated, 
then the SPV and ultimately its financiers and investors will bear this residual risk, 
so this chapter will highlight which type of financier/investor will ultimately bear 
the residual risks through comparing the project phase where the risk is apparent 
and against the type of financiers/investors that are active in that phase and 
exposed to the adverse outcome of each project risk.  
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Before a review of this risks can happen the difference of uncertainty and risk are 
explored as the financiers and investors to the South African wind power market 
are faced with more uncertainties at the early stages of the market than risks. 
The significance of this is that uncertainties are unmanageable whereas risks can 
be valued and assigned. 
 
Finally, the chapter will explore how these project risks are allocated through the 
project documentation and risk mitigation instrument away from the SPV to the 
different project participants according to the guiding principle of risk allocation. 
 
7.1. UNCERTAINTY 
 
The literature defines the distinction between uncertainty and risk, where 
uncertainty refers to an unstructured perception of the future where the 
probabilities of the different outcomes are unknown, whereas risk is used to 
explain the situation where the alternative outcomes have been specified and 
probabilities have been assigned to them (Venetsanos et al., 2002; and Nevitt 
and Fabozzi, 2000, as cited in Irwin, 2007).  
 
Venetsanos et al., 2002, p. 293-307 outline six broad areas of uncertainty that 
are apparent for the development of wind farm projects. These categories of 
uncertainty are: political; electricity market structure; demand for electricity; 
supply; initial capital requirements; technological issues and environmental 
regulations pertaining to wind farm development. These issues are briefly 
discussed to understand the context behind the individual project risk explained 
thereafter. The political will of a nation’s government will usually determine the 
enabling environment for wind energy especially from a regulatory perspective. 
Government regulations and policies can make or break the economics 
underpinning wind power projects (Ubajako, 2006).  
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The political uncertainty largely affects the uncertainty of market structure which 
refers to how the market for the electrical output of the wind project is structured 
and who ultimately bears the risk of production cost volatility (Venetsanos et al., 
2002, p. 293-307). In regulated markets this risk is passed onto end consumers 
through tariff structures while in the environment of recently deregulated power 
markets such as Brazil the question of who the end consumer becomes blurred 
i.e. is it a consumer or an intermediary (Venetsanos et al., 2002, p. 293-307). 
 
The uncertainty of demand and supply for electricity will cast concerns on the 
ability of the market to offtake the project’s electrical output as either demand will 
outstrip supply in both the short term and long term, and vice versa, with the 
electrical gird unable to handle the input of the project’s output. Furthermore, 
there is a lag between demand recognition, investment decision and the 
commissioning of an operating power plant. This lag time needs to be factored 
into power system planning in the long term, where demand grows at a relatively 
more predictable rate, and in the short term, which is more challenging as 
demand or peak demand grows at an unpredictable rate with sudden peaks 
(Venetsanos et al., 2002). The supply uncertainty is that the supply system of 
generation, transmission and distribution will need to maintain a reserve margin 
to meet demand at all times, so the uncertainty for a wind power plant developer 
and their financiers is whether the addition of the wind power plant will be in line 
with the maintenance of this reserve margin (Venetsanos et al., 2002). 
Essentially the demand and supply uncertainty is the uncertainty as to whether 
there will be a market for the project’s output over the lifetime of the project, 
therefore ensuring the project’s ability to generate income (Venetsanos et al., 
2002, p. 293-307). 
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Other uncertainties such as what will be the exact initial capital requirements, 
which for wind energy account for a significant proportion of the total energy 
production cost, and what will be the possibility of cost overruns and increased 
costs due to time delays during the construction period (Venetsanos et al., 2002; 
and (Ubajako, 2006). There will be technological issues with uncertainty relating 
to the technology employed and its availability to generate over the lifetime of the 
project. The technology can become economically obsolete due to technological 
advance, the question of the quality of the technology, and its suitability to the 
site (Venetsanos et al., 2002, p. 293-307). Finally, the Environmental Regulations 
or restrictions that dictate how the power plant must fit into the environment with 
limited impact, while this is less pronounced for clean technologies such as wind 
power the facility must take into account its impact on the surrounding 
environment and whether the projects development will be blocked or delayed 
due to infringement of environmental regulation (Venetsanos et al., 2002). 
 
The uncertainties applicable to the development of a wind power plant, outlined 
above, are the broad context from which many of the project risks arise. These 
uncertainties have a variety of uncertain outcomes, so individual risks are those 
uncertain outcomes that have been assigned a probability of occurring which 
then lends a degree of predictability to the situation. Financiers want to have 
certainty as to their financial exposure over the debt maturity period so they will 
seek a business environment that is predictable, so individual risks differ to 
uncertainties through a greater degree of predictability. However in most reality 
the exact probabilities of uncertain outcomes are unknown but project developers 
will be charged with assigning subjective probabilities to these events so in reality 
this distinction between uncertainty and risks may not be matter (Knight, 1921, as 
cited in Irwin, 2007). The financiers and investors that were reviewed in the 
exploratory interviews all agreed that it is the broader policy and regulatory 
uncertainties that is the main barrier to investment and financing.  
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This is due to the above definition in the sense that uncertainties are 
unmanageable so funders can not price or value to potential loss or gain of value 
from the risk not eventuating or if it does, respectively. This means that they 
cannot determine the true exposure or the risk that the funds they commit to a 
project and consequently cannot express their key financing terms and variables. 
In other words, faced with uncertainty, financiers and investors cannot accurately 
determine the cost and availability of their funds, which will result in more 
conservative, or costly, terms. With the distinction of uncertainty and risk in mind 
and how this affects funder’s decisions, the following chapter will discuss the 
common risks that appear on project financed wind farms. 
 
158 
Table 21: A table to show where each project risk is apparent over the project development phases 
PRE-FEASIBILITY FEASIBILITY FINANCING & 
PROJECT 
DOCUMENTATION 
CONTRACTING & 
PLANNING 
CONSTRUCTION OPERATION & 
MAINTENANCE 
REPOWERING OR 
DECOMMISSION 
Country Risk 
Political Risk 
Credit/Default Risk 
Environmental Risk 
Production/ Resource Risk  
Development Risks     
   Completion Risk   
    Construction Risk   
    
Commissioning & 
Performance Risk 
  
Cost Increase Risk (Evaluation period 1)  
Cost Increase Risk  
(Evaluation period 2)  
    Technology Risk  
     Resource Risk  
     Production Risk  
     Operation Risk  
     Market Risk  
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7.2. PROJECT SPECIFIC RISKS 
 
Project risks can be defined as the possibility of loss in project value associated 
with each uncertain, but possible, undesirable outcome where subjective 
probabilities have been assigned to the uncertain outcomes eventuating by 
project participants. Irwin, 2007 gives a comprehensive definition of risk as, 
“Unpredictable variation in value arising from unpredictable variation in a risk 
factor or random variable, where a risk factor is a variable whose outcome affects 
total project value and whose value is uncertain.” So risk impacts project value so 
while this value can be estimated over the life time of project it can never be 
accurately captured but rather the value of each alternative outcome and the 
probability of each outcome eventuating can be determined at a certain 
confidence level to determine the most probable overall project value. This paper 
indentifies 14 broad risk categories namely: country risk, political risk, 
credit/default risk, development risk, completion risk, environmental risk, 
construction risk, commissioning and performance risk, cost increase risk, 
production risk, resource risk, technology risk, operation risk, and finally market 
risk. 
 
Each project risk will occur at certain phases of the project’s development and 
Table 21, above, gives an indication as to where the responsible project 
participant will be exposed to this risk eventuating. This is not to say that these 
risks are only apparent in the project phases identified in Table 21, but rather this 
serves as a guide as in which project development phase these risks are likely to 
occur. In the same way these risk categories are not mutually exclusive so a risk 
can be classified under more than one broad category. The project participant 
that is responsible for this risk will be the entity best placed to manage the risk in 
a situation where risks are allocated by this guiding principle of risk allocation 
(explained later under Risk Allocation).  
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If, however, these risks are not appropriately allocated the financier and investor 
will ultimately bear the unallocated or residual risks (this concept is further 
explained under risk allocation, below). Table 19, in Chapter 6, illustrates which 
development phase each financier and investor is typically active. If we compare 
Table 21, above and Table 19, from Chapter 6, we can see which 
financier/investor will bear the residual risk under each project development 
phase which will in turn be reflected in their key financing terms and variables. 
 
In Chapter 5 the paper demonstrated the affect of risk on a financier/investor’s 
key financing terms and variables. Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386, describe 
how an increase in risk will interact with key financing variables as an increase in 
residual risks will have the result of financers and investors offering shorter 
investment horizons, increased equity requirements, reduced debt maturity, and 
larger debt and equity risk premiums. Ubajaka, 2006, supports this view as he 
explains that project risks affect the amount, timing and availability of funds for 
project finance and in the sense that for financiers a higher level of residual risks 
will decrease the loan amount, increases the interest rate and shortens debt 
maturity period. On the other hand, an increase in residual risks for equity 
investors will increase their minimum ROE requirements or cost of equity 
(Ubajaka, 2006).  
 
The identification and management of risks along the development process and 
who they affect is vitally important to a project finance structure as these risks 
have a significant impact on the key financing terms and variables that underpin 
the provision of project funds. However, each project is specific in terms of 
project participants, their requirements, their risk tolerances and their interaction 
which will ultimately determine how risks are allocated amongst them (Delmon, 
2009).  
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A common point to most project financed structures is that any unallocated, or 
residual risks, will be borne by the SPV, and ultimately it will be the financiers and 
the investors to this SPV that bear these residual risks (Delmon, 2009, p. 98). 
What follows is a discussion of the broad categories of project risks that a wind 
power plant will likely be exposed to at each phase of its development and which 
financier and/or investor will ultimately bear the residual risks if risks are not 
appropriately allocated. It is important to note that no risk should be discussed in 
isolation as risks rarely affect one project participant at a defined stage in the 
project but rather each risk will interface with other risks, between project 
participants and across different project development phases (Delmon, 2009, p. 
158-159). What follows then does not attempt to give a conclusive list of project 
risks, exactly when they occur, and who bears the residual risk, but rather the 
discussion aims to portray a guideline as to identify 14 broad categories of 
project risks, where in the development process are they most likely to be 
apparent, which financier/investor is most likely to ultimately bear the residual risk, 
and finally provide the views from the qualitative interviews for risk pertinent to 
South Africa. 
 
7.2.1. DEVELOPMENT RISK 
 
Development risk is the broad risk category that prevalent in the development 
phase of the project, from pre-feasibility to financial close and covers all the 
activities that occur in these phases (Delmon, 2009, p. 162-163). The initial 
phases of a project requires a heavy outlay of funds, called pre-investment 
finance, to move the project to a position of bankability and eventual financial 
close, especially due to the complexity of negotiating project documentation and 
these funds are provided by project sponsors, usually strategic investors, and 
DFIs (for South Africa it is the domestic DFIs who will provide pre-investment 
finance) as discussed in Chapter 6 (Delmon, 2009, p. 162-163).  
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So in the absence of financier’s debt it is the investor of this high risk pre-
investment finance that will bear the development risks with the chance, but not 
guarantee, of future return on equity once the project is operational, on sale of 
the asset at financial close, or through this equity can be treated as subordinated 
debt or equity in-kind to be re-payed once senior obligations are met (O’Flynn, 
Personal Interview, 2009; and Delmon, 2009). 
 
For South Africa, Arfaoui, 2009, from the DFI African Development Bank, 
explained that development risk was particularly pertinent. The AFDB requires a 
project champion to carry their investment that understands the host of activities 
that need to be carried out under the development phase in a manner that is 
ultimately bankable. Consequently, the AFDB will only engage with a project 
developer with the expertise or track record to understand the magnitude of this 
task. Both Arfaoui, 2009 and an industry participant, 2009 from BNP Paribas 
voiced their concern as to the level of the expertise of the domestic developers in 
South Africa and that it remained to see if international developer’s development 
portfolios were structured to accept South African development risk. In other 
words other markets such as China and India where the structure of market is 
clearer could present a more reliable investment (An Industry Participant, 
Personal Interview, 2009). 
 
7.2.2. PRODUCTION RISKS/RESOURCE RISK 
 
Resource risk can be explained as the risk that the resource that is required to 
power the project’s technology is inadequate, which has the affect of decreasing 
production and hence revenue, which ultimately reduces the cash flow required 
to service debt repayments (Ubajaka, 2006).   
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Wind power technology does not rely on costly input fuel as is the case with 
traditional power plants, so while wind energy projects do not present a fuel 
supply or resource risk in terms of availability and price fluctuations, there is still a 
resource that needs to be accurately measured and modelled. Furthermore, 
while accurate modelling techniques exist today that bring some degree of 
certainty to this how this resource will behave you are still modelling something is 
an intermittent resource with variability over the site, the seasons, and the years 
(Viljoen, Personal Interview, 2009; and Ubajaka, 2006). For this reason, Wiser, 
1997, discusses that renewable energy technologies such as wind energy are 
perceived by to have high resource risk by the financial community and that the 
majority of financial institutions lack significant experience in evaluating 
renewable energy resource risks.  
 
To understand the wind resource on site is the pivotal activity that largely 
determines how a wind power project is structured. The wind resource is 
preliminarily investigated at in the pre-feasibility stage, measured and modelled 
through the feasibility phase for 12 to 18 months and has an impact throughout 
the project until the decision to repower or decommission. Therefore this 
resource risk is apparent over the life of the project and a miscalculation in the 
feasibility stage in the measurement process can render a project ineffective in 
future phases such as the operational phase. Financiers require 12 to 18 months 
of correctly calibrated wind data and their key financing terms and variables are 
then ratio driven off the confidence interval (P90 or P50) of this data in the sense 
that data provided at a P90 sensitivity will qualify for more favourable key 
financing terms and variables when compared to that provided at P50, as the 
former provides better certainty to the revenue generation ability of the project 
with subsequent increased certainty to financiers as to their financial exposure 
(O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009; Delmon, 2009; Vajeth, Personal Interview 
2009; Eardley-Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009;  and Viljoen, Personal Interview, 
2009).  
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If the data was incorrectly measured and logged in the initial stages of the project, 
then it is ultimately the project company and its shareholders and financiers who 
will shoulder the reduction in value as a result of the adverse outcome of the 
resource risk which will occur in the operation phase of the project.  
 
For Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA Capital, the risk that stands out the most in South 
Africa, at this stage of the market’s development is resource risk. More 
specifically, there is limited wind data for South Africa both on a national level 
and on a project specific level (Maclay, Personal Interview, 2009). This 
insufficiency makes it difficult to determine the real performance of wind power 
projects which in turn makes it difficult for financiers to specify exact key 
financing terms and variables and for investors to determine the real return on 
equity at this early stage (Maclay, Personal Interview, 2009). Consequently, 
ABSA Capital, a commercial bank had not made a positive conclusion as to the 
wind resource in South Africa from the information they had seen and remain on 
the conservative end of the spectrum when reviewing this risk (Vajeth, Personal 
Interview, 2009). Under the context of this conservative view from banks it is 
essential that project developers measure and log the wind resource in order for 
this data to be presented in a bankable format. O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream 
Renewable Power explained that in many new markets for wind power 
development, he has experienced that local developers are attempting to do 
things in the cheapest way possible which in most cases renders the project 
unbankable or qualifies the project for unfavourable and costly key financing 
terms and variables. 
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7.2.3. COMPLETION RISK 
 
Completion risk is the risk that the works will not be completed in time, and in 
accordance, with the bankable project documentation, project specifications and 
requirements. Delmon, 2009, p. 163-164, defines completion risk as the, “risk 
that a project will not be able to pass its completion test within the time for 
completion” (Delmon, 2009). While Ubajaka, 2006, describes this risk as the risk 
that the project is not completed on time, or is never completed and thus never 
generates revenue to service the existing draw-downs on debt repayments or 
yield a return for investors. 
 
The completion risk is most likely to be apparent in the construction phase of the 
project as the construction contractor(s) work to design and builds the works in 
time for completion testing and commissioning of the project (Delmon, 2009, p. 
163-164). Consequently, it is the construction contractor who bears the loss in 
value due to the outcome of completion risk and this risk allocation is passed 
through the Construction Agreement from the SPV (Delmon, 2009). So if this risk 
is correctly allocated there should be no residual risks that would be ultimately 
the responsibility of the SPV’s shareholders and financiers. According to Table 
19, in Chapter 6, this could possible affect the investors and financiers active in 
the construction phase, namely: strategic, institutional or equity investors on the 
equity side and commercial banks, DFIs and ECAs on the debt side in South 
Africa. 
 
The completion risk is the broad risk category that captures the undesirable 
outcomes of incomplete works, time delays, and sub optimal performance from 
completed works all in the construction phase and the defects liability period in 
the operation phase.  
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So a review of completion risk can not be isolated from construction risk, 
commissioning and performance risk as they all deal with the issue of whether 
the design and works are fit for purpose as defined by the Concession 
Agreement. 
7.2.4. CONSTRUCTION RISK 
 
Construction risk can be defined as the probability of cost overruns and delays in 
completion occurring with the result that that the project is not constructed in 
accordance with specifications to be fit for purpose, leading to a shortfall in 
capacity and resulting in increased interest and lengthening of repayment profile 
(Ubajaka, 2006). Renewable energy technologies are capital intensive and 
therefore they require a large outlay of upfront funds with the largest drawdown 
on funding occurring in this phase of the project’s development (Wizelius, 2007). 
The primary form of security to financiers will be the total value of the project and 
its ability generate income, but until completion has occurred the project assets 
have little value. Furthermore, the construction phase is where most delays and 
cost overruns usually occur, which makes the construction phase the phase with 
the most risk exposure and potentially the most costly (Delmon, 2009, p. 164).  
 
If the undesirable outcomes eventuate, and risks are not appropriately allocated 
through the construction agreement then this phase implicates the majority of 
equity and debt providers to bear the residual risks, as explained above under 
completion risk, which will result in harsher key financing terms and variables or 
even refusal to grant the loan by financiers or non-investment by investors. 
Construction risks include all the risks that could occur through the construction 
period, some of which are: incomplete scope of work, cost overruns, unexpected 
site and foundation conditions, availability of materials, infrastructure and 
services, political and natural force majeure all with related price extras (Delmon, 
2009; Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001; and Ubajaka, 2006).  
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Through the Construction Agreement the SPV transfers the construction risks to 
the construction contractor who then has the obligation to ensure that the design 
and works are sufficient for the purpose intended for the project as defined under 
the Concession Agreement from the grantor (Delmon, 2009). Any residual risks 
will be the ultimate responsibility of the financiers and the investors in the SPV. 
 
Viljoen, 2009 form Cresco Project Finance explained that the construction risk for 
South Africa were largely undefined as a project of this nature has not been 
constructed in South Africa to date which means there is no benchmark for 
potential project financiers/sponsors to evaluate the practical rollout and the 
hidden risks. Consequently, the development of the first utility scale wind farm in 
South Africa will be closely followed by all industry stakeholders. 
 
7.2.5. COMMISSIONING RISK 
 
Completion risk is the risk of the works not satisfying the completion tests that 
verify that these works comply with project specifications, with external systems 
and that the plant’s equipment and systems all interface correctly (Delmon, 2009, 
p. 165-166). Upon completion testing the completed works can either not be fit 
for purpose or they can be incomplete, and it is for this reason that you can not 
separate the analysis of completion risk and commissioning risk as the latter is a 
sub-category of the former. Commissioning risk can occur in all the activities that 
move the project from financial close to successful commissioning and take over, 
or in other words from the end of the financing and project documentation phase 
to the end of the construction phase when completion is ascertained through 
successful  commissioning (Delmon, 2009, p. 166). The project participants are 
exposed to these risks at the end of the construction phase when commissioning 
tests take place and the uncertain outcome becomes certain.  
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Completion is essential to the SPV and its shareholders who want to maximise 
revenue by bringing the asset online as soon as possible; both the offtaker and 
grantor who require the output of the project; and finally the financiers who will 
want to claim back the debt extended to the project over the construction period 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 166).  
 
It is for these reasons that these interested parties will want to allocate the 
commissioning risk to the construction contractor(s) through the Construction 
Agreement and when completion is evidenced then a large transfer of risk occurs 
away from the construction contractor who will then be paid for the services 
rendered (Delmon, 2009, p. 166). There is a period called the defects liability 
period where the construction contractor(s) will remain liable for certain defects in 
the works in the operation phase of the project. If the risks are not appropriately 
allocated through the Construction Agreement it will be the SPV, and 
consequently, its shareholders and financiers that bear the residual risks. 
 
7.2.6. PERFORMANCE RISK 
 
Renewable energy technologies are perceived to have a high degree of 
performance risk as they are viewed as unproven (Wiser, 1997). The 
construction contractor(s) will be responsible for the design and building of the 
wind farm, a responsibility allocated through the Construction Agreement by the 
project company. There are three sets of performance criteria that the works 
should meet upon completion, commissioning and take over which are: those fit 
for purpose requirements stipulated by the grantor through the Concession 
Agreement and the loan repayment and return on equity requirements as defined 
by the financier and the investors through the Financing Agreement and the 
Shareholders Agreement respectively (Delmon, 2009, p. 173).  
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The interested project participants, grantor, financiers and investors, will include 
performance clauses, warrantees and penalties for default in the Construction 
Contract which will hold the construction contractor(s) responsible to deliver 
works that meet a minimum level of performance and in the case of default on 
this they are liable for any loss in value caused by inadequate works and hence 
the performance risk (Delmon, 2009, p. 173-176). 
 
Performance risk is apparent in all the activities involved over the construction 
phase and project participants will be exposed to these risks from completion and 
over the operation phase of the project. The construction contractor will be bear 
this risk as discussed, however any unallocated elements of this risk or residual 
risks will be the responsibility of the investors and financiers. 
 
7.2.7. TECHNOLOGY RISK  
 
Technology risk is the risk that the technology installed will not perform according 
to the predefined requirements and specifications of the grantor, shareholders 
and financiers so there will be a loss in value resulting in the actual revenue 
falling short of the forecasted revenue with implications on offtake obligations, 
ROE and debt servicing (Ubajaka, 2006). Or in other words the technology is 
inadequate for the purpose that it is intended (Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). 
Technology risk is typically apparent through the construction with the exposure 
over the operational period where defaults can occur. Renewable energy 
technology is relatively new with sharp incremental and radical innovation 
learning curves rendering technology obsolete which is why renewable energy 
technologies are considered to have high perceived technology risk by the 
financial community (Ubajaka, 2006; Wiser 1997). 
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Wind power technology, a renewable energy technology, is a relatively new 
technology when compared to other more traditional fossil fuels and as a 
consequence there is a high level of perceived risks by the financial community. 
This high level of perceived risks are reflected through the key financing terms 
and variables that the financial community has typically offered financing to 
privately owned, project financed wind power projects when compared to more 
traditional forms of energy generation technology (Wiser and Kahn, 1996).  
 
However due to the rapid deployment of wind turbine generators around the 
world this technology is maturing, security such as warrantees are developing 
and the skills to evaluate this performance result in readily available information 
to the financial community these key financing terms and variables may become 
less restrictive for project financed wind farms due to a drop in the level of 
perceived and real risks by the financial community (Wiser and Kahn, 1996; 
Delmon, 2009; and Navigator Project Finance, 2009). 
 
The technology that is employed and the probability of any default will be 
allocated to the construction contractor through the turbine equipment supplier in 
the form of performance related damages and latent defects liability period that 
extends into the operation phase of the project (Delmon, 2009, p. 174). If the 
technology risk is based on proven technology the financiers will usually be 
willing to take some of the performance risk or this drop in the level of real and 
perceived risks will be reflected through less restrictive key financing terms and 
variables (Delmon, 2009, p. 173-176). The financiers that will be exposed to the 
residual technology risk will be those active over the construction and operation 
phases of the project, namely: strategic, institutional, and equity investors; CDM 
buyers; and commercial banks, institutional debt investors and DFIs/ECAs. 
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The financiers, investors and industry participants that were interviewed agreed 
that wind turbine technology that is in the multi-megawatt range of 2 to 3 MW 
which is provided by a large trusted turbine supplier would not pose much of a 
technology risk for South African projects. Wind power is a tried and tested 
technology with over 1,250,000 MW installed globally, so technology risk is not a 
huge concern. Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank, agreed with this as 
long as it comes from a large, trusted supplier.  
 
O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power explained that the way in 
which they will mitigate technology risk in South Africa will be to only source their 
turbines from top quality manufacturers, such as Vestas, General Electric, and 
Siemens, and they do not even consider turbines from suppliers without a 
bankable track record and significant international capabilities. Greenwood, 2009, 
from New Energy Finance further backed this point up as he stated that the 
international machines were trusted by potential financiers and sponsors. Finally, 
Arfaoui, 2009, from the AFDB, explained that the technology risk is no risk what 
so ever with wind turbine technology as this is a well established and proven 
technology. Furthermore, the security packages, insurance and warranties that 
large turbine suppliers offer cover the well defined risks to great degree in the 
view of the AFDB. 
 
On the other hand some of the experience interviews revealed that financiers and 
investors had concerns about the performance of these international machines 
under South African conditions remained to be determined, especially their 
connectivity to the South Africa grid. Maclay, 2009, from Actis Equity Fund; an 
industry participant, 2009, from BNP Paribas; and Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco 
Project Finance, all agreed that there is no uncertainty as to whether the 
technology works but how the technology will perform in South Africa was the 
question, particularly with reference to whether there will be capacity to 
effectively service and maintain these machines over the 20 year project life time. 
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7.2.8. COST INCREASE RISK 
 
Cost increase risk, or cost overrun risk, is the risk that the actual costs incurred 
are greater than those forecasted under the financial model with an associated 
impact on revenue, debt servicing ability, and the level of ROE returned to 
investors (Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173).  
 
Cost increase risk is apparent over all the activities where the future cost for a 
project input, such as equipment or services, are forecasted and input into the 
financial model off which funding is extended to the project. However, there are 
two periods over the project’s development where this risk is evaluated: firstly, 
the period between pre-feasibility to financial close at the end of the financing 
and project documentation phase; and secondly, from financial close to through 
construction and into the operation phase (Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173). This 
allows for funder to evaluate if the financial model has varied greatly to the 
forecasted model they agreed to invest in or finance (Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173). 
 
Cost increase risk is the broad risk category that captures a variety of potential 
adverse outcomes and Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173, outlines some of these risks 
that the project participants are exposed to over the first and second evaluation 
periods are: inflation rate increase risk, interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, and 
refinancing risk, construction cost increase, input price increase, operation cost 
increase, cost of spare and replacement parts, and variation in off-take tariffs. All 
of the above elements can result in a mismatch between actual revenue and 
forecasted revenue thereby causing a revenue gap which will have a significant 
impact on the project’s viability. An example of where this risk can impact on a 
project is that of construction cost increase risk where due to the time frames 
required to complete works in this period the price of inputs that are quoted under 
a lump sum fixed price basis under an EPC construction contract can often 
increase over these timeframes.  
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Steel and cement prices are a prime example for wind power projects, as these 
inputs can vary substantially over the time from invoicing to that of supply 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173). However, while financiers will want project 
documentation to allocate this risk away from the SPV to the construction 
contractor and the equipment suppliers through the requirement for a lump sum 
fixed price these project participants will include contract price adjustments (CPA). 
 
CPAs are used to peg these key material inputs to indices such as the Steel and 
Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa (SIEFSA) escalation index and 
the Association of Electric Cable Manufacturers of South Africa (AECMSA). 
Despite the cost overrun risks being allocated to the construction contractor and 
equipment suppliers, financiers will still require that additional funds are made 
available by the SPV and its shareholders (Delmon, 2009 p. 167-173). These 
additional funds can come in the form of: contingency margins, stand-by 
subordinated debt, advance on capital draw downs, and stand by credit/debt 
facilities (Delmon, 2009, p. 167-173).  There is a host of risk allocation 
instruments but if these are not included in project documentation the residual 
risks will rest with all financiers and investors active over the project’s lifetime due 
to the two evaluation periods and the broad category that this risk covers. 
 
7.2.9. EXCHANGE RISK 
 
Delmon, 2009, p. 167-168, defines the exchange rate risk as the risk that comes 
from the exchange rate movement between the main project currencies and 
exchange risk is a sub-risk under the broad cost increase risk category (Delmon, 
2009). This is demonstrated through the following example, if an international 
lending institution awarded debt to an IPP in SA in Dollars and Eskom, the off-
taker, pays in Rands under the REFIT.  
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So cash available for debt service will be in Rands while debt servicing is in 
Dollars so any devaluation of the Rand against the Dollar will have an impact on 
the returns of the project and can be treated as a cost increase. Maclay, 2009, 
from Actis explains this concept and how Actis as an equity investor will be 
exposed to exchange risk as a dollar investor in the sense that project revenue 
will be calculated in Rands, the project’s local currency however the revenue will 
then be subject to the Dollar/Rand exchange rate which can have a significant 
impact to the project’s detriment if the Rand weakens and vice versa if the Rand 
strengthens against the Dollar.  
 
Both Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy Finance and O’Flynn, 2009, from 
Mainstream Renewable Power, shared this concern as he explained that the 
wind turbines will be sourced from the large manufacturers in Europe, which 
means that nearly 70-80% of the projects total cost will be in EUROS or Dollars. 
It is then rational that both financiers and investors will inject money into the 
project in these currencies and consequently will require that any return is 
returned in EURO or Dollars (O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009). The issue with 
this is that the cash flow from the project will be generated under the REFIT in 
Rands which means to remunerate financiers and investors the project is 
exposed to the currency exchange risk when converting from Rands to Euros or 
Dollars (O’Flynn, Personal Interview, 2009). 
 
As exchange risk is a sub-component of cost increase risk, it too is apparent over 
the two evaluation periods as identified under cost increase risk and any residual 
risks will be borne by the same financiers and investors. This exchange risk 
exposure can be mitigated through firstly, matching the currency of funding to 
that of revenue and expenses, secondly, through allocation of this risk to project 
participants best placed to handle it, thirdly, by hedging the risk directly on the 
currency market, and finally through the involvement of DFIs who can afford 
international funds in local currencies (Delmon, 2009, p. 167-168).  
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However, in South Africa, Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank explains 
that exchange risk is not a major issue when it comes to financing renewables 
projects as these are smaller in terms of value when compared to base load 
projects, so with a liquid currency market the banks can put up the FOREX 
required for the relatively small renewables FOREX requirements. 
 
7.2.10. OPERATION RISK 
 
The operation risk is the risk inherent in the components that could potentially 
have an adverse affect on the operation expenditure and the project output over 
the life time of the project with an overall loss in project value (Delmon, 2009, p. 
176-177). This risk is apparent from successful completion, and the occurrence 
of take over from the construction contractor(s) all the way through the operation 
phase to the end of the project. The operation risks are the responsibility of the 
SPV, the majority of which are allocated to the operator with all residual risks 
borne by the SPV (Delmon, 2009, p. 176-177). According to Table 19, Chapter 6, 
the financiers responsible in the operations phase will be commercial banks, long 
term institutional investors, international DFIs and ECAs. Financiers will want 
these risks allocated away from the SPV so they will usually require that the 
service packages offered by wind turbine equipment suppliers cover the following 
aspects: scheduled maintenance; all unscheduled but statistically-predictable 
routine maintenance; and scheduled major overhauls and subsystem 
replacements (Delmon, 2009, p. 176-177). 
 
7.2.11. MARKET RISK 
 
Market risk is the risk that for some reason the price received for the project’s 
output or the amount of output sold does not satisfy the minimum ROE and debt 
servicing requirements over the operation phase of the project.  
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A change in the price for the output or the amount of output that can be sold can 
be caused through a variety of influencing factors but predominantly these 
changes come through the likelihood that the utility cannot pay for the power it 
has agreed to buy, described as counterparty risk, and supply and demand 
forces that determines the amount of output required from the project in line with 
peak load curves (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004; and Delmon, 2009).  
 
This risk will usually be allocated to the offtaker through the PPA which will 
guarantee a certain tariff to be paid for the output, that is usually indexed to 
inflation, which will be defined for the majority of, preferably the entire, of the 
project’s lifetime, with any residual risks will be borne by the financiers and 
investors active in the operation phase of the project. Wiser and Pickle, 1998, 
describe how an increase in market risk will interact with key financing variables 
with increased equity requirements, reduced debt maturity, and larger debt and 
equity risk premiums (Wiser and Pickle, 1998, p. 361-386). Consequently, an 
increased level of perceived market risks by the financiers and investors can 
result in stricter and more expensive key financing terms and variables. 
 
In South Africa, O’Flynn, 2009 from Mainstream Renewable Power explained that 
there was a limited adherent merchant risk. According to O’Flynn, the feed-in 
tariff makes a significant difference to reducing the levels of merchant risk as it 
guarantees a revenue for the project at least R1.25/kWh for the 20 year lifetime 
of the project. This is a prime example where regulation from the public arena 
has removed uncertainty for the investors and financiers this example is the 
prime reason for the private interest in the South African wind industry. Whereas, 
Vajeth, 2009, from ABSA Capital, believed the contrary, as he identified 
significant market and counterparty risk in the connection and management of 
these wind power plants to the South African grid network. Counterparty risk can 
be defined as the likelihood that the utility cannot pay for the power it has agreed 
to buy (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004). So the counterparty risk, in this case, 
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is that a wind power plant can only produce electricity when the wind blows so 
ABSA would like to see some sort of guarantee that at whatever time of day/night 
these wind farms are producing power Eskom will not block the off-take as there 
is not enough demand on the grid to prevent gird network stability failure or there 
is a cheaper source of energy that is readably available at the time.  
 
In other words, the degree to which Eskom’s grid network is prepared to accept 
the influx of wind energy power on an intermittent dispatchable basis and 
whether Eskom will pay for this power is of critical concern for ABSA as a 
financier of to project financed utility scale wind farms in South Africa. This issue 
refers directly to the regulating capacity that adapts power production to actual 
power consumption which Eskom has to use to adapt the system to the 
variations in the wind and the output of the wind turbines (Wizelius, 2007). 
 
7.2.12. COUNTRY RISK 
 
Energy projects are considered to have a high degree of potential political or 
sovereign risk due to their political importance and size (Godier et al., 2009). 
Country risk is the broad risk category that covers a variety of country specific 
risk elements that are inherent to doing business in a particular country such as 
political risk and regulatory risk (Delmon, 2009). Due to the broad nature of 
country risks the project is exposed to these risks over its entire development and 
all the financiers and investors that contribute to a project will bear these risks 
and the loss in value if they eventuate. Godier et al., 2000, “Africa’s potential to 
attract mainstream financing has traditionally been inhibited by poor economic 
performance, weak governance and the high levels of political risk perceived by 
prospective commercial investors.”  
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This risk category is of prime importance to the South African wind industry as it 
is the political risk and weak governance or regulatory risk that are the key 
limiting factors on the availability and cost of finance and investment in the South 
African wind market. These risks are described in detail below. 
 
7.2.13. POLITICAL RISK 
 
Political risks are those risks that occur outside of the project and the project 
participant’s sphere of influence which make these risks particularly difficult to 
manage with conventional insurance and risk mitigation instruments, and in many 
instances elements of the political risk will be inherent in investing in a particular 
country (Delmon, 2009, p. 179-187).  A project will be exposed to political risks 
over its full lifetime as the political setting is the context under which the project 
exists and some of the risk elements under the broad risk category of political risk 
are defined by Delmon, 2009, p. 179-187, as: change in budget, government or 
political will; expropriation of the asset; war; rebellion; terrorism; default and delay 
from public sector project participants; change in laws and the regulatory 
environment and force majeure risk. 
 
The grantor, which is Eskom in South Africa, can accept this risk through the 
Concession Agreement as Eskom, as a public utility, is best capable to influence 
the outcome of political risk as a state-owned utility (Delmon, 2009, p. 179-187). 
Another option is the involvement of DFIs who can provide cover for political risk 
through specialist political risk insurance and financial instruments, in addition 
DFIs usually provide funding for the political entities’ projects so they are unlikely 
to ignore the requirements of a DFI backed project which lends political visibility 
on an international and local scale. Furthermore, the involvement of local lenders, 
local shareholders and subcontractors can align the project with national 
development targets through providing employment and social upliftment which 
increase the political will for the project’s success.  
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These activities, however, can only allocate a portion of this far reaching risk 
away from the SPV and the rest will be borne by all financiers and investors 
active in the project (Delmon, 2009, p. 179-187).  
 
7.2.14. REGULATORY RISK 
 
The challenge for regulatory setting entities is to provide private investors with 
the incentive, predictability and reassurance to attract their capital into the sector 
which is provided through effective, stable and defined market signals and 
mechanisms which are communicated to the market through setting policy and 
regulation that have affect over the long term (Wiser and Pickle, 1998; Jechoutek 
and Lamech, 1995; Raab, 2008; Wizelius, 2007 and Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 
2004). The focus of these policies should be concentrated on reducing costs and 
improving revenues which have the overall affect of increasing profitability, and 
on reducing uncertainty and risks for investors and financiers, in a manner that 
best answers broader policy objectives (Raab, 2008).  
 
All financiers and investors require is that the business environment is 
predictable so they have the security and liquidity in order to maintain the cost of 
capital at a reasonable level so this policy framework must create a situation 
where those who invest in wind power projects are guaranteed a market for their 
output and revenue certainty from these activities (Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 
2004). It is then the challenge of the regulator entities to create an enabling 
environment to facilitate a predictable business environment (Jechoutek and 
Lamech, 1995, p. 941-953). America, Europe and an increasing number of 
developing nations have guaranteed a fixed price power through regulatory 
mechanisms and have been successful in creating an enabling environment 
through the setting of major structural and policy reforms and they have been 
successful in attracting capital to their power sector, reduce renewable energy 
risks, and therefore reduce financing risk premiums (Jechoutek and Lamech, 
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1995; Dunkerley, 1995; Wizelius, 2007; and Wiser and Pickle, 1998). In other 
words it is the public players who have a direct impact on the availability and cost 
of project funding.  
 
The regulatory risk element that exists in the South African IPP wind power 
market is more of an uncertainty at this stage than a well defined risk. In the 
NERSA document “Regulatory Rules for Power Purchase Cost Recovery” they 
set rules that are in line with the broader policy objectives under the Electricity 
Regulation Act, 2006. One of these rules is to, “promote transparency, 
consistency and predictability in regulatory approaches and minimise perceptions 
of regulatory risks.” This is a clear example of the mandate that NERSA, a public 
player, has set it self. However, to date they have not been successful in 
implementing a clear institutional framework and thereby minimising perceived 
regulatory risks. This uncertainty comes from many undefined processes such as 
the outcome of the REFIT and the PPA documentation process; the outcome of 
the DOE’s Integrated Resource Plan 2 (IRP2); the regulatory issues pertaining to 
how wind power projects will interact with the national grid; and the timeframe 
that it will take to define these regulatory uncertainties which all lead to 
insecurities for investors (Boust, 2009; and Raab, 2008).  
 
Potgieter, 2009, from Investec, supported this view as he explained that 
regulatory risk is vital to any financier, investor or stakeholder in a domestic wind 
market as it is under the regulatory framework that all activities along the value 
chain are regulated and controlled. Without a reliable regulatory framework there 
can be no enabling environment to set the structure for how value moves among 
stakeholders throughout the value chain. Potgieter, 2009, clearly stated that there 
is only one important project risk in South Africa and that is regulatory risk. The 
specific components of this project risk, ranked in order of importance, are firstly 
the generating license; secondly the PPA; and thirdly the grid connection 
(Potgieter, 2009).  
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This point is further stressed by Sipha Ndawonde, from Frost and Sullivan as 
quoted in Creamer [3], 2009, “What is required now is more dialogue between 
the regulators of the renewable energy industry on issues such as grid stability, 
grid connection costs and the timeframe in which these issues will be resolved” 
(Creamer [3], 2009). 
 
It is this “dialogue” that is key to the successful development of a wind industry 
and the effective attainment of the broader national policy objectives. It is the 
public players in South Africa that currently hold the key to unlock this market’s 
potential. 
 
7.2.15. REGULATORY TIMEFRAME 
 
Wizelius, 2007, argues that political policy influences the pace of wind power 
development in a country’s power sector in two manners: firstly, in setting of the 
regulation that defines the procedures and permissions that are necessary to 
develop a wind power project; and secondly, the setting of the framework to allow 
for the economic conditions to facilitate that the output of the project can be sold 
and distributed. The pace of the wind power development varies with the varying 
levels of support given by governments to wind power policy and regulation 
(Wizelius, 2007). The IRP1 and 2 will contain the portfolio of generation sources 
that will satisfy South Africa’s energy demand over the long term and it is this 
document that will control the amount of wind power that will be included in this 
long term energy plan. Once the financial community understands the amount of 
wind power that will be included in South Africa, or the size of the market, as 
stipulated in the IRP, there will be a significant portion of uncertainties that will be 
defined, the largest of which, is the Government’s commitment. This is a clear 
regulatory risk in South Africa under the current market conditions. 
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Further regulatory concerns for both international and domestic commercial 
banks, according to Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank is on two levels: 
firstly, that the state understands the detail of renewable projects and that they 
get the documentation done in a way that works from the bank’s perspective; and 
secondly, that these processes are executed in a timeframe that will not render 
existing projects financially unattractive.  
 
O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power, shared the same concern as 
he believes that there is an “open arms” attitude from a regulatory point of view in 
South Africa and, through Mainstreams relationships with the appropriate levels 
of government, they believe that all indications are that regulatory body want 
renewables to happen and it is the how and when factor that is the issue rather 
then the if factor (O’Flynn, Personal interview, 2009). The how and when factor is 
the influx of international expertise that brings along with international best 
practises in terms of PPA structure, grid licensing, grid procedures and project 
development. O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power identified the 
finer regulatory details that stand out as uncertainties: the format of the PPA 
document; the response time for grid applications; the actual cost to connect to 
the grid; and actual grid licensing and other issues with dispatch into the grid. 
O’Flynn, 2009, explained that, “the majority of the puzzle pieces are there and 
the only thing outstanding at the moment are the finer details of the regulatory 
issues that will only really be flushed out as the first project moves through the 
development path.” 
 
7.2.16. REFIT AND THE PPA PROCESS 
 
The Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) has created a clear signal to both 
financiers and investors as to the political will of the South African Government 
and the potential to earn returns off their investment through the guarantee of a 
tariff for the project’s output.  
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Maarten van der Horst, from GDF Suez as cited in Creamer, [2], 2009, explained 
that the REFIT created a “strong incentive” to the financial community and that 
proposed tariffs under the REFIT, particularly for wind power, creative the 
incentive for investors to “seriously” consider investment opportunities in South 
Africa. This signal has essentially created the basis for the industry and caught 
the attention of private investors of both equity and debt, the next step is to define 
how, when and what returns are available.  
 
Phase 1 of the REFIT policy mechanism defined the tariff levels and qualifying 
technologies in NERSA’s media statement, “NERSA Decision on Renewable 
Energy Feed-In Tariff (Refit)” as released on the 31 March 2009. Phase 2, 
NERSA Consultation Paper on the REFIT was then released on 17 July 2009, 
which identified further qualifying technologies and included a proposed PPA 
document for public comment which was finalised in a media statement, NERSA 
decision on renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT) Phase II, made on the 02 
November 2009. At this point there are three uncertainties that require clarity: the 
structure of PPA, the REFIT Cost recovery mechanism, and finally the criteria for 
selecting IPP’s and the procurement process.  
 
The undetermined, vital project document of the PPA is a significant outstanding 
uncertainty. Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project Finance supported this view as 
from his perspective the real outstanding issue is a stable regulatory framework 
under which this financial process can act with certainty. Financiers and sponsors 
want to know that a project has a secured, stable and attractive cashflow over the 
life of a project. This stability can only come in the form of a PPA which is the key 
outstanding issue that stands between the South African wind energy projects 
and financing. The NERSA Phase II, 2009, media statement state that, “the 
standardised Direct Agreement, Fuel Supply Agreement (FSA), Transmission 
Connection Agreement (TCA) and Transmission Use of System Agreement 
(TUOSA) be included as Schedules of the REFIT PPA in the first annual review 
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of the REFIT.” So without the PPA and it associated schedules, much of the vital 
project financing documentation is undefined. In other words it is the timing and 
the structure of the PPA that will define these outstanding uncertainties that will 
eventually drive the risk and risk appetite in South Africa (Industry Participant, 
BNP Paribas, 2009). Maclay, 2009, from Actis describes this uncertainty of an 
undefined PPA process as the largest barrier to South Africa wind project 
financing.  
 
As explained before with project-finance arrangements, the lender looks primarily 
to the cash-flow and assets of a specific project for repayment rather than the 
assets or credit of the promoter of the facility. This means that in the absence of 
a well defined PPA debt cannot be forthcoming and investors cannot commit 
capital to the project. Maclay, 2009, described that Eskom, NERSA and the 
Government are all the same when it comes to opening a PPA to potential 
developers and it is only once this issue is clearly defined that the financing and 
its specific terms will become clear. Maclay, 2009, stated that Actis were happy 
about the level of the REFIT but how this tariff is implemented is the biggest 
uncertainty at this stage and once the PPA is defined will it be sufficient to 
facilitate the returns that Actis is looking to gain.  
 
From the debt side, Eardley-Taylor, 2009 from Standard Bank gave the example 
of the MTPPP and the PNCP which were two programs that were not supposed 
to be financed under a project financed structure. So when it came to the REFIT 
PPA, NERSA sent a PPA document to the major banks to comment on, however 
when they finally announced the REFIT it was stated that the PPA would build off 
the structure of the MTPPP. This PPA discussed “day ahead dispatch” which is 
not a possibility for RE technologies that rely on intermittent resource supply. It is 
this type of misunderstanding in the format that the important project finance 
documentation for Renewable energy projects should take that stands out as a 
major concern for Standard Bank (Eardley-Taylor, Personal Interview, 2009). 
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Eskom’s role, as defined under the REFIT, is as the renewable energy 
purchasing authority (REPA), and the single buyer office (SBO) is also situated 
within the power utility, thereby designating Eskom as the offtaker and 
responsible for the long term purchase of wind generated electrical power 
(Haffajee, 2009, as cited by van der Merwe, 2009). This means that Eskom will 
have to pay renewable energy generators the premium tariff proposed by the 
REFIT from the revenue they receive from the existing Eskom consumer tariff. 
However doubts existed as to whether these tariffs would be able to support the 
payment of the REFIT tariff over the long term, which is also a market risk, as it 
was estimated that to meet the 10,000GWh target by 2013, or nearly 700 MW of 
renewable energy power, would cost in the order of R3 billion annually for Eskom 
to recover the cost of purchasing that power under existing consumer tariff levels  
which were already under pressure from Eskom’s R460 billion new-build 
programme (Haffajee, 2009, as cited by van der Merwe, 2009). 
 
The criteria for selecting IPPs has not been specifically clarified in full and exactly 
what would qualify one project over another remains to be seen, furthermore the 
specific contribution of wind energy to the country’s energy mix in the long term 
will remain unclear unless the DoE’s 20 year integrated resources plan 2 was 
gazetted, while clarity as to whether the IRP1 and the 500MW assigned to wind 
from 2010 to 2013 would be a final number and not open to variation (Haffajee, 
2009, as cited by van der Merwe, 2009). Viljoen, 2009, from Cresco Project 
finance identified the lack of clarity on the procurement process of Renewable 
energy/IPP power in South Africa as the largest outstanding uncertainty under 
the current environment. This procurement process uncertainty is made up of the 
lack of a defined PPA; whether it will be an open or closed process in terms of 
amount MW required; and whether it will be a tender process or not?  
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The above uncertainties are by no means an exhaustive list but all these 
uncertainties have the affect of leaving the key financing terms and variables 
largely unspecific which reflects the lack of clarity that the financiers and 
investors still have with regards to financing utility scale wind farms in South 
Africa. Inaction by the government and the associated energy public players has 
the direct affect of creating uncertainty which in turn affects the availability and 
cost of project finance for wind power projects in South Africa. 
 
7.2.17. INTERACTION WITH THE NATIONAL GRID 
  
The gird connection of wind power projects in South Africa stands out as a 
significant uncertainty in the financial community.  The abundant wind resource in 
South Africa is often far away from the centres where the power is needed the 
most, therefore to transmit and distribute this power is of vital importance. So the 
uncertainties that stand out are firstly, the time it will take to connect and 
strengthen the grid from where it is generated to where it is consumed, and 
secondly, who would bear the costs of this called wheeling costs. Yousuf 
Haffajee, 2009, the Eskom market development manager, as cited in Engineering 
News, claimed that, “the challenge of connecting generators to the grid should 
not be underestimated, as it was substantial.” Furthermore Haffajee, 2009, stated 
that, “the development of renewable energy power plants, which sat idle because 
they were unable to connect to the national grid was a situation to be avoided” 
(van der Merwe, 2009). Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank, agreed with 
this issue as he explained around the world the issue of grid connection stands 
out when it comes to the development of wind farm projects and in South Africa, 
Eardley-Taylor, 2009, indicated that this will be a major problem in South Africa 
and a source of potential completion risk. The significance of this uncertainty is 
further supported by O’Flynn, 2009; from Mainstream Renewable Power as he 
state that access to the grid is a significant outstanding risk at this stage.  
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Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy Finance further identified the uncertainty of 
matters relating to the grid as he said that grid connection and capacity for wind 
energy projects would be larger issue in the minds of the financial community 
(Greenwood, 2009). 
 
On the matter of grid connection, Eardley-Taylor, 2009, from Standard Bank 
discussed that in South Africa there are two major issues when it comes to 
connecting renewable projects into the grid: grid connection and grid 
strengthening. Eskom’s transmission and distribution business is responsible for 
this activity however Eskom is facing major funding problems and they have 
limited personal capacity so the thought of Eskom having to execute 20 plus 
concurrent grid connections in the Western, Eastern and Northern Cape plus 
strengthen the surrounding grid to support the new influx of power is shaping up 
to be the major barrier or delaying point at this stage of the market. What is more 
is that Eskom are already behind on upgrading the grid for their own new build 
projects so the probability of them prioritising grid connections and upgrades for 
IPP’s renewable energy projects is very unlikely so according to DOE and 
NERSA it will have to be the project developer’s expense to connect the project 
to the grid and to field the cost of this connection (Eardley-Taylor, Personal 
Interview, 2009). O’Flynn, 2009, from Mainstream Renewable Power explained 
that it takes more than a favourable feed in levy to facilitate wind power 
generators onto the grid and Mainstream is concerned as to the degree all the 
players involved understood what is required in connecting these generators to 
the grid. Currently there are no procedures or policies in place that facilitated the 
connection of IPPs to the Eskom owned transmission and distribution network, 
which stands out as a concern to Mainstream (O’Flynn, Personal interview, 2009). 
So it whether Eskom has the capacity, funding and skills necessary to facilitate 
the connection of wind energy generators to the grid stands out as a major 
uncertainty for potential financiers and investors in South Africa. 
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Potgieter, 2009, from Investec brought up the concern as to the cost of this grid 
connection that project developers would have to pay, as to date none of the 
developers have a clear indication as to what the cost of this process will be. The 
legislation around this topic that exists today is that the potential generator must 
make an application to NERSA which they will issue a cost with a 65% 
confidence interval to the project. However, Potgieter, 2009, explained that these 
estimates vary vastly between quotes for projects in close proximity to each other 
geographically and of similar structure. The exact cost of the gird connection in 
SA remains an uncertainty and a further risk component from the 
financier/investor’s perspective. 
 
7.2.18. ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
 
Environmental Risk is the risk that the project will have an adverse affect on the 
natural environment that it will be built within and what the economic, 
administrative and environmental consequences will be and what the ultimate 
loss in total project value will be (Delmon, 2009, p. 187-190). The best wind 
resource is usually located in areas that are environmentally sensitive such as 
coast lines, mountains and natural protected areas, for instance in South Africa 
the West Coast where an abundant wind resource exists also contains the 
protected and endangered fynbos biome so micrositing will have to take into 
account these protected areas as defined under the EIA (Delmon, 2009, p. 187-
190). Greenwood, 2009, from New Energy commented on this point as much of 
the land that has been earmarked for wind farm development is close to 
environmentally sensitive land such as nature reserves and settlements. A further 
element of environmental risk is that of force majeure, which can be explained as 
the risk of uncertain outcomes that pertain to the environment that are outside of 
the sphere of influence of the project its project participants (Delmon, 2009, p. 
187-190). Environmental risk exists over the lifetime of the projects full 
development from recognition of need to decommissioning or repowering.  
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It is the environmental impact assessment (EIA) that officially outlines the 
potential impact of the project on the environment and it is required before a 
project can move out of the feasibility stage. In South Africa the environmental 
risks, resulting in an adverse affect on the project or a change in the 
environmental specifications, was becoming a larger consideration for financiers 
and sponsors (Pringle [2], 2009). 
 
7.2.19. CREDIT/DEFAULT RISK 
 
Credit risk, or default risk, is the risk that a project participant will be unable to 
perform the scope of their services according to the terms and conditions set out 
in the project documentation or supporting contract, with the consequence of a 
loss in overall project value (Delmon, 2009, p. 191-192). The investors to a SPV 
will be charged with the task to ensure that all the project participants are well 
placed to perform their obligations from the following perspectives: financial 
stability, technical capacity, available resources, longevity, capacity to bear risks 
and managerial capacity of each participant (Delmon, 2009, p. 191-192). This 
risk will be apparent from the pre-feasibility phase over the life of the project as 
different project participants have their input into the project. This risk can be 
allocated away from the SPV, its shareholders and the financiers through third 
party warrantees, bonds and retainage accounts that cover and default of 
contractual obligations. 
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Figure 4: Project Finance Structure and risk allocation  
Source: Compiled from primary research 
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Figure 3, above, identifies the project participants in a typical project financed 
wind farm in South Africa, it demonstrates the flow of project risks between 
project participants, the project documentation that transfers or allocates these 
risks amongst the project participants, indicates the risk remuneration vehicles 
and finally the project inputs of each project participant which each participant 
delivers in return for the risk premium they receive.  
 
Major infrastructure projects require permission or enabling legislation from a 
governing body such as the state or relevant local authority which in most cases 
will be separate from the grantor of the concession agreement (Delmon 2009). In 
the case of South Africa, the government, implemented through the DOE and 
NERSA have made the policy provision for renewable IPP’s in the country’s 
power market through the 10,000GWh by 2013 renewable energy target, the 
mandate of 30% of new build must come from IPP generators, and finally the 
REFIT to mention the predominant governmental regulations. These policy 
objectives and the associated regulatory moves have created the space or 
demand for IPP’s, so by an IPP filling this space the project company or SPV and 
its shareholders, financiers and other project participants will take on the project 
risks inherent in developing a power project in return for the R1.25/kWh REFIT 
tariff. These risks flow through Eskom, the state-owned utility, through the 
Concession Agreement which is made up of the PPA, which is signed by the 
Single Buyers Office (SBO) in Eskom as mandated under the REFIT Phase 1, 
and the Grid License, which is awarded by NERSA the regulator which also 
regulates the whole process which is mandated by the National Energy Regulator 
Act, 2004 (Act No. 40 of 2004). The REFIT Phase II was published on 2 
November 2009 explains the Concession and power purchase agreement 
documentation that will be applicable under the REFIT of the standardised Direct 
Agreement, Fuel Supply Agreement (FSA), Transmission Connection Agreement 
(TCA) and Transmission Use of System Agreement (TUOSA). 
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These project risks then flow through the SPV and are allocated to different 
project participants so it is then essential, under a project financing structure, to 
identify risks, allocate them appropriately, and ensure that the responsible parties 
are adequately incentivised to manage their risks efficiently (Esty, 2004; 
Navigator Project Finance, 2009). This incentive comes in the form of 
remuneration for bearing a risk, which is increase in value the risk bearing entity 
receives in compensation for bearing the potential loss in value from worlds 
where the risk eventuates (Irwin, 2007). Each project participant will seek this risk 
remuneration through different vehicles: return on equity to shareholders; interest 
rates (cost of debt) from financiers; higher prices or risk premiums included in the 
contract price charged by project participants for bearing certain risks (Delmon, 
2009, p. 157).  
 
An SPV is set up under a project financed structure and the capital structure of 
the SPV will be a split between equity from investors and debt from financiers. By 
creating a space for IPP’s in the generation mix in South Africa the government 
has handed over certain project risks to IPP project owners, for bearing such 
risks the SPV and its owners are remunerated through the return on the 
investment. However, it is the paid up equity from shareholders that will ultimately 
bear the majority of any unallocated risk as it is “first loss” or it is ranked junior to 
senior debt provided by banks (Sejersen, 2010). So, all residual risks that are not 
effectively allocated will in the first instance be borne by the SPV and it’s the 
shareholders that are first loss when faced with any downside from residual risks 
(Delmon, 2009, p. 157).  
 
If the shareholders cannot absorb the full impact of a residual risk, it is the 
financiers who will then be exposed. Financiers are risk adverse and are not the 
party best placed to manage many of the project specific risk, such as those 
found in construction and operation, so when financiers evaluate the project 
structure they will take great care in ensuring that as many of the project risks are 
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allocated to the project participants away from their debtor; or the SPV (Delmon, 
2009, p. 157). So it is the exposure of both shareholders and financiers to 
residual risk that will ultimately determine the cost of equity and debt respectively. 
 
The other project participants, beyond the shareholders and the financiers, who 
will accept risk for remuneration, are the construction contractor(s) and the 
operator who will provide services, such as BOP works, during the construction 
and operation periods in return for a risk premium included in their fixed contract 
prices respectively. So the flow of construction project risks are allocated to the 
project company through the Concession Agreement and PPA and transferred to 
the construction contractor through the Construction Agreement and the operator 
through the Operation and Maintenance Agreement (Delmon, 2009). The ideal 
situation is where all the project risks are transferred to the other project 
participants and away from the SPV and this is called a back-to-back risk 
allocation basis (Delmon, 2009, p. 161). To accomplish a complete back-to-back 
risk allocation all the project documentation should mirror the terms of the project 
risks transferred to the SPV under the Concession Agreement between the off-
taker and the SPV (Delmon, 2009, p. 161).  
 
The risk management framework can be explained as identifying all project risks, 
understanding each project participant’s risk tolerance, then deciding how each 
risk will be addressed and whether it can be avoided, accepted, or transferred 
according to the principle of risk allocation; to the party best placed to manage 
the risk, as to achieve back-to-back allocation of project risks (Sargent and Lundy 
LLC, 2001). This is essential under a project financed structure as risks can not 
be passed down to ratepayers, as is the case with utilities, but the risk is the 
ultimate responsibility of the developer, SPV and the shareholders and financiers 
(Sargent & Lundy LLC, 2001).  
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The financiers and sponsors will therefore require that through the contractual 
structure of the project documentation that risks are allocated away from the SPV 
to other project participants best placed to mange these risks in order to limit the 
exposure of the financiers and sponsors (Delmon, 2009). The allocation of risk 
can be defined as the process to determine the extent to which each party takes 
responsibility for unpredictable variation in project value to define how project 
participants share value in each possible state of the world (Irwin, 2007). Irwin, 
2007, explains the concept of risk allocation as increasing or decreasing the 
value of a responsible party in different possible outcomes or worlds. In other 
words by allocating a risk to a project participant, in worlds where the risk factor 
turns out badly, this party will have a decrease in the value of their interest in the 
project, however in worlds where this risk factor turns out well or does not 
eventuate their value will be increased (Irwin, 2007). This guiding principle of risk 
allocation is detailed below. 
 
7.3.1. GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF RISK ALLOCATION  
 
The context for effective risk allocation is set by the point that if any risks are 
unassigned, this residual risk will be the ultimate responsibility of the project 
company and the financiers as explained above. So in order to achieve back-to-
back allocation of risk the risk allocation should follow the guiding principle for 
efficient and effective risk allocation, where each risk is allocated to the party best 
placed to manage that risk in order to maximise total project value (Delmon, 2009; 
Ruster, 1996; Irwin, 2007). This is a broad statement as it does not define what it 
means to be “best placed” to manage a particular risk. Irwin, 2007, develops this 
concept as he explains that the risks should be allocated amongst party 
participants according to their ability to influence the sensitivity of total project 
value to the corresponding risk factor; anticipate or respond to the risk factor; and 
finally to absorb the risk.  
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Furthermore, risks and rights must be allocated together so that the party best 
placed to manage a certain risk also has all the rights and abilities to make the 
decisions that will manage the risk in a way that benefits total project value (Irwin, 
2007).  
 
Firstly, by allocating a risk to the party with the best ability to influence that 
particular risk factor the party is also allocated the potential increase in value that 
will occur if the party influences the risk to avoid its undesirable outcome (Irwin, 
2007). So the party that is best placed to influence the risk factor will be 
incentivised to commit its resources to improve the uncertain outcome of the risk 
until the point that the extra cost of improvement is as great as the extra benefit, 
thereby increasing total project value (Irwin, 2007). Secondly, in some cases 
there will be no party that is best placed to influence the risk so the risk should be 
allocated according to the project parties’ ability to anticipate and time to respond 
to the risk factor (Irwin, 2007). By allocating according to these concepts the 
party that is best placed to most influence the sensitivity of total project value to 
the risk factor to the party that is capable of responding in the shortest time frame 
to the risk induced change firm may maximise total project value through 
incentivising value adding responses to encourage positive outcomes from 
adverse changes in risk outcomes (Irwin, 2007). Thirdly, because parties are not 
risk neutral and financial markets are not perfect the first two components of the 
guiding principle for risk allocation are not enough, in some cases, to effectively 
allocate risk, so a third element is included, namely, the parties’ ability to absorb 
the risk (Irwin, 2007). When project participants are risk neutral under the context 
of perfect financial markets then all participants would buy and sell risk exposure 
based on the outcomes, but irrespective of the variability of these outcomes, until 
there was no difference in the ability of parties to absorb further risk and the 
residual risks would matter equally to all project participants (Irwin, 2007).  
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In reality, however, participants are risk adverse and some parties will have a 
greater ability to absorb risks than others based on their ability to pass risks onto 
other parties and the risk aversion of the ultimate risk bearers (Irwin, 2007). 
 
In reality effective and efficient, back-to-back risk allocation according to the 
guiding principle does not always occur. The three components outlined by Irwin, 
2007 may work in different directions in the sense that the project participant that 
is has the best ability to influence a particular risk may not be the party that is 
best placed to anticipate, respond or absorb the risk so tradeoffs must be made 
according to the maximising of total project value (Irwin, 2009). While the guiding 
principle of risk efficient and effective risk allocation creates the ideal situation of 
back-to-back risk allocation, in practise, this does not always occur as 
commercial and negotiating strength of each project participant has a greater 
affect on the allocation of risks amongst parties  (Delmon, 2009, p. 155). 
 
Faced with the broader policy objectives project participants will allocate risk 
between themselves through the rules set out under the regulatory framework 
which is geared to reduce uncertainty. However, in South Africa the rules of the 
game have not been clearly set by the policy and regulatory framework which 
has left a large degree of uncertainty in financiers and investor’s minds. This will 
have the effect of increasing transaction times and the cost of capital as sources 
of funds take conservative views on the undefined uncertainties.  
 
7.3.2. RISK MITIGATION INSTRUMENTS 
 
The majority of the allocation occurs contractually through the project 
documentation which will define the specific risk mitigation instruments that will 
be used to incentivise project participants to accept risk and deliver their project 
inputs in a way that protects the project company and its financiers.  
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In the construction phase of the project there are a variety of risk mitigation 
instruments that can be employed, namely: advanced payment, performance and 
completion bonds; contractual arrangements and associated guarantees; 
contingency funds and lines of credit; and private insurance; retainage, and 
liquidated damages (Ruster, 1996; Delmon, 2009; and Sargent and Lundy LLC, 
2001).  
 
Similarly, in the operation period of the project the risk mitigating instruments that 
are typical under a project financed structure are: contractual arrangements, 
contingency reserves, cash traps, cash sweeps, insurance, and risk 
compensation devices (Ruster, 1996; and Sargent and Lundy LLC, 2001). For 
South Africa the interviewees for the qualitative interviews were questioned as to 
their requirements for the inclusion of risk mitigation instruments. Eardley-Taylor, 
2009 from Standard Bank explained that the bank would like to see projects 
packaged with the standard project finance risk mitigation instruments such as 
performance bonds, liquidated damages, and warranty bonds. O’Flynn, 2009, 
from Mainstream indicated that they require a 97% availability guarantee; 5 year 
warrantees that the turbines will perform as intended under the South African 
conditions. 
 
7.4. CONCLUSION 
 
Risks differ to uncertainties through a greater degree of predictability as 
uncertainty refers to an unstructured perception of the future where the 
probabilities of the different outcomes are unknown while project risks can be 
defined as the possibility of loss in project value associated with each uncertain, 
but possible, undesirable outcome where subjective probabilities have been 
assigned to the uncertain outcomes eventuating by project participants.  
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The allocation of uncertainties then becomes difficult because the actual value of 
the uncertainties can not be determined and the party best placed to manage, 
influence, anticipate and absorb becomes harder to identify. With a greater 
degree of uncertainty in a project financed deal the cost of capital will increase 
and transaction times will be drawn out. It is then the public players who need to 
define the policy and regulatory frameworks under which the associated 
uncertainties can be defined into risks, and the private project participants can 
then allocate these risks accordingly. This then highlights the important impact 
policy and regulatory entities have in determining the availability and cost of 
capital for project financed wind farms in South Africa. 
 
For a project financed, utility scale wind farm in South Africa there are 14 broad 
risk categories, namely: country risk, political risk, credit/default risk, development 
risk, completion risk, environmental risk, construction risk, commissioning and 
performance risk, cost increase risk, production risk, resource risk, technology 
risk, operation risk, and finally market risk. This chapter has identified where each 
risk eventuates along the project’s development phases and which project 
participant will typically be exposed to each risk, which party will be allocated 
each risk, and the type of financier/investor that will ultimately bear the residual 
risks. The identification and management of risks along the development process 
and who they affect is vitally important to a project finance structure as these 
risks have a significant impact on the key financing terms and variables that 
underpin the provision of project funds. One point that is common to most project 
financed structures is that any unallocated, or residual risks, will be borne by the 
SPV, and ultimately it will be the financiers and the investors to this SPV that 
bear these residual risks. Consequently, financiers and investors will insist that 
the project risks are allocated according to the guiding principle of risk allocation 
to achieve effective and efficient, back-to-back allocation or risk in order to 
maximise total project value and to minimise the SPV’s risk exposure. 
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8. CHAPTER 8CONCLUSIONS AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
AVAILABILITY AND COST OF WIND POWER PROJECT 
FUNDING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
“Banks are looking for measurable risks and for risk mitigation measures and not 
the absence of risk.”  
(Jérôme Guillet, Dexia Bank, as quoted by Sejersen, 2010) 
 
The thesis has examined the way in which investors and financiers set the 
availability and cost of their project funds in response to the enabling 
environment in the wind power sector in South Africa. Risks differ to uncertainty 
through a greater degree of predictability and it is the gaps in this enabling 
environment that serve to create uncertainty. With limited predictability financiers 
and investors will make the decision to reduce the availability and take a 
conservative view on the cost of project funding. Investors and financiers make 
decisions around whether to invest, ownership options, and finance structures 
which are based off the degree of perceived uncertainty in the enabling 
environment. Once these decisions have been made they will communicate the 
nature of this investment through their set of key financing terms and variables.  
 
In South Africa there are a series of broader points of uncertainties in the 
enabling environment: the lack of an overall guiding policy for the electricity 
sector; the ambiguous interaction between the policy, legislative and regulatory 
200.                     Chapter 8: Availability and Cost of Wind Project Funding 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
entities; and the conflicting set of legislation and regulations passed by these 
entities. Under these broad areas of uncertainty there are a host of more specific 
uncertainties that stand as barriers to investment for potential IPP’s. Faced with 
these uncertainties in the South African enabling environment, many investors 
and financiers have taken the decision to invest with a tendency towards an IPP 
ownership option, through a project finance structure. However, the actual nature 
of this commitment, in terms of the set of key financing terms and variables, will 
be based off the distinction of the uncertainties going forward. Figure 5, below 
illustrates the process explained above.  
 
 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                Investing and Financing Decisions Private Entities 
 
P
riv
a
te
 P
la
y
e
rs 
   P
o
lic
y                                M
u
ltip
le
 R
o
le
s 
 
  
  
Enabling Environment Political & Institutional Entities 
South African Government 
DOE 
Financiers 
Providers of project debt 
Investors 
Providers of project equity 
Regulatory 
Incentives 
Policy 
Objectives & 
Legislation 
Project Finance 
IPP 
Key Financing 
Terms and 
Variables 
System Operator, 
Generator, Offtaker 
ESKOM 
Sources of uncertainty: 
- Undefined overall 
electricity policy 
- Ambiguity in interaction 
between entities 
- Conflicting legislation 
and regulation 
Specific uncertainty: 
Barriers to investment 
Regulator 
NERSA 
Financing Structures 
Ownership Options 
Debt 
Requirements 
R
e
g
u
la
to
ry
 
Availability & C st of Project Funds 
Figure 5: IPP Response - Financing and Investment Decisions 
201.                     Chapter 8: Availability and Cost of Wind Project Funding 
 
University of Cape Town (UCT) 
Energy Research Centre (ERC) 
James White 
8.1. KEY RESEARCH QUESTIONS: CONCLUSIONS 
 
The specific conclusions of the thesis will be outlined under the key research 
questions presented in Chapter 1. 
 
What are the policy objectives and the associated Regulatory Framework 
that pertains to the development of a wind power market in South Africa?  
 
There has been a series of steps taken to establish an enabling environment 
however they have lacked the implementation mechanisms to make them a 
reality. There were two white papers that are relevant to the electricity sector that 
set out targets with very little context under which these targets could be 
achieved. The reform process under the 1998 White Paper on the Energy Policy 
was abandoned in 2004 while the 2003 White Paper on Renewable Energy set 
the Renewable Energy target of 10,000 GWh by 2013 which set a weak policy 
objective to drive legislation and regulation. The target did cause some political 
momentum as it was the justification NERSA used to pass the favourable REFIT 
tariff. This tariff was somewhat undermined by the DOE with the August 
regulations that served to put a cap on the REFIT and restrict it to a tender 
process. Added to the above contexts is South Africa's recent , conditional, 
commitment to the UNFCCC in terms of the Copenhagen Accord; South Africa is 
committed to a 34% deviation below the ‘business as usual' CO2  and GHG 
emissions growth trajectory by 2020, and a 42% deviation below the ‘business as 
usual' trajectory by 2025. 
 
The policy, legislation and regulation in the electricity have caused some political 
momentum that has attracted the attention of private investment. However, the 
lack of an overall guiding policy for the electricity sector; the ambiguous 
interaction between the policy, legislative and regulatory entities; and the 
conflicting set of legislation and regulations passed by these entities have served 
to create uncertainty to investors and financiers. 
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What gaps exist in the enabling environment for wind power projects in 
South Africa? 
 
This question essentially addresses the how the gaps in the enabling framework 
create uncertainties for investors. Under the broader uncertainties explained in 
the previous question there are more specific barriers that were communicated in 
the exploratory interviews. The purpose of the thesis was not to delineate an 
exhaustive set of these barriers but rather to highlight some of the more pertinent 
barriers with respect to project financing and describe how financiers and 
investors will react to the degree of uncertainty in these barriers. The outstanding 
uncertainties that came out of the analysis are particularly focused within the 
policy, regulatory enabling environment: 
 
- A clear counter party needs to be identified as an independent system and 
market operator (ISMO) separate from ESKOM; 
- The responsibilities and mandate of the offtaker must be set; 
- A workable set of project documentation needs to be put in place to 
access the REFIT such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA), 
Standardised Direct Agreement, Transmission Connection Agreement 
(TCA), and Transmission Use of System Agreement (TUOSA); 
- The transparent grid connection process needs to be set; 
- The transparent and defined IPP selection process, with a clear set of 
selection criteria needs to be documented and nominated implementing 
parties need to honour this bidding process. 
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What is the predominant financing structure and ownership option for 
utility scale wind power plants globally and in South Africa? 
 
For the development of a utility scale wind power plant there are three main 
financing structures: government financing, corporate financing, and project 
financing, which are commonly matched to three common ownership options of: 
nonutility generator (NUG), investor owned utility (IOU) and public utility 
ownership (PUO). Traditionally project financing under a NUG or IOU ownership 
option has been used to develop wind power projects globally especially in the 
early stages of a wind market’s development due to high inherent uncertainties in 
a new, undefined market. The research revealed that this will be no different in 
South Africa with a focus on project finance structure and a private IPP 
ownership option. This is at least relevant for early stages of the market when 
uncertainties are high with the possibility of corporate financing as the market 
develops and uncertainties are worked into a defined set of risks founded in past 
practise. The preference for project finance is due to the non- or limited recourse 
debt that is offered by banks under this structure so that sponsor’s balance 
sheets are protected by the high level of perceived project risks with a particular 
relevance to regulatory risk. An IPP ownership option is essentially the only 
vehicle open to private developers as the South African electricity sector is 
heavily regulated with Eskom as the dominant utility. 
 
Who are the financiers and investors that have chosen to invest in 
response to the signals in the enabling environment? 
 
A typical project financed, utility-scale wind farm project goes through seven 
identifiable project development phases namely: pre-feasibility; feasibility 
analysis; financing and project documentation; contracting and planning; 
construction; operation and maintenance; and repowering or decommissioning. 
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Over these phase different combinations of debt and equity are used with varying 
risk exposure to fund the development and operation process. Four broad ranges 
of equity funders exist: strategic investors, institutional investors, equity investors 
and CDM buyers, while debt providers can be broken down into commercial 
banks, institutional investors and development finance institutions (DFIs).  
 
In South Africa there is an overwhelming support from the private players that 
have moved their focus into the wind energy market in South Africa. The 
financiers and investors interviewed in the exploratory interviews explained that if 
the environment is right then the funding will flow easily into the project.  This 
highlights the pressing need for an enabling environment founded on strong 
policy signals with defined roles and responsibilities. Under this framework all 
major risks can be appropriately identified, assessed, mitigated and allocated to 
facilitate the provision of this debt.  
 
There are four, possibly five, domestic commercial banks that have openly 
commented that they want to finance wind power projects South Africa and there 
are a host of private investors and developers that are in the process of 
developing portfolios of potential wind power plant sites and building up their 
local operations. More specifically the strategic investors that are likely to develop 
large portfolios will be: 
 
- Macquarie Capital and Old Mutual through their cooperation called African 
Clean Energy Developments; 
- Investec and GDF Suez; 
- Mainstream Renewable Power; 
- RES; 
- With smaller developers pursuing individual projects such as the 
Electrawinds, Watt Energy with Tsitsikamma Community Wind Farm, and 
the Central Energy Fund with Nelson Mandela Bay.  
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Many of these smaller developers will rely on the expensive and low return 
pioneering work done by the larger strategic investors so will only invest at a later 
stage. These investors will be active throughout the development process with all 
of them focusing on development and the majority looking to operate the wind 
farm but with limited ownership in the operational phase of the project. The four, 
possibly five domestic commercial banks will be: Standard Bank, FNB, Nedbank 
and ABSA, while Investec is unlikely to finance. Finally, the DFIs, namely the 
World Bank, AFD, AFDB, IDC and DBSA, will all play an important role in 
facilitating pre-investment finance and technical assistance to move the projects 
from identification of the need for the project to financial close. Most importantly 
the DFIs, and their ability to absorb a higher degree of sovereign/political risk, will 
make these institutions crucial for the market through filling the gaps where 
private finance will be too risk adverse. This is especially relevant to longer debt 
maturity periods where private finance will stop at 8 to 10 years while DFIs can 
extend past those loan tenures. 
 
There has been an overwhelming response to the REFIT from the private finance 
community however whether they will invest and the nature of this investment will 
be in response to the level of clarity in the enabling environment. 
 
What project uncertainties and risks stand out in the market 
financiers/investors to the South African wind energy market? 
 
For a general project financed, utility scale wind farm there are 14 broad risk 
categories, namely: country risk, political risk, credit/default risk, development risk, 
completion risk, environmental risk, construction risk, commissioning and 
performance risk, cost increase risk, production risk, resource risk, technology 
risk, operation risk, and finally market risk. In the early development phases risks’ 
potential impact are more severe as there is more uncertainty in these risks.  
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This is why in South Africa it is so important to limit this uncertainty in setting the 
right enabling environment. These risks have a significant impact on the key 
financing terms and variables as any unallocated, or residual risks, will be borne 
by the SPV, and ultimately it will be the financiers and the investors to this SPV 
that bear these residual risks. Consequently, financiers and investors will insist 
that the project risks are allocated according to the guiding principle of risk 
allocation to achieve effective and efficient, back-to-back allocation or risk in 
order to maximise total project value and to minimise the SPV’s risk exposure. 
 
South Africa has limited experience in wind power and there are a large degree 
of broader uncertainties in the enabling environment as defined above. So many 
of these risks remain as uncertainties as investors and financiers have 
insufficient information to define them into predictable risks. These uncertain 
project risks will serve to reduce to availability and cost of project funds in the 
sector. 
 
What are the ranges of key financing variables for project financing utility 
scale wind farms in South Africa? 
 
The ranges of key financing terms and variables were compiled from the 10 
qualitative exploratory interviews, representative of South African financiers and 
investors. These ranges are represented in Table 22, and were generally within 
and below the ranges as stipulated in the literature review. 
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Table 22: General ranges of the key financing terms and variables from the 
qualitative interviews compared to those from the literature 
 
TOLERANCE 
KEY FINANCING VARIABLE EXPLANATION 
Literature 
Exploratory 
Interviews 
Capital Structure Debt to equity Ratio 50/50 – 90/10 60/40 – 80/20 
Debt Interest Rate Interest Rate 8.5% – 14.90% 12% – 14% 
Debt Maturity 
Length of the Loan, 
years 
10 – 15 yrs 
8 – 15 yrs 
(refinance) 
Debt Amortisation Debt payment schedule 
Mortgage-style 
Repayment 
Sculpted and 
Mortgage 
Debt Service Coverage Ratios 
Minimum acceptable 
value for the DSCR 
1.35 – 1.60 1.2 – 1.4 
Equity Return 
Return on Equity 
(ROE), Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) 
16% to 20% USD 
IRR 
ZAR: 18% - 20% 
Dollar: 11% - 
25% 
Payback Period (Equity) Number of years - 12 years 
Source: Compiled from primary research 
 
How does this range reflect the perceived level of uncertainty 
financiers/investors see in the South African wind energy market? 
 
The ranges determined from the South African interviews were generally in line 
with the ranges as stipulated in the literature however they tended towards the 
more risk-adverse end of this spectrum, i.e. stricter and more costly. How this 
conclusion reflects perceived uncertainty, or risks, can be answered through the 
consideration of two elements. Firstly, the key financing terms and variables 
reflect the perceived level of uncertainty and risks that a specific financiers or 
investors sees in the enabling environment of the project. Secondly, that there is 
an important distinction between uncertainty and risk: Risk differs to uncertainty 
through a greater degree of predictability as the different outcomes of a risk can 
be identified and managed. 
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From the perspective of the first element one would conclude that while 
financiers are willing to extend a higher portion of funds in the capital structure 
they will offer this debt on stricter terms and at a higher cost of debt which 
reflects their high perception of uncertainty and risks in the South African wind 
energy project finance arena. This is true for equity investors too who require a 
higher minimum ROE than those published internationally. However, this result 
must be viewed with some caution as if we analyse the outcome with the second 
element in mind, the distinction between risk and uncertainty, we can see that 
presently too many uncertainties exist in the market for funders to communicate 
an accurate and tailored set of key financing terms and variables for the South 
Africa utility scale wind power plant development. So these ranges will be 
skewed towards the stricter end of the spectrum to take into account the large 
variation in outcomes due to uncertainty rather than predictable risks. This 
outcome of an apparent stricter set of key financing variables and the lower risk 
appetite must also be reviewed in the context of the global limited liquidity and 
overall tighter risk tolerances under the global financial crisis. The literature 
reviewed is predominantly before the advent of the financial crisis, whereas the 
qualitative exploratory interviews were conducted well into this crisis. 
 
In the presence of a higher degree of uncertainty investors and financiers will set 
a stricter set of key financing terms and variables. The ranges expressed in the 
exploratory interviews tended towards the restrictive end of the spectrum which 
was in response to the high degree of perceived uncertainty in the enabling 
environment.  
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What is the impact of uncertainty on the availability and cost of project 
funds? 
 
The literature defines the distinction between uncertainty and risk, where 
uncertainty refers to an unstructured perception of the future where the 
probabilities of the different outcomes are unknown, whereas risk is used to 
explain the situation where the alternative outcomes have been specified and 
probabilities have been assigned to them (Venetsanos et al., 2002; and Nevitt 
and Fabozzi, 2000, as cited in Irwin, 2007). So under this definition risks differ 
from uncertainty through a greater degree of predictability. Risks will interact with 
the key financing variables in the sense that a project with a high degree of 
perceived risks will result in shorter investment horizons, increased equity 
requirements, reduced debt maturity, and larger debt and equity risk premiums. 
This will affect the amount, timing and availability of funds for project finance. The 
investment and financing decisions that private players will make in response to 
steps taken in the enabling environment are: 
 
- Manipulating the availability of their funds (i.e. to invest or not, how much 
to invest or loan);  
- Choosing an ownership option and financing structure 
- Setting the cost of their funds 
- Determining the set of requirements and covenants under which they will 
make their funds available 
- Setting their key financing terms and variables 
 
Investors and financiers will choose to divert funds away from uncertain or risky 
markets and if they do choose to invest their funds will be limited, offered with 
stricter terms and at a higher cost. In South Africa it is the gaps in the regulatory 
framework which have the direct result of creating uncertainty and increasing the 
level of perceived regulatory risk in the South African wind power sector.  
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So the inaction from the public players on defining the set of barriers will have the 
result of limiting the availability and cost of funding; increasing the overall cost to 
IPP’s in supplying energy through more costly debt; and thereby eroding investor 
returns. 
 
8.2. CONCLUSION 
 
There is an overall positive attitude towards investment and financing IPP project 
financed wind power projects in South Africa however due to the high degree of 
perceived uncertainties in the enabling environment the availability and cost of 
project funds will be restrictive until the policy, legislative and regulatory 
framework defines these uncertainties. The broad set of uncertainties revolve 
around: the lack of a common and transparent understanding due to the missing 
overall policy objectives for the electricity sector; the confusing set of legislation 
and regulation that do not detail the clarity as to how these policy objectives will 
be met; and the overall dominance Eskom due to its multiple and somewhat 
conflicting roles in the electricity sector. These broader uncertainties form the 
context for the specific barriers to an investor and financier friendly environment 
which cover the undefined project documentation such as the PPA, the grid 
connection process and how the selection criteria will apply. 
 
Investors and financiers respond to uncertainty through the manipulation of their 
key financing terms and variables. It is these vehicles that set the amount, terms, 
requirements and costs or returns that financiers and investors require to invest 
when exposed to a certain level of uncertainty or risks. The key financing terms 
and variables will be changed along a spectrum of favourable to restrictive in the 
presence of a higher degree of perceived uncertainties and risks. This movement 
has the effect of either protecting the financier or investor through a greater 
restriction on the amount of funds they invest or through increasing the value 
they receive for taking on a higher degree of uncertainties and risk.  
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Risks differ to uncertainty through a greater degree of predictability so the 
variation in value of uncertainties can be expected to be larger than that of risks. 
So the key financing variables are expected to be more restrictive in a market 
with more uncertainty than that of a market with more predictable risks. This is 
the case in the ranges expressed by the exploratory interviews for South Africa, 
which were generally closer to the restrictive end of the spectrum when 
compared to the ranges sourced from the literature.  
 
So there is sufficient commitment and capacity in the financing landscape for IPP, 
project financed wind power projects in South Africa. This is characterised by 
readily available funding which is communicated by the overwhelming interest 
from potential financiers and investors. However, the project specific cost and 
terms on which these funds will be extended are largely undefined as there is no 
first project and insufficient certainty in the enabling environment. 
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